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Economic and financial analysis provides the bridge between the identification of technical options and the development of bankable interconnection project proposals to facilitate cross-border electricity trade. The overarching goal of this guidebook is to document a methodology for economic and financial analysis of potential investments to facilitate regional electricity trade, which serves to inform decision-makers on policy choices, and subsequently to inform the detailed project appraisal. This guidebook has been prepared as part of the work program of the Pan Arab Regional Electricity Trade Platform (PA-RETP). This guidebook is focused on the appraisal of power-transmission-line investments to facilitate regional electricity trade.
Cost-Benefit Analysis --- Discount Rate --- Electric Power --- Energy --- Energy Policies and Economics --- Energy Subsidies --- Energy Trade
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Discount. --- Investments --- Social aspects. --- Discount --- 355 --- AA / International- internationaal --- Investing --- Investment management --- Portfolio --- Finance --- Disinvestment --- Loans --- Saving and investment --- Speculation --- Bank discount --- Discount rate --- Social aspects --- Milieu
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The social discount rate measures the rate at which a society would be willing to trade present for future consumption. As such it is one of the most critical inputs needed for cost-benefit analysis. This paper presents estimates of the social discount rates for nine Latin American countries. It is argued that if the recent track record in terms of growth in the region is indicative of future performance, estimates of the social discount rate would be in the 3-4 percent range. However, to the extent that the region improves on its past performance, the social discount rate to be used in the evaluation of projects would increase to the 5-7 percent range. The paper also argues that if the social planner gives a similar chance to the low and high growth scenario, the discount rate should be dependent on the horizon of the project, declining from 4.4 percent for a 25-year horizon to less than 4 percent for a 100-year horizon.
Achieving Shared Growth --- Debt Markets --- Discount rate --- Discount rates --- Economic Theory & Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Inequality --- International bank --- Opportunity cost --- Poverty Reduction --- Private investment --- Public investment --- Public sector borrowing --- Rate of return --- Tax --- Tax regime
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This mixed methods study investigates why fewer than one in five impact evaluations integrates a value-for-money analysis of the development intervention being evaluated. This study distills four main insights from combined analysis of 33 semi-structured and unstructured interviews, surveys of 497 policy makers and 16 journal editors, and portfolio analyses of World Bank and worldwide impact evaluations. The study finds that low levels of training in cost data collection and analysis methods, together with a lack of standardization of the value-for-money assumptions (e.g., time horizons, discount rates, and economic or financial cost accounting) limit value-for-money integration into impact evaluations. Further eroding researchers' incentives, demand for cost evidence from the journals that publish impact evaluations is mixed. Ill-defined standards of rigor undermine editors' capacity to evaluate the quality of value-for-money analysis when it is integrated with impact evaluation evidence. Institutional funders of impact evaluations do not consistently demand that cost analysis be integrated into their funded evaluations. This study finds no evidence in support of the myth that policymakers do not demand cost evidence. Rather, it finds that researchers have few ways of knowing what kind of analysis policymakers need and when they need it. Improving the stock of impact evaluators who are cross trained in value-for-money methods, establishing standards in what constitutes rigor in costing, resolving methodological issues, and improving linkages between policymakers and researchers would lead to greater integration of value-for-money methods in impact evaluations.
Cost Accounting --- Cost-Benefit Analysis --- Cost-Effectiveness --- Development Economics and Aid Effectiveness --- Discount Rate --- Impact Evaluation --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Science and Technology Development --- Standards and Technical Regulations --- Statistical and Mathematical Sciences --- Time Horizon --- Value For Money
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The social discount rate measures the rate at which a society would be willing to trade present for future consumption. As such it is one of the most critical inputs needed for cost-benefit analysis. This paper presents estimates of the social discount rates for nine Latin American countries. It is argued that if the recent track record in terms of growth in the region is indicative of future performance, estimates of the social discount rate would be in the 3-4 percent range. However, to the extent that the region improves on its past performance, the social discount rate to be used in the evaluation of projects would increase to the 5-7 percent range. The paper also argues that if the social planner gives a similar chance to the low and high growth scenario, the discount rate should be dependent on the horizon of the project, declining from 4.4 percent for a 25-year horizon to less than 4 percent for a 100-year horizon.
Achieving Shared Growth --- Debt Markets --- Discount rate --- Discount rates --- Economic Theory & Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Inequality --- International bank --- Opportunity cost --- Poverty Reduction --- Private investment --- Public investment --- Public sector borrowing --- Rate of return --- Tax --- Tax regime
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This background paper describes five different tools that can be used for the assessment of tax incentives by governments in low income countries' (LICs). The first tool (an application of cost-benefit analysis) provides an overarching framework for assessment. Evaluations of the various costs and benefits of tax incentives are vital for informed decision making, but are rarely undertaken, partly because it can be a difficult exercise that is demanding in terms of data needs. The next three tools (tax expenditure assessment, corporate micro simulation models, and effective tax rate models) can be used as part of a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis, to shed light on particular aspects. Effective tax rate models shed light on the implications of tax parameters - including targeted tax incentives - on investment returns and help understand the implications of reform for expected investment outcomes. The document presents two tools for assessing the transparency and governance of tax incentives in LICs. These discuss principles in transparency and governance of tax incentives, and allow for benchmarking existing LIC practices against better alternatives.
Accounting --- Bonds --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Developing Countries --- Discount Rate --- Emerging Markets --- Equity --- Expenditures --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Foreign Direct Investment --- Global Economy --- Globalization --- Income Tax --- Inflation --- Insurance --- Intangible Assets --- Legal Framework --- Life Insurance --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Opportunity Cost --- Private Sector Development --- Public Finance --- Rule of Law --- Tax Administration --- Tax Exemptions --- Tax Policy --- Taxation & Subsidies --- Taxes --- Telecommunications --- Transparency
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There is a common perception that low productivity or low growth is due to what can be called an "innovation shortfall," usually identified as a low rate of investment in research and development (R&D) when compared with some high innovation countries. The usual reaction to this perceived problem is to call for increases in R&D investment rates, usually specifying a target that can be as high as 3 percent of GDP. The problem with this analysis is that it fails to see that a low R&D investment rate may be appropriate given the economy's pattern of specialization, or may be just one manifestation of more general problems that impede accumulation of all kinds of capital. How can we know when a country suffers from an innovation shortfall above and beyond the ones that should be expected given the country's specialization and accumulation patterns? This is the question the authors tackle in this paper. First, they show a simple way to estimate the R&D gap that can be explained by a country's specialization pattern, illustrating it for the case of Chile. For this country they find that although its specialization in natural-resource-intensive sectors explains part of its R&D gap, a significant shortfall remains. Second, the authors show how a calibrated model can be used to determine the R&D gap that should be expected given a country's investment in physical and human capital. If the actual R&D gap is above this expected gap, then one can say that the country suffers from a true innovation shortfall.
Allocation --- Debt Markets --- Discount rate --- E-Business --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economics --- Factors of production --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- GDP --- Human capital --- International trade --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Productivity --- Specialization --- Stock of capital
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There are three stakeholders in a public-private partnership (PPP), (a) the government in office, (b) private firms (financial and non-financial) and investors (individual and institutional), and (c) final beneficiaries (taxpayers or users, present and future). The raison detre of PPPs is threefold: (i) to crowd in private firms and investors into projects that they will otherwise not undertake; (ii) to transfer to the private sector a significant part of the risks and costs that the government would otherwise fully absorb; and (iii) to ensure that the projects efficiency/quality is at least equal to that obtained if the government alone carried all costs and risks. Important (yet often ignored) implications follow. First, outsourcing (e.g., construction and maintenance) to the private sector does not by itself constitute a PPP if all risks and costs are, in one way or another, still borne by the government. Second, a PPP does not reduce total risk; it simply distributes it differently, involving private sector firms and investors. Third, the total costs borne by the final beneficiaries would be lower under a PPP (compared to a project whose costs and risks rest completely in the governments balance sheet) only if the PPP achieves efficiency gains; otherwise, what beneficiaries save in taxes they will pay in user fees, although, under a PPP, more of the costs would be assigned to direct beneficiaries/users, than to taxpayers at large. Fourth, that a PPP can provide (cash) budget relief may be a welcome corollary for the government in office but it is not a core objective of a PPP.
Access to Finance --- Accounting --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bonds --- Capital Markets --- Commercial Banks --- Contracts --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Default --- Discount Rate --- Due Diligence --- Economic Development --- Emerging Markets --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Services --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- Insurance --- Jurisdiction --- Life Insurance --- Loans --- Long-Term Finance --- Outsourcing --- Private Participation in Infrastructure --- Private Sector Development --- Public Finance --- Public-Private Partnerships --- Savings --- Taxes
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This paper uses an analytically tractable intertemporal framework for analyzing the dynamic pricing of a utility with an underdeveloped network (a typical case in most developing countries) facing a competitive fringe, short-run network adjustment costs, theft of service, and the threat of a retaliatory regulatory review that is increasing with the price it charges. This simple dynamic optimization model yields a number of powerful policy insights and conclusions. Under a variety of plausible assumptions (in the context of developing countries) the utility will find its long-run profits enhanced if it exercises restraint in the early stages of network development by holding price below the limit defined by the unit costs of the fringe. The utility's optimal price gradually converges toward the limit price as its network expands. Moreover, when the utility is threatened with retaliatory regulatory intervention, it will generally have incentives to restrain its pricing behavior. These findings have important implications for the design of post-privatization regulatory governance in developing countries.
Choice --- Consumers --- Costs --- Debt Markets --- Demand --- Discount Rate --- Diseconomies of Scale --- E-Business --- Economic Efficiency --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Incentives --- Investment --- Low Tariffs --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal Costs --- Markets and Market Access --- Monopoly --- Optimization --- Prices --- Pricing --- Private Sector Development --- Profit Maximization --- Profits --- Urban Water Supply and Sanitation --- Utility --- Variables --- Water Supply and Sanitation --- Welfare
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Contingent liabilities create management problems for governments. They have a cost, but judging what the cost is and whether it is worth incurring is difficult. Except in the case of contingent liabilities created by simple guarantees of debt, governments usually can incur contingent liabilities without budgetary approval or recognition in the governments accounts. So governments may prefer contingent liabilities to other obligations. (The uncertainty surrounding contingent liabilities can work differently. It is well known that PPPs create contingent liabilities, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and others often warn of the risks. The initial reaction of a cautious Ministry of Finance may be to seek to avoid all contingent liabilities.) Management problems also arise once a government has incurred a contingent liability. Projects need to be monitored to reduce risks if possible. Spending on contingent liabilities must sometimes be forecast, despite the difficulty.
Accounting --- Auctions --- Bankruptcy --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Contracts --- Credibility --- Debt Markets --- Default --- Deposit Insurance --- Developing Countries --- Discount Rate --- Equity --- Exchange Rates --- Expenditures --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crisis --- Financial Management --- Gross Domestic Product --- Inflation --- Information Technology --- Insurance --- Political Economy --- Property Rights --- Public Sector Development --- Risk Management --- Rule of Law --- Securities --- Tariffs --- Transparency --- Transport
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