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Duty

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A substantially new account of obligation, inspired by major thinkers in the Continental traditionBryan Lueck offers a substantially new solution to a classic philosophical problem: how is it possible that morality genuinely obligates us, binding us without regard to our perceived or actual well-being? Staging a fruitful dialogue between the analytic and Continental philosophical traditions, while reflecting specifically on the work of Hegel, Merleau-Ponty, Serres and Nancy, Lueck offers a creative new approach. Building on Immanuel Kant’s fact of reason – the idea that being a moral subject presupposes that one has accepted the bindingness of obligation – Lueck shows that moral obligation must be rethought as the fact of sense.Key FeaturesPresents a substantially new approach to the classic philosophical problem of the source of normativity Provides a detailed account of the history of western philosophical reflection on obligation Develops the ethical implications of the work of 20th century and contemporary Continental philosophers who are not typically regarded as moral philosophers Suggests new and fruitful paths of research on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Serres and Nancy"

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"This chapter explains the four principal issues that are explored in this book. The four items on the Putative Contrasts List summarize these issues: (1) Both moral responsibility and moral obligation require freedom but whereas, seemingly, the former does not require freedom to do otherwise, the latter does. (2) Semicompatibilism regarding responsibility (or obligation) is the thesis that even if determinism is incompatible with freedom to do otherwise, it is compatible with responsibility (or obligation). Arguably, while responsibility semicompatibilism is plausible, obligation semicompatibilism is far less tenable. (3) Externalism about responsibility or obligation is the view that how you acquire apt antecedents of action, such as beliefs, desires, and values, may influence whether you are responsible for, or are morally obligated to do, something. It appears that whereas responsibility externalism is true, there is little or no reason to believe that obligation externalism is true. (4) While obligations can change with time's passage, blameworthiness cannot. The general conclusion argued for is that the only item on this list that captures a real difference is item (3). Obligation and responsibility are far more similar to each other than items (1), (2), and (4) suggest. A chapter-by-chapter synopsis concludes the discussion"--

Duty --- Responsibility