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How creditors came to wield unprecedented power over heavily indebted countries-and the dangers this poses to democracyThe European debt crisis has rekindled long-standing debates about the power of finance and the fraught relationship between capitalism and democracy in a globalized world. Why Not Default? unravels a striking puzzle at the heart of these debates-why, despite frequent crises and the immense costs of repayment, do so many heavily indebted countries continue to service their international debts?In this compelling and incisive book, Jerome Roos provides a sweeping investigation of the political economy of sovereign debt and international crisis management. He takes readers from the rise of public borrowing in the Italian city-states to the gunboat diplomacy of the imperialist era and the wave of sovereign defaults during the Great Depression. He vividly describes the debt crises of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s and sheds new light on the recent turmoil inside the Eurozone-including the dramatic capitulation of Greece's short-lived anti-austerity government to its European creditors in 2015.Drawing on in-depth case studies of contemporary debt crises in Mexico, Argentina, and Greece, Why Not Default? paints a disconcerting picture of the ascendancy of global finance. This important book shows how the profound transformation of the capitalist world economy over the past four decades has endowed private and official creditors with unprecedented structural power over heavily indebted borrowers, enabling them to impose painful austerity measures and enforce uninterrupted debt service during times of crisis-with devastating social consequences and far-reaching implications for democracy.

Debts, Public --- History. --- Amsterdam capital market. --- Argentina. --- Bank of Greece. --- Brady debt restructuring. --- Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. --- European debt crisis. --- Great Depression. --- Greece. --- Greek debt crisis. --- IMF. --- International Monetary Fund. --- King Philip II. --- Latin America. --- Mexico. --- Syriza party. --- bailout. --- bankers' alliance. --- bonds. --- capitalism. --- capitalist economy. --- conditional lending. --- contract enforcement. --- credit class. --- credit repayment. --- credit-money. --- credit. --- creditors. --- cross-border contract. --- debt crisis. --- debt moratorium. --- debt repayment. --- debt restructuring. --- debt service. --- debt servicing. --- debtor compliance. --- debtor discipline. --- default. --- democracy. --- democratic institutions. --- emergency lending. --- enforcement mechanism. --- external debt. --- finance. --- financial crisis. --- fiscal distress. --- foreign credit. --- foreign debt servicing. --- foreign investment. --- global finance. --- globalization. --- intermediary. --- international creditors. --- international crisis management. --- international debts. --- international lending. --- internationalization. --- lending cycles. --- long-term reputation. --- market discipline. --- power. --- public debt. --- repayment. --- short-term credit. --- social costs. --- solvency. --- sovereign debt crises. --- sovereign debt repayment. --- sovereign debt. --- sovereign default. --- spillover costs. --- structural power. --- syndicated lending. --- trade sanctions.

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This paper studies the role of morality in the decision to repay debts. Using a field experiment with a large Islamic bank in Indonesia, the paper finds that moral appeals strongly increase credit card repayments. In this setting, all of the banks late-paying credit card customers receive a basic reminder to repay their debt one day after they miss the payment due date. In addition, two days before the end of a ten-day grace period, clients in a treatment group also receive a text message that cites an Islamic religious text and states that "non-repayment of debts by someone who is able to repay is an injustice." This message increases the share of customers meeting their minimum payments by nearly 20 percent. By contrast, sending either a simple reminder or an Islamic quote that is unrelated to debt repayment has no effect on the share of customers making the minimum payment. Clients also respond more strongly to this moral appeal than to substantial financial incentives: receiving the religious message increases repayments by more than offering a cash rebate equivalent to 50 percent of the minimum repayment. Finally, the paper finds that removing religious aspects from the quote does not change its effectiveness, suggesting that the moral appeal of the message does not necessarily rely on its religious connotation.

Access to credit --- Adverse selection --- Arrears --- Assets --- Bank indonesia --- Banking --- Bankruptcy and resolution of financial distress --- Banks and banking reform --- Borrowers --- Checking account --- Collect debts --- Collections --- Communications --- Consumer choice --- Consumer choices --- Credit card --- Credit card debt --- Credit control --- Credit market --- Current debt --- Customer service --- Customers --- Debt --- Debt forgiveness --- Debt markets --- Debt relief --- Debt repayment --- Debtor --- Debts --- Default --- Deposit --- E-Business --- Emerging markets --- Equity --- Equity fund --- Estate private sector development --- Ethical behavior --- Ethical global equity --- Ethical global equity fund --- Exchange --- Fair trade --- Finance and financial sector development --- Financial development --- Financial products --- Forgiveness --- Gambling --- Global equity --- Goods --- Grace period --- Grants --- Human capital --- Human rights --- Income --- Indebted --- Indebted poor countries --- Insurance --- Interest --- Interest rate --- Interest rates --- Interested party --- International bank --- Investment --- Investment management --- Investor --- Islamic bank --- Islamic law --- Late payment --- Law --- Liquidity --- Liquidity constraint --- Loan --- Loan repayment --- Moral hazard --- Moral suasion --- Mortgage --- New credit --- Outsourcing --- Outstanding debt --- Partner bank --- Payment --- Payments --- Peer pressure --- Penalties --- Penalty --- Political economy --- Portfolio --- Price --- Pricing --- Property --- Public debt --- Real estate --- Repayment --- Repayment behavior --- Repayment of debt --- Repayment of debts --- Repayment rate --- Repayment rates --- Responsible investment --- Restructuring --- Revenue --- Risk --- Saving --- Savings --- Savings account --- Savings accounts --- Services --- Share --- Shares --- Socially responsible investment --- Sovereign debt --- Stocks --- Student debt --- Student loans --- Trade --- Usury laws