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This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.

Bribe --- Bribes --- Business Transactions --- Corrupt --- Corrupt Officials --- Corrupt Practices --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Crime and Society --- Democracy --- E-Business --- Graft --- Multinational --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Social Development

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This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly to firms' experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.

Bribe --- Bribes --- Business Transactions --- Corrupt --- Corrupt Officials --- Corrupt Practices --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Crime and Society --- Democracy --- E-Business --- Graft --- Multinational --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Social Development

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Well-functioning institutions matter for economic development. In order to operate effectively, public institutions must also inspire confidence in those they serve. The authors use data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very large global household survey, to document a quantitatively large and statistically significant negative correlation between corruption and confidence in public institutions. This suggests an important channel through which corruption can inhibit development by eroding confidence in public institutions. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of controls for country and respondent-level characteristics, and they show how it can plausibly be interpreted as reflecting at least in part a causal effect from corruption to confidence. The authors also show that individuals with low confidence in institutions exhibit low levels of political participation, show increased tolerance for violent means to achieve political ends, and have a greater desire to "vote with their feet" through emigration.

Banks --- Bribe --- Bribery --- Bribes --- Confidence --- Corrupt --- Corrupt acts --- Corruption --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Corruption in government --- Corruption perceptions --- Corruption perceptions index --- Crony --- Government Diagnostic Capacity Building --- Integrity --- Judicial system --- Judiciary --- Police --- Political corruption --- Poverty Monitoring and Analysis --- Poverty Reduction --- Public official --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Transparency --- Violence

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January 2000 - What aspects of institution building most affect the transition to a market economy? In terms of effects on per capita income and school enrollment, the rule of law may be most important. In terms of life expectancy, the quality of the bureaucracy plays a more crucial role. Campos presents measures with which to map institution building during the transition from centrally planned to market economies. Data collection and indicators are measured in terms of five institutional dimensions of governance: Accountability of the executive; Quality of the bureaucracy; Rule of law; Character of policymaking process; Strength of civil society. Campos highlights the differences over time and between Central and Eastern European countries and those of the former Soviet Union. In terms of effects on per capita income and school enrollment, Campos finds the rule of law to be the most important institutional dimension, both for the sample as a whole and for differences between the two regions. In terms of life expectancy, however, the quality of the bureaucracy plays the most crucial role. One important message Campos draws from the results is that institutions do change over time and are by no means as immutable as the literature has suggested. The range of feasible policy choices (for changing institutions) may be much wider than is often assumed. This paper is a product of Development Policy, Development Economics Senior Vice Presidency. The author may be contacted at nauro.campos@cerge.cuni.cz.

Accountability --- Bureaucracy --- Bureaucratic Quality --- Civil Society --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Data Collection --- Economic Development --- Economic Growth --- Good Governance --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- Growth Rates --- Indicators --- Institutional Change --- Institutional Framework --- Institutional Reform --- Institutions --- Market Economy --- National Governance --- Per Capita Income --- Property Rights --- Public Sector Corruption and Anticorruption Measures --- Rule Of Law --- Transition Economies

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No systematic study has examined the effect of post-conflict justice on the duration of peace on a global basis. This paper attempts to fill that void by building on a newly constructed dataset (Binningsbo, Elster, and Gates 2005), which reports the presence of various forms of post-conflict justice efforts (trials, purges, reparation to victims, and truth commissions) as well as processes associated with abstaining from post-conflict justice (amnesty and exile). It investigates the long-term effects of post-conflict justice on the duration of peace after conflict. It uses a Cox proportional hazard model to analyze the influence of the various types of post-conflict justice on the length of the peace period before the recurrence of violent conflict. Post-conflict trials as well as other types of justice do lead to a more durable peace in democratic as well as non-democratic societies, but the results are weak and are therefore difficult to generalize. Forms of non-retributive justice (that is, reparations to victims and truth commissions), however, are strongly associated with the duration of peace in democratic societies, but are not significant for non-democratic societies. Amnesty tends to be destabilizing and generally associated with shorter peace duration, but exile tends to lead to a more durable peace.

Atrocities --- Civil War --- Civil Wars --- Compromise --- Conflict --- Conflict and Development --- Corruption and Anticorruption Law --- Deterrence --- Fighting --- Human Rights --- International Community --- International Law --- International Treaties --- Massacres --- Peace --- Peace and Peacekeeping --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Post Conflict Reintegration --- Rebels --- Reconciliation --- Social Conflict and Violence --- Social Development --- University --- Victims --- Violence --- Violent Conflict --- Weapons