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June 2000 - This study of trade flows among and between nine Russian regions and 14 republics of the former Soviet Union shows a bias toward domestic trade in the reform period that is primarily the result of tariffs. In addition, old linkages - such as infrastructure, business networks, and production and consumption chains - have limited the reorientation of trade. Djankov and Freund study the effects of trade barriers and the persistence of past linkages on trade flows in the former Soviet Union. Estimating a gravity equation on trade among and between nine Russian regions and 14 former Soviet republics, they find that Russian regions traded 60 percent more with each other than with republics in the reform period (1994-96). By contrast, the Russian regions did not trade significantly more with each other than with republics in the prereform period (1987-90). The results suggest that the bias toward domestic trade in the reform period is primarily the result of tariffs. In addition, past linkages - such as infrastructure, business networks, and production and consumption chains - have limited the reorientation of trade. This paper-a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department-is part of a larger effort in the department to promote economic liberalization.
LTC --- M1 --- Reform --- Roads and Highways --- Transport --- VD --- ZDV --- Armenia --- Azerbaijan --- Belarus --- Estonia --- Georgia --- IRU --- Latvia --- Lithuania --- Moldova --- Tajikistan --- Turkmenistan --- Ukraine --- Uzbekistan
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Architecture --- Architecture --- Architecture --- Architecture --- Architecture --- Architecture --- History --- History --- History --- History --- History --- History --- Hendaye (France) --- Hondarribia (Spain) --- Irún (Spain) --- Buildings, structures, etc. --- Buildings, structures, etc. --- Buildings, structures, etc.
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The author studies the persistence of inequality and inefficient governance in a physical capital accumulation model with perfect information, missing credit markets, and endogenous barriers to entry. When access to investment opportunities is regulated, rent-seeking entrepreneurs form coalitions of potentially varying size to bribe a regulator to restrict entry. Small coalitions run short of resources, while large coalitions suffer more severe free-rider problems. The distribution of wealth thus determines the equilibrium coalition structure of the economy and consequently the level of regulatory capture. A dynamic analysis supports the persistence of inefficiencies in the long run. Initial conditions determine whether the economy converges to a steady state characterized by efficient governance and low levels of inequality, or a path toward an institutional trap where regulatory capture and wealth inequality reinforce each other. This paper-a product of the Poverty Team, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the determinants of institutions.
Agents --- Bargaining --- Consensus --- Corruption --- Entry --- GDP --- Gi --- Index --- Institutional Change --- Iru --- Licensing --- Ms --- Nature --- Production --- Roads and Highways --- Supply --- Transport --- Vd --- Vdu --- Wealth --- Wealth Constraints --- Zdv
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Evidence from Uganda shows that poor public provision of infrastructure services - proxied by an unreliable and inadequate power supply - significantly reduces productive private investment; Lack of private investment is a serious policy problem in many developing countries, especially in Africa. Despite recent structural reform and stabilization, the investment response to date has been mixed, even among the strongest reformers. The role of poor infrastructure and deficient public services has received little attention in the economic literature, where the effect of public spending and investment on growth is shown to be at best ambiguous. Reinikka and Svensson use unique microeconomic evidence to show the effects of poor infrastructure services on private investment in Uganda. They find that poor public capital, proxied by an unreliable and inadequate power supply, significantly reduces productive private investment. Firms can substitute for inadequate provision of public capital by investing in it themselves. This comes at a cost, however: the installation of less productive capital. These results have clear policy implications. Although macroeconomic reforms and stabilization are necessary conditions for sustained growth and private investment, without an accompanying improvement in the public sector's performance, the private supply response to macroeconomic policy reform is likely to remain limited. This paper - a product of Public Economics and Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to study public service delivery and economic growth. The authors may be contacted at rreinikka@worldbank.org or jsvensson@worldbank.org.
Bottlenecks --- Capital Stock --- Debt Markets --- Emerging Markets --- Employment --- Equipment --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Infrastructure --- Interest --- Interest Rates --- International Economics & Trade --- Investment --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Investment Rate --- Investment Rates --- IRU --- Labor Policies --- M1 --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Non Bank Financial Institutions --- Prices --- Private Sector Development --- Prof Standard Errors --- Roads and Highways --- Social Protections and Labor --- Statistics --- Tax --- Taxes --- Trade and Regional Integration --- Transport --- Vdu
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