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Group liability is often portrayed as the key innovation that led to the explosion of the microcredit movement, which started with the Grameen Bank in the 1970s and continues on today with hundreds of institutions around the world. Group lending claims to improve repayment rates and lower transaction costs when lending to the poor by providing incentives for peers to screen, monitor, and enforce each other's loans. However, some argue that group liability creates excessive pressure and discourages good clients from borrowing, jeopardizing both growth and sustainability. Therefore, it remains unclear whether group liability improves the lender's overall profitability and the poor's access to financial markets. The authors worked with a bank in the Philippines to conduct a field experiment to examine these issues. They randomly assigned half of the 169 pre-existing group liability 'centers' of approximately twenty women to individual-liability centers (treatment) and kept the other half as-is with group liability (control). We find that the conversion to individual liability does not affect the repayment rate, and leads to higher growth in center size by attracting new clients.

Bank Policy --- Conversion --- Debt Markets --- Exchange --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Markets --- Good --- Group Lending --- Joint Liability --- Lender --- Liability --- Loans --- Micro-Enterprises --- Microcred Microfinance --- Poverty --- Repayment --- Repayment Rate --- Repayment Rates --- Social Capital --- Transaction --- Transaction Costs

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Competing theories increasingly support the positive role of social capital in small loan default costs of group lending; at the same time, potential group collusion may increase loan delinquencies. Findings from the available literature are mixed on the role of the various attributes of group lending. But past studies suffer from estimation bias due to the unobserved sorting behavior of group members and their other attributes. This paper attempts to resolve that estimation bias by utilizing longitudinal data from 297 Grameen Bank groups since their inceptions. A dynamic lagged dependent model with correction for time-varying heterogeneity of group and individual behavior is applied to estimate the effect of group liability in the Grameen Bank. The results suggest that group liability matters in both loan disbursement and repayment, with women less of a credit risk than men and women's groups more homogeneous than men's. Finally, the benefits of social capital outweigh the costs of group collusion, especially for women's groups, thereby reducing overall default rates. The risk-pooling behavior of diverse men's groups increases men's repayment behavior. Overall, group lending as practiced by Grameen Bank appears to increase repayment rates.

Agriculture --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Group lending --- Group liability --- Loan delinquencies --- Microfinance --- Rural Development --- Small loan default costs --- Social capital

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Using two new datasets, the authors examine whether the presence of banks affects the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions. They find evidence that competition matters. Greater bank penetration in the overall economy is associated with microbanks pushing toward poorer markets, as reflected in smaller average loans sizes and greater outreach to women. The evidence is particularly strong for microbanks relying on commercial funding and using traditional bilateral lending contracts (rather than the group lending methods favored by microfinance nongovernmental organizations). The analysis considers plausible alternative explanations for the correlations, including relationships that run through the nature of the regulatory environment and the structure of the banking environment; but it fails to find strong support for these alternative hypotheses.

Access to Finance --- Bank branch --- Banking system --- Banks --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Collateral --- Commercial banks --- Debt Markets --- Deposit --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Access --- Financial depth --- Financial institutions --- Financial services --- Group lending --- International Bank --- Loan --- Loan sizes --- Low-income borrowers --- Microfinance --- Microfinance institutions --- Outreach --- Profitability --- Repayment