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Few forms of market exchange intrigue economists as do auctions, whose theoretical and practical implications are enormous. John Kagel and Dan Levin, complementing their own distinguished research with papers written with other specialists, provide a new focus on common value auctions and the "winner's curse." In such auctions the value of each item is about the same to all bidders, but different bidders have different information about the underlying value. Virtually all auctions have a common value element; among the burgeoning modern-day examples are those organized by Internet companies such as eBay. Winners end up cursing when they realize that they won because their estimates were overly optimistic, which led them to bid too much and lose money as a result. The authors first unveil a fresh survey of experimental data on the winner's curse. Melding theory with the econometric analysis of field data, they assess the design of government auctions, such as the spectrum rights (air wave) auctions that continue to be conducted around the world. The remaining chapters gauge the impact on sellers' revenue of the type of auction used and of inside information, show how bidders learn to avoid the winner's curse, and present comparisons of sophisticated bidders with college sophomores, the usual guinea pigs used in laboratory experiments. Appendixes refine theoretical arguments and, in some cases, present entirely new data. This book is an invaluable, impeccably up-to-date resource on how auctions work--and how to make them work.

Auctions --- Paradoxes --- Value --- 381.17 --- Standard of value --- Cost --- Economics --- Exchange --- Wealth --- Prices --- Supply and demand --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Bailments --- Commercial law --- Auctions. --- Paradoxes. --- Value. --- E-books

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Internet auctions. --- Auctions --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Bailments --- Commercial law --- Online auctions --- Electronic commerce --- Computer network resources. --- eBay (Firm) --- eBay Inc. --- ebay.com

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Law of obligations. Law of contract --- Comparative law --- Tort and negligence --- United Kingdom --- France --- Auctions --- Vente aux enchères --- Law and legislation --- Droit --- Vente aux enchères --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Bailments --- Commercial law

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A guide to modeling and analyzing auctions, with the applications of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction decision making.

Auctions --- Game theory --- Commerce --- Business & Economics --- Marketing & Sales --- Auctions. --- Game theory. --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Mathematical models --- Mathematics --- Bailments --- Commercial law --- E-books --- ECONOMICS/Microeconomics --- ECONOMICS/Game Theory

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Through accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard re

Auctions --- Game theory --- Mathematical models --- Game theory. --- Games, Theory of --- Theory of games --- Mathematics --- Dutch auctions --- Vendues --- Bailments --- Commercial law --- Mathematical models. --- Vente aux enchères --- Théorie des jeux --- Modèles mathématiques --- Auctions - Mathematical models