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Book
Eurobonds : A Quantitative Analysis of Joint-Liability Debt
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Year: 2019 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : The World Bank,

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Abstract

This paper assesses the consequences of implementing a joint liability debt system in a two-country small open economy model. With joint liability a default of one country makes the other participant liable for its debt. The results highlight a trade-off between the contagion risk, in the sense that this instrument may push some member states to default even though they are individually solvent, and cheaper access to credit on average, since lenders are at risk only if no participating sovereign is willing to service the debt. The findings suggest that the welfare consequences of this policy proposal hinge critically on the timing of its introduction: Introducing such instruments at the peak of the Eurozone crisis would have helped the Periphery and harm the Core member states, while its adoption during normal times has the potential to make all participants better-off.


Book
How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification.


Book
Has the Global Banking System Become More Fragile over Time?
Authors: ---
Year: 2011 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in the global banking system. The authors construct a default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk for more than 1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three-year period leading to the financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results support an increase in scope for intra-national supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for "too-connected-to-fail" institutions that can impose significant externalities.


Book
Has the Global Banking System Become More Fragile over Time?
Authors: ---
Year: 2011 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

This paper examines time-series and cross-country variations in default risk co-dependence in the global banking system. The authors construct a default risk measure for all publicly traded banks using the Merton contingent claim model, and examine the evolution of the correlation structure of default risk for more than 1,800 banks in more than 60 countries. They find that there has been a significant increase in default risk co-dependence over the three-year period leading to the financial crisis. They also find that countries that are more integrated, and that have liberalized financial systems and weak banking supervision, have higher co-dependence in their banking sector. The results support an increase in scope for intra-national supervisory co-operation, as well as capital charges for "too-connected-to-fail" institutions that can impose significant externalities.


Book
Foreign Bank Subsidiaries' Default Risk During the Global Crisis : What Factors Help Insulate Affiliates from Their Parents?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2014 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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This paper examines the association between the default risk of foreign bank subsidiaries and their parents during the global financial crisis, with the purpose of understanding what factors can help insulate affiliates from their parents. The paper finds evidence of a significant positive correlation between parent banks' and foreign subsidiaries' default risk. This correlation is lower for subsidiaries that have higher capital, retail deposit funding, and profitability ratios and that are more independently managed from their parents. Host country regulations also influence the extent to which shocks to the parents affect the subsidiaries' default risk. In particular, the correlation between the default risk of the subsidiary and the parent is lower for subsidiaries operating in countries that impose higher capital, reserve, provisioning, and disclosure requirements and tougher restrictions on bank activities.


Book
How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability?
Authors: --- ---
Year: 2012 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification.


Book
Is There A Distress Risk Anomaly ? : Corporate Bond Spread As A Proxy for Default Risk
Authors: ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

Although financial theory suggests a positive relationship between default risk and equity returns, recent empirical papers find anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities of default. The authors show that returns to distressed stocks previously documented are really an amalgamation of anomalies associated with three stock characteristics - leverage, volatility and profitability. In this paper they use a market based measure - corporate credit spreads - to proxy for default risk. Unlike previously used measures that proxy for a firm's real-world probability of default, credit spreads proxy for a risk-adjusted (or a risk-neutral) probability of default and thereby explicitly account for the systematic component of distress risk. The authors show that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures, such as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters. They do not find default risk to be significantly priced in the cross-section of equity returns. There is also no evidence of firms with high default risk delivering anomalously low returns.


Book
The Sovereign-Bank Nexus in EMDEs : What is it, is it Rising, and What are the Policy Implications?
Authors: ---
Year: 2019 Publisher: Washington, D.C. : The World Bank,

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This paper explores the sovereign-bank nexus in emerging markets and developing economies: the interconnectedness between the health of the sovereign and the banking system. Data from 140 emerging markets and developing economies suggest that this nexus is rising. First, banks have increased their exposure to their sovereigns in the past decade. Second, government debt has grown, and fiscal positions have deteriorated, raising the specter of sovereign stress. Third, banking system assets and bank credit to the private sector have steadily increased, which may restrict the sovereign's capacity to contain a banking crisis. Fourth, empirical evidence from 36 emerging markets and developing economies documents the existence of the nexus and suggests that it has increased recently. However, deeper country analysis is required for a better understanding of the sovereign-bank nexus, given country idiosyncrasies, including the structure of sovereign debt and the composition of the investor base, and data lags and opacities. To minimize the adverse effects of the sovereign-bank nexus, efforts should be focused on maintaining fiscal and bank buffers, strengthening surveillance and supervision of the banking system, improving transparency and data quality of bank-sovereign linkages, better addressing the regulatory treatment of the sovereign exposures and government support of the banking sector, and carefully evaluating the policy trade-offs in the sovereign-bank nexus.


Book
Is There A Distress Risk Anomaly ? : Corporate Bond Spread As A Proxy for Default Risk
Authors: ---
Year: 2010 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

Although financial theory suggests a positive relationship between default risk and equity returns, recent empirical papers find anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities of default. The authors show that returns to distressed stocks previously documented are really an amalgamation of anomalies associated with three stock characteristics - leverage, volatility and profitability. In this paper they use a market based measure - corporate credit spreads - to proxy for default risk. Unlike previously used measures that proxy for a firm's real-world probability of default, credit spreads proxy for a risk-adjusted (or a risk-neutral) probability of default and thereby explicitly account for the systematic component of distress risk. The authors show that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures, such as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters. They do not find default risk to be significantly priced in the cross-section of equity returns. There is also no evidence of firms with high default risk delivering anomalously low returns.

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