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This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of "local" and "national" are context specific. A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility's catchment area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians: because of "spillover" effects, local politicians have a greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a national politician as they capture only a portion of the political gains from utility performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other electoral jurisdictions within the utility's catchment area. The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity cooperative's catchment area for national politicians. The authors illustrate this framework through case studies of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy implications.
Economic Theory & Research --- Electoral Jurisdiction --- Electric Utility --- Energy --- Intra-Country Variation --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Political Economy --- Political Systems and Analysis --- Politics and Government --- Power Sector --- Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures --- Utility Performance Improvements
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This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of "local" and "national" are context specific. A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility's catchment area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians: because of "spillover" effects, local politicians have a greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a national politician as they capture only a portion of the political gains from utility performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other electoral jurisdictions within the utility's catchment area. The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity cooperative's catchment area for national politicians. The authors illustrate this framework through case studies of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy implications.
Economic Theory & Research --- Electoral Jurisdiction --- Electric Utility --- Energy --- Intra-Country Variation --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Political Economy --- Political Systems and Analysis --- Politics and Government --- Power Sector --- Public Sector Corruption & Anticorruption Measures --- Utility Performance Improvements
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November 1999 - It is difficult to choose the best model for forecasting real per capita GDP for a particular country or group of countries. This study suggests potential gains from combining time series and growth-regression-based approaches to forecasting. Kraay and Monokroussos consider two alternative methods of forecasting real per capita GDP at various horizons: Univariate time series models estimated country by country; Cross-country growth regressions. They evaluate the out-of-sample forecasting performance of both approaches for a large sample of industrial and developing countries. They find only modest differences between the two approaches. In almost all cases, differences in median (across countries) forecast performance are small relative to the large discrepancies between forecasts and actual outcomes. Interestingly, the performance of both models is similar to that of forecasts generated by the World Bank's Unified Survey. The results do not provide a compelling case for one approach over another, but they do indicate that there are potential gains from combining time series and growth-regression-based forecasting approaches. This paper - a product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to improve the understanding of economic growth. The authors may be contacted at akraay@worldbank.org or gmonokroussos@worldbank.org.
Actual Outcomes --- Country Variation --- Cross-Country Growth Regressions --- Economic Forecasting --- Explanatory Variables --- First-Order --- Forecast --- Forecast Performance --- Forecasting --- Future Growth --- Growth Forecasts --- Growth Models --- Growth Projections --- Growth Regression --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Popular Empirical Framework --- Relative Forecast Performance --- Sample Forecasting --- Time Series --- Time Series Model --- Time Series Models --- Time Series Variation
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