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Private enforcement of EC competition law
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ISBN: 9789041126139 9041126139 Year: 2007 Volume: 25 Publisher: Alphen aan den Rijn ; Kluwer Law International,

Global price fixing
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ISBN: 1280864508 9786610864508 3540342222 3540342176 3540786694 Year: 2007 Publisher: Boston : Kluwer Academic,

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The book describes and analyzes the formation, operation, and impacts of modern global cartels. It provides a broad picture of the economics, competition law and history of international price fixing. A deeper understanding of the phenomenon is afforded by intensive case studies of collusion in the markets for lysine, citric acid, and vitamins. Particular attention is given to the economic injuries sustained by the cartels' customers. The author assesses whether antitrust enforcement by the European Union, the United States, and other countries is capable of deterring cartels in the foreseeable future.


Book
The theory of collusion and competition policy
Author:
ISBN: 9780262342995 0262342995 9780262036931 0262036932 0262343002 Year: 2017 Publisher: Cambridge, Massachusetts : The MIT Press,

Interim report of the multimodal group, presented to commisioner Van Miert
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ISBN: 928276964X 9789282769645 Year: 1996 Publisher: Luxembourg EUR-OP

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Keywords

Sea transport. Seaports --- European Union --- Antitrust law --- Concurrence --- Droit --- Price fixing --- Transportation --- Freight and freightage --- Shipping --- Containerization --- Rates --- -Freight and freightage --- -Price fixing --- -Shipping --- -Transportation --- -Public transportation --- Transport --- Transportation, Primitive --- Transportation companies --- Transportation industry --- Locomotion --- Commerce --- Communication and traffic --- Storage and moving trade --- Marine shipping --- Marine transportation --- Maritime shipping --- Ocean --- Ocean traffic --- Ocean transportation --- Sea transportation --- Shipping industry --- Water transportation --- Marine service --- Merchant marine --- Collusion on pricing --- Collusive pricing --- Fixing, Price --- Horizontal price fixing --- Price collusion --- Pricing --- Restraint of trade --- Affreightment --- Cargo --- Freight handling --- Contracts, Maritime --- Materials handling --- Tonnage --- Combined transport --- Container transportation --- Intermodal transportation --- Containers --- -Rates --- -Economic aspects --- Economic aspects --- Freight --- -Containerization --- Public transportation --- Freight transportation --- Freightage --- Price fixing - European Union countries --- Transportation - Rates - European Union countries --- Freight and freightage - Rates - European Union countries --- Shipping - Rates - European Union countries --- Containerization - European Union countries - Rates

Final report of the multimodal group
Authors: ---
ISBN: 9282829340 9789282829349 Year: 1998 Publisher: Luxembourg Office for official publications of the European communities

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The economics of collusion : cartels and bidding rings
Authors: ---
ISBN: 0262017326 0262525941 9786613594167 0262301504 1280498935 9780262525947 0262300737 9780262301503 9781280498930 9780262017329 Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press,

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Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to suppress rivalry that relies on interfirm communication and/or transfers. Rivalry between competitors erodes profits; the suppression of rivalry through collusion is one avenue by which firms can enhance profits. Many cartels and bidding rings function for years in a stable and peaceful manner despite the illegality of their agreements and incentives for deviation by their members. In The Economics of Collusion, Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx offer an examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented, and how it might be detected. Marshall and Marx, who have studied collusion extensively for two decades, begin with three narratives: the organization and implementation of a cartel, the organization and implementation of a bidding ring, and a parent company's efforts to detect collusion by its divisions. These accounts--fictitious, but rooted in the inner workings and details from actual cases--offer a novel and engaging way for the reader to understand the basics of collusive behavior. The narratives are followed by detailed economic analyses of cartels, bidding rings, and detection. The narratives offer an engaging entree to the more rigorous economic discussion that follows. The book is accessible to any reader who understands basic economic reasoning. Mathematical material is flagged with asterisks.

Keywords

Price fixing. --- Cartels. --- Competition. --- Competition --- Competition (Economics) --- Competitiveness (Economics) --- Economic competition --- Commerce --- Conglomerate corporations --- Covenants not to compete --- Industrial concentration --- Monopolies --- Open price system --- Supply and demand --- Trusts, Industrial --- Cartels --- Combinations, Industrial --- Combinations in restraint of trade --- Industrial combinations --- Big business --- Restraint of trade --- Commodity control --- Interlocking directorates --- Collusion on pricing --- Collusive pricing --- Fixing, Price --- Horizontal price fixing --- Price collusion --- Pricing --- Economic aspects --- Law and legislation --- Price fixing --- E-books --- ECONOMICS/Microeconomics --- SOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law --- 338.51 --- 380.22 --- AA / International- internationaal --- 334.75 --- 338.516 --- 347.7 --- 334.75 Bedrijfsconcentraties. Economische concentratie. Monopolies. Fusies. Merger. Kartel. Trust. Antitrust --- Bedrijfsconcentraties. Economische concentratie. Monopolies. Fusies. Merger. Kartel. Trust. Antitrust --- 347.7 Handelsrecht --- Handelsrecht --- 338.516 Markt als prijsmechanisme. Marktmechanisme. Marktprijs. Vrije concurrentie. Monopolistische concurrentie. Oligipolie. Duopolie. Marginale prijsvorming --groothandel-kleinhandelprijs zie {339.3} --- Markt als prijsmechanisme. Marktmechanisme. Marktprijs. Vrije concurrentie. Monopolistische concurrentie. Oligipolie. Duopolie. Marginale prijsvorming --groothandel-kleinhandelprijs zie {339.3} --- Kartels en afspraken --- Concurrentie. Monopolie, duopolie, oligopolie --- Prix --- Concurrence. --- Fixation.


Book
Competition Policy and Price Fixing
Author:
ISBN: 1400846072 9781400846078 9780691158624 0691158622 Year: 2013 Publisher: Princeton, NJ

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Throughout the world, the rule against price fixing is competition law's most important and least controversial prohibition. Yet there is far less consensus than meets the eye on what constitutes price fixing, and prevalent understandings conflict with the teachings of oligopoly theory that supposedly underlie modern competition policy. Competition Policy and Price Fixing provides the needed analytical foundation. It offers a fresh, in-depth exploration of competition law's horizontal agreement requirement, presents a systematic analysis of how best to address the problem of coordinated oligopolistic price elevation, and compares the resulting direct approach to the orthodox prohibition. In doing so, Louis Kaplow elaborates the relevant benefits and costs of potential solutions, investigates how coordinated price elevation is best detected in light of the error costs associated with different types of proof, and examines appropriate sanctions. Existing literature devotes remarkably little attention to these key subjects and instead concerns itself with limiting penalties to certain sorts of interfirm communications. Challenging conventional wisdom, Kaplow shows how this circumscribed view is less well grounded in the statutes, principles, and precedents of competition law than is a more direct, functional proscription. More important, by comparison to the communications-based prohibition, he explains how the direct approach targets situations that involve both greater social harm and less risk of chilling desirable behavior--and is also easier to apply.

Keywords

Price fixing. --- Antitrust law. --- Competition --- Anti-trust law --- Competition law --- Trusts, Industrial --- Commercial law --- Trade regulation --- Collusion on pricing --- Collusive pricing --- Fixing, Price --- Horizontal price fixing --- Price collusion --- Pricing --- Restraint of trade --- Government policy. --- Law and legislation --- Law --- Antitrust law --- Price fixing --- Government policy --- EU Article 101. --- European Union. --- Sherman Act Section 1. --- Supreme Court precedents. --- U.S. antitrust law. --- U.S. lower court. --- adjudication. --- agreement requirement. --- alternative rule. --- burden of proof. --- cheating. --- chilling effects. --- circumstantial evidence. --- classic cartels. --- communication-based prohibition. --- communications technology. --- communications-based prohibition. --- communications. --- competition law. --- competition policy. --- competition rules. --- consumer welfare. --- contrasting approaches. --- conventional prohibition. --- coordinated behavior. --- coordinated oligopoly pricing. --- coordinated price elevation. --- corporate strategy. --- decision-making framework. --- decision-theoretic approach. --- detection. --- deterrence benefits. --- deterrence. --- differentiated products. --- differentiation. --- direct approach. --- game theory. --- homogeneous goods. --- horizontal agreements. --- horizontal-restraints cases. --- indirect approach. --- industry conditions. --- injunctions. --- institutional issues. --- interdependence. --- interdependent coordination. --- interfirm communication. --- interfirm communications. --- internal evidence. --- investigation. --- language. --- liability assessment. --- liability. --- lower courts. --- market behavior. --- market conditions. --- market-based evidence. --- market-based techniques. --- modern competition policy. --- modern oligopoly theory. --- monetary sanctions. --- negative behavioral effects. --- nonprice coordination. --- nonprice terms. --- oligopolies. --- oligopolistic coordination. --- oligopolistic industries. --- oligopolistic price elevation. --- oligopoly behavior. --- oligopoly theory. --- orthodox prohibition. --- paradox of proof. --- polar-opposite cases. --- price coordination. --- price cutting. --- price elevation. --- price fixing. --- price-fixing cases. --- price-fixing prohibition. --- prior scholarship. --- pure interdependence. --- remedies. --- sanctions. --- social welfare consequences. --- social welfare. --- unilateral market power.

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