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This research thesis aimed to better understand the employees perceptions of dealing with free-rider consumers in a multichannel environment. Indeed, we studied the retail employee perceived threat and disadvantages of free-riding. In order to achieve this, we conducted a qualitative research using semi-structured interviews. After analyzing the results, we identified different disadvantages perceived by retail employee regarding the free-riding behavior.
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This volume brings together 8 previously unpublished papers dealing with various modes of allocating jointly consumable goods (i.e. public goods). The issues covered range from voluntary contributions and price exclusion (market allocation) to positive and normative analyses of different political allocation procedures for public goods. Given this wide spectrum of allocative schemes for public goods there does not seem to be an easy and clear-cut message from modern public-goods theory to public allocation policy.
Public goods. --- Free rider problem (Economics) --- Free riding (Economics) --- Public goods problem (Economics) --- Economics --- Public goods --- Willingness to pay --- Goods, Public --- Finance, Public --- Welfare economics
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This paper examines whether countries consider the welfare of other nations when they make water development decisions. The paper estimates econometric models of the location of major dams around the world as a function of the degree of international sharing of rivers. The analysis finds that dams are more prevalent in areas of river basins upstream of foreign countries, supporting the view that countries free ride in exploiting water resources. There is weak evidence that international water management institutions reduce the extent of such free-riding.
Dams --- Dams and Reservoirs --- Free Riding --- International Waters --- River Basin Management --- Water & Industry --- Water Resource --- Water Resources --- Water Supply & Systems --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions
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A natural history of cheating from selfish genes to lying politiciansNature is rife with cheating. Possums play possum, feigning death to cheat predators. Crows cry wolf to scare off rivals. Amphibians and reptiles are inveterate impostors. Even genes and cells cheat. The Liars of Nature and the Nature of Liars explores the evolution of cheating in the natural world, revealing how dishonesty has given rise to wondrous diversity.Blending cutting-edge science with a wealth of illuminating examples—from microscopic organisms to highly intelligent birds and mammals—Lixing Sun shows how cheating in nature relies on two basic rules. One is lying, by which cheaters exploit honest messages in communication signals and use them to serve their own interests. The other is deceiving, by which cheaters exploit the biases and loopholes in the sensory systems of other creatures. Sun demonstrates that cheating serves as a potent catalyst in the evolutionary arms race between the cheating and the cheated, resulting in a biological world teeming with complexity and beauty.Brimming with insight and humor, The Liars of Nature and the Nature of Liars also looks at the prevalence of cheating in human society, identifying the kinds of cheating that spur innovation and cultural vitality and laying down a blueprint for combatting malicious cheating such as fake news and disinformation.
Adaptation (Biology) --- Environmental adaptation --- Adaptation, Environmental --- Biology --- Self-organizing systems --- Variation (Biology) --- Biological fitness --- Genetics --- Alternative reproductive tactics. --- Arms race. --- Camouflage. --- Cheating. --- Communication. --- Deception. --- Delusion. --- Disinformation. --- Evolution. --- Free riding. --- Honest signaling. --- Illusion. --- Infidelity. --- Lying. --- Mimicry. --- Natural selection. --- Nest/brood parasitism. --- Placebo effect. --- Self-deception. --- Sexual selection. --- Chicanery --- Deceit --- Subterfuge --- Truthfulness and falsehood --- Intrigue
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This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences.
Economic history --- European Union (EU), spatial autoregression and connectivity --- alliance --- strategic free riding --- Nash equilibrium --- terror cycles --- terror paths --- counterterror policy --- conflict dynamics --- asymmetric conflict --- continuous game --- national security --- Blotto game --- imperfect information --- machine learning --- terrorism --- game theory --- hybrid threats --- state competition --- prospect theory --- grand strategy --- retaliation --- counterterror --- coalition --- backlash --- conflict --- contests --- momentum --- n/a
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This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences.
Economic history --- European Union (EU), spatial autoregression and connectivity --- alliance --- strategic free riding --- Nash equilibrium --- terror cycles --- terror paths --- counterterror policy --- conflict dynamics --- asymmetric conflict --- continuous game --- national security --- Blotto game --- imperfect information --- machine learning --- terrorism --- game theory --- hybrid threats --- state competition --- prospect theory --- grand strategy --- retaliation --- counterterror --- coalition --- backlash --- conflict --- contests --- momentum --- n/a
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This book contributes to the literature on conflict and terrorism through a selection of articles that deal with theoretical, methodological and empirical issues related to the topic. The papers study important problems, are original in their approach and innovative in the techniques used. This will be useful for researchers in the fields of game theory, economics and political sciences.
European Union (EU), spatial autoregression and connectivity --- alliance --- strategic free riding --- Nash equilibrium --- terror cycles --- terror paths --- counterterror policy --- conflict dynamics --- asymmetric conflict --- continuous game --- national security --- Blotto game --- imperfect information --- machine learning --- terrorism --- game theory --- hybrid threats --- state competition --- prospect theory --- grand strategy --- retaliation --- counterterror --- coalition --- backlash --- conflict --- contests --- momentum --- n/a
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Outlining the major competing theories in the history of political and moral philosophy--from Locke and Hume through Hart, Rawls, and Nozick--John Simmons attempts to understand and solve the ancient problem of political obligation. Under what conditions and for what reasons (if any), he asks, are we morally bound to obey the law and support the political institutions of our countries?
Social ethics --- Political philosophy. Social philosophy --- Allegiance --- Justice --- Political ethics --- Ethics, Political --- Ethics in government --- Government ethics --- Political science --- Politics, Practical --- Ethics --- Civics --- Injustice --- Conduct of life --- Law --- Common good --- Fairness --- Loyalty, Political --- Political loyalty --- Loyalty --- Citizenship --- Patriotism --- Moral and ethical aspects --- Allegiance. --- Justice. --- Political ethics. --- Politische Verantwortung. --- Politische Ethik. --- Bentham, Jeremy. --- Chapman, John. --- Ewing, A. C. --- Feinberg, Joel. --- Hobbes, Thomas: on consent. --- Ladd, John. --- Lyons, David. --- McPherson, Thomas. --- Nozick, Robert. --- Plamenatz, J. P. --- Socrates. --- acceptance of benefits. --- authority. --- benefits of government. --- citizenship. --- disobedience. --- domains, significance of. --- free riding. --- justice: and consent. --- legal obligation. --- legitimate government. --- natural duty. --- open benefits. --- participant. --- positional duties. --- special relationships. --- traditional approach.
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Individual decision making can often be wrong due to misinformation, impulses, or biases. Collective decision making, on the other hand, can be surprisingly accurate. In Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore demonstrates that the very factors behind the superiority of collective decision making add up to a strong case for democracy. She shows that the processes and procedures of democratic decision making form a cognitive system that ensures that decisions taken by the many are more likely to be right than decisions taken by the few. Democracy as a form of government is therefore valuable not only because it is legitimate and just, but also because it is smart. Landemore considers how the argument plays out with respect to two main mechanisms of democratic politics: inclusive deliberation and majority rule. In deliberative settings, the truth-tracking properties of deliberation are enhanced more by inclusiveness than by individual competence. Landemore explores this idea in the contexts of representative democracy and the selection of representatives. She also discusses several models for the "wisdom of crowds" channeled by majority rule, examining the trade-offs between inclusiveness and individual competence in voting. When inclusive deliberation and majority rule are combined, they beat less inclusive methods, in which one person or a small group decide. Democratic Reason thus establishes the superiority of democracy as a way of making decisions for the common good.
Democracy. --- Democracy --- Majorities. --- Philosophy. --- Elections --- Representative government and representation --- Voting --- Minorities --- Self-government --- Political science --- Equality --- Republics --- Majorities --- Philosophy --- E-books --- Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. --- Condorcet Jury Theorem. --- Miracle of Aggregation. --- authoritarian objection. --- cognitive artifacts. --- cognitive diversity. --- collective decision making. --- collective decision. --- collective intelligence. --- collective prediction. --- contemporary democratic theory. --- counters. --- critical literature survey. --- crowdsourcing. --- deliberation. --- democracy. --- democratic decision making. --- democratic deliberation. --- democratic institutions. --- democratic intelligence. --- democratic norms. --- democratic politics. --- democratic reason. --- democratic theory. --- democratic unreason. --- descriptive representation. --- dialogical deliberation. --- doctrinal paradox. --- dumb many. --- elected enlightened. --- epistemic democracy. --- epistemic failures. --- epistemic improvements. --- epistemic performance. --- fact. --- group polarization. --- human decision making. --- inclusive deliberation. --- incompetent multitude. --- individual decision making. --- individual reason. --- informational free riding. --- judgment aggregation. --- majority rule. --- maze. --- metaethical views. --- political cognitivism. --- political incompetence. --- politics. --- random lotteries. --- social cognitive artifacts. --- systematic biases. --- talkers. --- theory of reasoning. --- transformative epistemic properties. --- value. --- voting paradox. --- voting.
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Alexander Schuessler has done what many deemed impossible: he has wedded rational choice theory and the concerns of social theory and anthropology to explain why people vote. The "paradox of participation"--why individuals cast ballots when they have virtually no effect on electoral outcomes--has long puzzled social scientists. And it has particularly troubled rational choice theorists, who like to describe political activity in terms of incentives. Schuessler's ingenious solution is a "logic of expressive choice." He argues in incentive-based (or "economic") terms that individuals vote not because of how they believe their vote matters in the final tally but rather to express their preferences, allegiances, and thus themselves. Through a comparative history of marketing and campaigning, Schuessler generates a "jukebox model" of participation and shows that expressive choice has become a target for those eliciting mass participation and public support. Political advisers, for example, have learned to target voters' desire to express--to themselves and to others--who they are. Candidates, using tactics such as claiming popularity, invoking lifestyle, using ambiguous campaign themes, and shielding supporters from one another can get out their vote even when it is clear that an election is already lost or won. This important work, the first of its kind, will appeal to anyone seeking to decipher voter choice and turnout, social movements, political identification, collective action, and consumer behavior, including scholars, graduate students, and upper-level undergraduates in political science, economics, sociology, anthropology, and marketing. It will contribute greatly to our understanding and prediction of democratic participation patterns and their consequences.
Rational choice theory --- Voting --- Political participation --- Rational choice theory. --- Social choice --- Ansolabehere, Stephen. --- Appadurai, Arjun. --- Bartels, Larry. --- Bonaccorso, John. --- Brennan, Geoffrey. --- Carter, Jimmy. --- Clinton, Bill. --- Diamond, Edwin. --- Durkheim, Emile. --- Edelman, Murray. --- Eisenhower, Dwight D. --- Ferejohn, John. --- Giddens, Anthony. --- Goodman, Robert. --- Haug, Wolfgang. --- Herbst, Susan. --- Hotelling, Harold. --- Iyengar, Shanto. --- Jamieson, Kathleen Hall. --- Johnson, Lyndon. --- King, Gary. --- Lennon, John. --- Lennons Problem. --- Lifestyle. --- Mickelson, Sig. --- Nagler, Jonathan. --- Nixon, Richard. --- Olson, Mancur. --- Page, Benjamin. --- Riker, William. --- Scib. --- Tedlow, Richard. --- Verba, Sidney. --- Walker, Mary. --- Wright, Gerald. --- abstention. --- bandwagons (momentum). --- biographical narratives. --- chaos theorem. --- commodification. --- composition of utility. --- electoral campaigns. --- expressive tipping model. --- free-riding. --- identity (attachment). --- marketing. --- opinion polls. --- paradox of participation. --- participation costs. --- public goods. --- rational ignorance. --- selective incentives. --- snob-good. --- turnout. --- Voting. --- Political participation. --- Balloting --- Polls --- Elections --- Politics, Practical --- Suffrage --- Citizen participation --- Community action --- Community involvement --- Community participation --- Involvement, Community --- Mass political behavior --- Participation, Citizen --- Participation, Community --- Participation, Political --- Political activity --- Political behavior --- Political rights --- Social participation --- Political activists
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