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Banking regulation is an economically powerful and politically very salient instrument of economic policy. After all, the financial crisis had derived from an over-leveraged banking system obviating the importance of banking regulation for the functioning of regulatory capitalism. Gundbert Scherf’s research focuses on this nexus between integrated banking, supranational monetary policy and national banking regulation. He finds that national level differences in financial systems and related institutions explain and drive variation in regulatory financial stability policy across countries. Applying game-theoretical rigor to political economy interactions, Gundbert Scherf develops a model of time-inconsistent supervisory policy as well as international competition in regulatory standards. He shows how these patterns lead to financial instability, by analyzing the original members of the Euro Zone as well as the US and the UK in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2007/8.     Contents ·         Varieties of financial systems and regulatory preferences ·         Banking regulation in an integrating financial market ·         Interaction of banking supervision and monetary policy ·         Time consistency problems in supervisory policy      Target Groups ·         Researchers and students in the fields of economics, political economy, and finance interested in financial systems, regulation and supervisory policy ·         Central bankers, regulators, and executives in banking and finance    The Author Dr. Gundbert Scherf wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Henrik Enderlein, Chair of Political Economy, at the Freie Universität Berlin.

European Union countries -- Economic conditions -- 21st century. --- European Union countries -- Economic policy. --- Eurozone. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries. --- Monetary unions -- European Union countries. --- Economic stabilization --- Banking law --- Banks and banking --- Business & Economics --- Finance --- Banking --- Economic Theory --- Government policy --- Banks and banking, Central --- Monetary unions --- Economics. --- Management science. --- Economics, general. --- Economic theory --- Political economy --- Social sciences --- Economic man --- Quantitative business analysis --- Management --- Problem solving --- Operations research --- Statistical decision

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Intergovernmental tax relations --- subsidiarite --- impots indirects --- subsidiariteit --- indirecte belastingen --- Fiscal policy --- Subsidiarity --- Taxation --- droit fiscal --- harmonisation fiscale --- pays de la ce --- taxation --- Political science --- Sociology --- Federal-provincial tax relations --- Federal-state tax relations --- State-local tax relations --- Tax relations, Intergovernmental --- Tax sharing --- Federal government --- Intergovernmental fiscal relations --- Law and legislation --- fiscaal recht --- fiscale harmonisatie --- eg landen --- aanslag --- Subsidiarity. --- European Union --- Droit fiscal --- Fiscal policy - European Union countries --- Taxation - Law and legislation - European Union countries --- Intergovernmental tax relations - European Union countries

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The paper analyzes some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact. Greater "procedural" flexibility in the Pact's implementation may improve welfare. Procedural flexibility designates the enforcer's room to apply judgment on underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality measures. Budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy; therefore, better monitoring and greater transparency would increase the benefits from procedural flexibility. Overall, a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending, and increase high-quality outlays.

Budget deficits -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Monetary policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Structural adjustment (Economic policy) -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Macroeconomics --- Public Finance --- Fiscal Policy --- Institutions and the Macroeconomy --- General Aggregative Models: General --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Public finance & taxation --- Structural reforms --- National accounts --- Fiscal policy --- Expenditure --- Fiscal governance --- National income --- Expenditures, Public --- Germany --- Monetary policy --- Budget deficits --- Structural adjustment (Economic policy) --- Econometric models.

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is central to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in Europe. Initiated by Germany in 1995 and adopted in 1997, it regulates the fiscal policies of European Union Member States. Following numerous violations of its deficit reference value, the Pact's Excessive Deficit Procedure was suspended in 2003. The decision to suspend was brought before the European Court of Justice in 2004 and the SGP then underwent painstaking reform in 2005. After a period of economic prosperity and falling budgetary deficits, the global economic crisis put the system under renewed stress. Ruling Europe presents a comprehensive analysis of the political history of the SGP as the cornerstone of EMU. It examines the SGP through different theoretical lenses, offering a fascinating study of European integration and institutional design. One cannot understand the Euro without first understanding the SGP.

Money. Monetary policy --- European Union --- Fiscal policy --- Monetary policy --- Politique fiscale --- Politique monétaire --- European Union countries --- Pays de l'Union européenne --- Economic integration. --- Intégration économique --- Economic integration --- EEC / European Union - EU -Europese Unie - Union Européenne - UE --- 334.151.20 --- 331.31 --- 336.451 --- -339.5094 --- Ui1 --- Monetary management --- Economic policy --- Currency boards --- Money supply --- Economische en monetaire unie van de Europese Gemeenschappen: algemeenheden. --- Economisch beleid. --- Begrotingsjaren en begrotingsstaten. Rijksmiddelenbegroting. Begrotingstekort. --- Politique monétaire --- Pays de l'Union européenne --- Intégration économique --- 339.5094 --- Economisch beleid --- Economische en monetaire unie van de Europese Gemeenschappen: algemeenheden --- Begrotingsjaren en begrotingsstaten. Rijksmiddelenbegroting. Begrotingstekort --- Social Sciences --- Political Science --- Fiscal policy - European Union countries --- Monetary policy - European Union countries --- European Union countries - Economic integration --- Pacte de stabilité et de croissance (1997) --- Union économique et monétaire --- Stabilisation économique --- Développement économique

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The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates. The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation. Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules, have more ambiguous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures, as others have also found. However, our most robust, and hopeful, finding is that budget institutions-mechanisms and rules of the budget process-that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.

Budget -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Elections -- Economic aspects -- European Union countries. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Fiscal policy -- European Union countries -- Econometric models. --- Political Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Public Finance --- Budget --- Fiscal policy --- Elections --- Econometric models. --- Economic aspects --- Electoral politics --- Franchise --- Polls --- Tax policy --- Taxation --- Budgeting --- Government policy --- Political science --- Politics, Practical --- Plebiscite --- Political campaigns --- Representative government and representation --- Economic policy --- Finance, Public --- Expenditures, Public --- Forecasting --- Labor --- Macroeconomics --- Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General --- Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook: General --- National Budget, Deficit, and Debt: General --- National Budget --- Budget Systems --- National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General --- Fiscal Policy --- Debt --- Debt Management --- Sovereign Debt --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Budgeting & financial management --- Public finance & taxation --- Labour --- income economics --- Budget planning and preparation --- Expenditure --- Fiscal stance --- Public debt --- Unemployment rate --- Public financial management (PFM) --- Debts, Public --- Unemployment --- Poland, Republic of --- Income economics