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Economics --- Economists --- 08 --- 330.08 --- AA / International- internationaal --- History --- Biography --- Biografieën en memoires --- Economisten --- Coase, R. H. --- Coase, Ronald Harry --- Coase, Ronald H.

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Upon hearing that Ronald Coase had been awarded the Nobel Prize, a fellow economist's first response was to ask with whom Coase had shared the Prize. Whether this response was idiosyncratic or not, I do not know; I expect not. Part of this type of reaction can no doubt be explained by the fact that Coase has often been characterized as an economist who wrote only two significant or influential papers: "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) and "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960). And by typical professional standards of "significant" and "influential" (i. e. , widely read and cited), this perception embodies a great deal of truth, even subsequent to Coase's receipt of the Prize. This is not to say that there have not been other important works - "The Marginal Cost Controversy" (1946) and "The Lighthouse in Economics" (1974) come immediately to mind here - only that in a random sample of, say, one hundred economists, one would likely find few who could list a Coase bibliography beyond the two classic pieces noted above, in spite of Coase's significant publication record. ' The purpose of this collection is to assess the development of, tensions within, and prospects for Coasean Economics - those aspects of economic analysis that have evolved out of Coase's path-breaking work. Two major strands of research can be identified here: law and economics and the New Institutional Economics.

Externalities (Economics). --- Institutional economics. --- Law --- Right of property. --- Economic aspects. --- Coase, Ronald H. --- Economies externes --- Institutionnalisme --- Coase, R. H. --- Economic analysis of law --- Law of real property --- Externalities (Economics) --- Droit de propriété --- Droit --- Aspect économique --- Law and economics. --- Economic history. --- Public finance. --- Microeconomics. --- Law and Economics. --- History of Economic Thought/Methodology. --- Public Economics. --- Price theory --- Economics --- Cameralistics --- Public finance --- Public finances --- Currency question --- Economic conditions --- History, Economic --- Economics and jurisprudence --- Economics and law --- Jurisprudence and economics --- Jurisprudence --- Ownership of property --- Private ownership of property, Right of --- Private property, Right of --- Property, Right of --- Property rights --- Right of private ownership of property --- Right of private property --- Right of property --- Right to property --- Civil rights --- Property --- Costs, Social --- External economies and diseconomies --- External effects (Economics) --- Social costs --- Public goods --- Waste (Economics) --- Welfare economics --- Law and legislation

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Contrary to what news reports might suggest, the majority of politicians behave ethically and are never subject to investigations. Is this because of the elaborate system of rules Congress has constructed to regulate the conduct of its members as well as the fear of electoral reprisal? Drawing on economic literature on the behavior of firms, Glenn Parker answers no. He argues that members of Congress behave ethnically not because of the fear of punishment but because of their concern for their reputations. He draws parallels between politicians and businesses, since both stand to suffer significantly when accused of wrongdoing. Just as business' poor behavior can cause brand names to be tarnished, prices to plummet, and future business to disappear, dishonest politicians stand to sacrifice the human capital invested in their careers, and premiums for honesty, such as electoral security and prestigious post-elective employment. Parker explores public attitudes toward the behavior of members of Congress and shows how those attitudes shape the way members conduct their professional lives. Written from the perspective of public choice, this book offers a novel approach to the question of how to keep politicians honest.

Self-control --- Political ethics --- Political corruption --- Legislators --- Economic aspects. --- United States. --- Agrawal, Anup. --- Akerlof, George H. --- Beard, Edmund. --- Bianco, William T. --- Cain, Bruce. --- Coase, Ronald H. --- Davis, Michael. --- Downs, Anthony. --- Ferejohn, John. --- Fiorina, Morris. --- Goff, Brian. --- Horn, Stephen. --- Ippolito, Pauline M. --- Klein, Benjamin. --- Krehbiel, Keith. --- Maloney, Michael. --- Ornstein, Norman J. --- Peltzman, Sam. --- Saloma, John S. --- Teeters, Holly. --- Van Houweling, Robert. --- Vanbeek, James R. --- Ward, Daniel S. --- Welch, Susan. --- Yiannakis, Diana Evans. --- adverse selection. --- assumptions: extended dealings. --- congressional casework. --- congressional foreign travel. --- corruption. --- elections: control of politicians. --- extended dealings. --- faithful-agent reputation: coding. --- home style. --- honoraria. --- hypotheses. --- incomplete contracts. --- last-period problems: in Congress. --- legislator-constituent contact. --- moral hazards. --- opportunism: check kiting. --- post-elective employment: categories of. --- price premium. --- principal-agent relationship. --- quasi-experimental research. --- quasi-rents. --- rational ignorance. --- reputation: accessibility. --- reputational control: evidence of. --- residual claimant. --- shirking: in Congress. --- vertical integration.