Listing 1 - 10 of 31 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Choose an application
Pierre Jacob est l'un de nos (rares) philosophes analytiques. Son livre, publié simultanément en anglais par Cambridge University Press et en français, entreprend de résoudre deux questions : les choses ont-elles un sens et nos représentations sont-elles des processus cérébraux dotés de propriétés sémantiques ? Deuxièmement, nos représentations peuvent-elles expliquer nos comportements ? Pierre Jacob montre comment la solution du dilemme précédent permet de donner une réponse affirmative à cette question. En même temps qu'il apporte une contribution originale, ce livre offre un exposé magistral de l'état des discussions sur ces questions en philosophie analytique. Pierre Jacob, philosophe, est directeur de recherche au C. N. R. S.
Choose an application
Many of our deepest disagreements turn on matters of definition. Philosophers discuss the definitions of knowledge, art, truth, and freedom, and social and political questions about personhood, health and disease, marriage and gender are also commonly thought of as turning in part on definitions. This book contributes to our understanding of how we engage with questions and disagreements of this kind. It argues that disputes about matters of definition are not just about the meanings of words or our concepts, and they do not typically involve change of meaning. Instead, it develops a conception of definition on which engaging in an investigation or a discussion helps determine the meanings of our words without changing them; what is determined is the meaning our words had all along. This temporal externalist view—that what happens at the end of our investigation or discussion can play a role in determining what we meant and thought throughout—puts us in a position to see why typical ways we engage with questions of definition make sense, and are not confused or in need of revision. The book develops this style of view in unprecedented detail and shows how it helps make sense not only of definitional disputes, but also of disagreements about matters of taste (such as discussions of whether a particular food is delicious, or a certain film is funny.) Its defense of temporal externalism includes powerful new criticisms of competing philosophical views about verbal dispute, metalinguistic negotiation, inconsistent concepts, conceptual engineering, and relativism.
Choose an application
Externalism (Philosophy of mind). --- Cognition --- Philosophy of mind. --- Philosophy.
Choose an application
Putnam is one of the most influential philosophers of recent times, and his authority stretches far beyond the confines of the discipline. However, there is a considerable challenge in presenting his work both accurately and accessibly. This is due to the width and diversity of his published writings and to his frequent spells of radical re-thinking. But if we are to understand how and why philosophy is developing as it is, we need to attend to Putnam's whole career. He has had a dramatic influence on theories of meaning, semantic content, and the nature of mental phenomena, on interpretations of quantum mechanics, theory-change, logic and mathematics, and on what shape we should desire for future philosophy. By presenting the whole of his career within its historical context, de Gaynesford discovers a basic unity in his work, achieved through repeated engagements with a small set of hard problems. By foregrounding this integrity, the book offers an account of his philosophy that is both true to Putnam and helpful to readers of his work.
Putnam, Hilary --- Externalism (Philosophy of mind) --- History --- Putnam, Hilary. --- Putnam, H. --- Putnam, Khilary --- Externalism (Philosophy of mind) - History - 20th century.
Choose an application
Choose an application
Philosophical anthropology --- Theory of knowledge --- Externalism (Philosophy of mind) --- Philosophy of mind
Choose an application
"The advances in artificial intelligence and robotics are increasingly calling into question the distinction between simulation and reality of the human person. On the one hand, they suggest a computeromorphic understanding of human intelligence, and on the other, an anthropomorphic view of AI systems. In other words: We increasingly view ourselves as our machines, and conversely, our machines as ourselves. So what is the difference between human and artificial intelligence? And can artificial intelligence achieve consciousness at some point? The chapter argues that an embodied view of consciousness and the person establishes a notion of intelligence that cannot be reduced to information processing"--
Externalism (Philosophy of mind) --- Artificial intelligence. --- Technology --- Social aspects. --- Artificial intelligence --- Social aspects --- Technology - Social aspects
Choose an application
Choose an application
An argument that activity provides a useful template for thinking about representation and that deeds are themselves representational: our representing of the world consists, in part, in certain sorts of deeds that we perform in the world.
Listing 1 - 10 of 31 | << page >> |
Sort by
|