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The book, first published in 2002, examines circuit court decision making on issues not clearly covered by existing precedents. Its central questions are to what extent circuit judges' choices to adopt legal rules are influenced by the actions of other circuit judges and whether judges attempt to decide legal issues as they think the Supreme Court would in their place. Evidence comes from quantitative analyses of several hundred cases and from interviews with two dozen circuit court judges. The evidence indicates that judges give attention to the work of colleagues on their own court and other circuits and that the actions, prestige, and expertise of these colleagues are important. On the other hand, while Supreme Court precedents factor heavily in the circuit judges' decisions, expectations as to how the Supreme Court might decide appear to have little effect on their actions. These findings suggest that legal and policy goals influence judges' decision-making.

Appellate courts --- Judicial process --- Federal courts --- Social Sciences --- Political Science

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Judges --- District courts --- Appellate courts --- Selection and appointment --- Federal courts

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This book looks at the U.S. Middle District Court of Florida, which represents about 1/2 of Florida's population and is one of the busiest courts in the state, interpreting and applying Supreme Court decisions in cases such as the Terry Schaivo "right to die" case.

Justice, Administration of --- District courts --- History. --- United States. --- Federal courts

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"Courts are key players in the dynamics of federal countries since their rulings have a direct impact on the ability of governments to centralize and decentralize power. Courts in Federal Countries examines the role high courts play in thirteen countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Nigeria, Spain, and the United States. The volume's contributors analyse the centralizing or decentralizing forces at play following a court's ruling on issues such as individual rights, economic affairs, social issues, and other matters. The thirteen substantive chapters have been written to facilitate comparability between the countries. Each chapter outlines a country's federal system, explains the constitutional and institutional status of the court system, and discusses the high court's jurisprudence in light of these features. Courts in Federal Countries offers insightful explanations of judicial behaviour in the world's leading federations."--

Constitutional courts --- Federal government --- Cours constitutionnelles --- Gouvernement fédéral --- Constitutional courts. --- Federal government. --- Verfassungsgericht --- Föderalismus --- Einheitsstaat --- Rechtsvergleich --- Federal courts

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How did the federal judiciary transcend early limitations to become a powerful institution of American governance? How did the Supreme Court move from political irrelevance to political centrality? Building the Judiciary uncovers the causes and consequences of judicial institution-building in the United States from the commencement of the new government in 1789 through the close of the twentieth century. Explaining why and how the federal judiciary became an independent, autonomous, and powerful political institution, Justin Crowe moves away from the notion that the judiciary is exceptional in the scheme of American politics, illustrating instead how it is subject to the same architectonic politics as other political institutions. Arguing that judicial institution-building is fundamentally based on a series of contested questions regarding institutional design and delegation, Crowe develops a theory to explain why political actors seek to build the judiciary and the conditions under which they are successful. He both demonstrates how the motivations of institution-builders ranged from substantive policy to partisan and electoral politics to judicial performance, and details how reform was often provoked by substantial changes in the political universe or transformational entrepreneurship by political leaders. Embedding case studies of landmark institution-building episodes within a contextual understanding of each era under consideration, Crowe presents a historically rich narrative that offers analytically grounded explanations for why judicial institution-building was pursued, how it was accomplished, and what--in the broader scheme of American constitutional democracy--it achieved.

Courts --- Judiciary --- Dispute resolution (Law) --- Judicial districts --- Law --- Procedure (Law) --- Judicial power --- Jurisdiction --- Justice, Administration of --- History. --- Law and legislation --- Federal courts --- Adjective law --- Legal procedure --- Practice (Legal procedure) --- Procedural law --- Practice --- Procedure --- Procedure (Law). --- Judicial power. --- Courts. --- Justiciability --- Power, Judicial --- Constitutional law --- Implied powers (Constitutional law) --- Judicial independence --- Separation of powers