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Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why (The World Bank, 1998) generated a new wave of controversy about foreign aid and policy conditionality that had seen several decades of intense debate. Much of the recent debate has focused on the aid-growth relationship and the role of "good" policies. While a great deal has been said about qualitative aspects of aid effectiveness (that is, fungibility, among other things), little attention has been paid so far to some important quantitative aspects. Ranaweera draws attention to this neglected aspect of the aid debate to show that the level of aid requirements of a country is an equally important and integral part of aid and aid effectiveness. The author compares the World Bank/IMF approaches to estimation of external assistance requirements of a country in quantitative terms with an alternative model, the "balance of payments constrained growth model" (based on the Harrod trade multiplier). He finds that the latter model is not a real alternative as it is an incomplete model. More important, he shows that international financial institutions use these quantitative frameworks in a very flexible and pragmatic way to carry on a meaningful policy dialogue with both donors and recipient countries, which has an important bearing on aid effectiveness. This paper--a product of the Development Data Group--is part of an ongoing effort to improve quantitative analytical tools for country assistance strategies.
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Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why (The World Bank, 1998) generated a new wave of controversy about foreign aid and policy conditionality that had seen several decades of intense debate. Much of the recent debate has focused on the aid-growth relationship and the role of "good" policies. While a great deal has been said about qualitative aspects of aid effectiveness (that is, fungibility, among other things), little attention has been paid so far to some important quantitative aspects. Ranaweera draws attention to this neglected aspect of the aid debate to show that the level of aid requirements of a country is an equally important and integral part of aid and aid effectiveness. The author compares the World Bank/IMF approaches to estimation of external assistance requirements of a country in quantitative terms with an alternative model, the "balance of payments constrained growth model" (based on the Harrod trade multiplier). He finds that the latter model is not a real alternative as it is an incomplete model. More important, he shows that international financial institutions use these quantitative frameworks in a very flexible and pragmatic way to carry on a meaningful policy dialogue with both donors and recipient countries, which has an important bearing on aid effectiveness. This paper--a product of the Development Data Group--is part of an ongoing effort to improve quantitative analytical tools for country assistance strategies.
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In retrospect, NATO and EU enlargements can be viewed as fairly simple processes; they admitted states that wanted to be accepted and were lavishly rewarded. In contrast, this study explores the harder politics waged by the much larger regional organizations of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations lack material incentives or instruments of coercion, instead having to work on the basis of shared values. They also face a variety of threats from discordant members. In this book, the author uses internal conditionality to explain how these organizations have cleverly and subtly responded to such difficulties. Drawing on interviews in a range of post-communist countries and with practitioners inside and outside the organizations, the diverse case studies in this book examine issues of conflict, democratization, the death penalty, rewarding high office and retaining institutional membership. The author explores how international organizations which lack powers of compulsion can respond to recalcitrant member-states and offers practical lessons for the international promotion of norms.
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Leaders have used economic power as a tool of foreign policy since at least Pericles, whose trade sanctions against Megara helped to spark the Peloponnesian War. But as Cécile Fabre notes, philosophers have spent relatively little time thinking about the relevant ethics, especially compared with the time they have spent thinking about the ethics of war. Yet the moral questions raised by the use of economic statecraft are significant and complex. Fabre deploys a cosmopolitan theory of justice and the theory of justified harm to answer these questions, and concludes that political actors are morally entitled to resort to economic sanctions and conditional aid, but only as a means to protect human rights, and so long as the harms which they thereby inflict are not out of proportion to the goods they bring about. Moreover, they are morally entitled to resort to conditional lending and conditional debt forgiveness, not just with a view to protect human rights, but also, under certain conditions, to pursue other non-wrongful political goals.--
Economic sanctions --- Economic assistance --- Conditionality (International relations) --- Human rights
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Government lending --- Conditionality (International relations) --- Subsidies --- Law and legislation
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From the anarchy of Somalia to the relative stability of Nepal, fragile and transitional situations represent a broad spectrum of contexts. However, they share some common features: these are risky environments – for the people who live there, for their governments, for neighbouring countries, and for those who seek to provide assistance. Positive outcomes are hard to achieve and the risk of regression in countries emerging from armed conflict is high. International engagement in these situations presents significant risks for donors and implementing partners, but also holds the potential for substantial rewards in terms of improved results and outcomes. Indeed, more often than not, the risks associated with not engaging in these contexts – both for the countries themselves and for the international community – outweigh most of the risks of engaging in the first place. The question therefore is not whether to engage but how to engage in ways that are context-specific and do not come at an unacceptable cost. This publication provides the evidence to help donors understand how to balance risks and opportunities in order to protect the integrity of their institutions while delivering better results to those who need it most.
Political systems --- Conditionality (International relations). --- Economic assistance. --- Economic development --- Economic policy. --- Violence --- Security systems. --- Prevention.
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