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Book
Love the Job... or the Patient? : Task vs. Mission-Based Motivations in Health Care
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2018 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : The World Bank,

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Abstract

A booming literature has argued that mission-based motives are a central feature of mission-oriented labor markets. This paper shifts the focus to task-based motivation and finds that it yields significantly more effort than mission-based motivation. Moreover, in the presence of significant task motivation, mission motivation has no additional effect on effort. The evidence emerges from experiments with nearly 250 medical and nursing students in Burkina Faso. The students exert effort in three tasks, from boring to interesting. In addition, for half of the students, mission motivation is present: their effort on the task generates benefits for a charity. Two strong results emerge. First, task motivation has an economically important effect on effort, more than doubling effort. Second, mission motivation increases effort, but only for mundane tasks and not when the task is interesting. Moreover, even for mundane tasks, the effects of mission motivation appear to be less than those of task motivation.


Book
Was Weber Right? : The Effects of Pay for Ability and Pay for Performance on Pro-Social Motivation, Ability and Effort in the Public Sector
Authors: ---
Year: 2015 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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This paper examines the effects of pecuniary compensation on the ability and motivation of individuals in organizations with non-pecuniary or pro-social missions. In particular, the paper compares flat pay systems, unrelated with ability or effort, to two other systems that are considered superior: high-powered, pay for performance schemes and more traditional, "Weberian" schemes that calibrate pay to ability, independent of effort. The analysis uses a sample of future public sector workers and finds that all three pay schemes attract motivated workers into tasks with a pro-social mission. However, flat pay schemes also attract low ability workers. In the short run, pay-for-performance schemes generate higher effort than flat pay and pay-for-ability systems, a difference driven entirely by effects on unmotivated workers. Once selection effects are accounted for, however, workers with pay for ability and pay for performance exert statistically indistinguishable levels of effort in the pro-social task. Moreover, pay for ability elicits effort at lower cost than pay for performance.


Book
Intrinsic Motivation, Effort and the Call to Public Service
Authors: ---
Year: 2013 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Pay schemes in the public sector aim to attract motivated, high-ability applicants. A nascent literature has found positive effects of higher pay on ability and no or slightly positive effects on motivation. This paper revisits this issue with a novel subject pool, students destined for the private and public sectors in Indonesia. The analysis uses dictator games and real effort tasks to examine wage effects on a measure of motivation that exactly matches the mission of the public sector task. The model and experimental design allow for precisely measuring (1) the distribution of ability over the effort task; (2) the distribution of motivational preferences for public sector missions; and (3) outside options when choosing to work for public sector missions. Three novel conclusions emerge. First, more pro-social workers do, in fact, exert higher effort in a pro-social task. Second, in contrast to previous research, motivated individuals are more likely to join the public sector when public sector pay is low than when it is high. Third, real public sector workers exhibit greater pro-sociality than private sector workers, even for entrants into the Indonesian Ministry of Finance.


Book
Was Weber Right? : The Effects of Pay for Ability and Pay for Performance on Pro-Social Motivation, Ability and Effort in the Public Sector
Authors: ---
Year: 2015 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Export citation

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Bookmark

Abstract

This paper examines the effects of pecuniary compensation on the ability and motivation of individuals in organizations with non-pecuniary or pro-social missions. In particular, the paper compares flat pay systems, unrelated with ability or effort, to two other systems that are considered superior: high-powered, pay for performance schemes and more traditional, "Weberian" schemes that calibrate pay to ability, independent of effort. The analysis uses a sample of future public sector workers and finds that all three pay schemes attract motivated workers into tasks with a pro-social mission. However, flat pay schemes also attract low ability workers. In the short run, pay-for-performance schemes generate higher effort than flat pay and pay-for-ability systems, a difference driven entirely by effects on unmotivated workers. Once selection effects are accounted for, however, workers with pay for ability and pay for performance exert statistically indistinguishable levels of effort in the pro-social task. Moreover, pay for ability elicits effort at lower cost than pay for performance.

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