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The strategic-choice approach has a long pedigree in international relations. In an area often rent by competing methodologies, editors David A. Lake and Robert Powell take the best of accepted and contested knowledge among many theories. With the contributors to this volume, they offer a unifying perspective, which begins with a simple insight: students of international relations want to explain the choices actors make--whether these actors be states, parties, ethnic groups, companies, leaders, or individuals. This synthesis offers three new benefits: first, the strategic interaction of actors is the unit of analysis, rather than particular states or policies; second, these interactions are now usefully organized into analytic schemes, on which conceptual experiments may be based; and third, a set of methodological "bets" is then made about the most productive ways to analyze the interactions. Together, these elements allow the pragmatic application of theories that may apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as individuals protesting environmental degradation, governments seeking to control nuclear weapons, or the United Nations attempting to mobilize member states for international peacekeeping. Besides the editors, the six contributors to this book, all distinguished scholars of international relations, are Jeffry A. Frieden, James D. Morrow, Ronald Rogowski, Peter Gourevitch, Miles Kahler, and Arthur A. Stein. Their work is an invaluable introduction for scholars and students of international relations, economists, and government decision-makers.

Strategic planning. --- International relations. --- Axelrod, Robert. --- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. --- Chicken Game. --- Depew, David J. --- Fearon, James. --- Frieden, Jeffry. --- Hirshleifer, Jack. --- Keohane, Robert O. --- Lake, David. --- Lamarckism. --- Morrow, James. --- Rogowski, Ronald. --- aggregation of preferences. --- constructivist theories. --- deterrents: alliances as. --- ecology, organizational. --- hegemonic stability theory. --- linkage in bargaining. --- mathematical model. --- multiple-veto systems. --- reversion point. --- scale of units. --- screening.

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Noncooperative Game Theory is aimed at students interested in using game theory as a design methodology for solving problems in engineering and computer science. João Hespanha shows that such design challenges can be analyzed through game theoretical perspectives that help to pinpoint each problem's essence: Who are the players? What are their goals? Will the solution to "the game" solve the original design problem? Using the fundamentals of game theory, Hespanha explores these issues and more.The use of game theory in technology design is a recent development arising from the intrinsic limitations of classical optimization-based designs. In optimization, one attempts to find values for parameters that minimize suitably defined criteria-such as monetary cost, energy consumption, or heat generated. However, in most engineering applications, there is always some uncertainty as to how the selected parameters will affect the final objective. Through a sequential and easy-to-understand discussion, Hespanha examines how to make sure that the selection leads to acceptable performance, even in the presence of uncertainty-the unforgiving variable that can wreck engineering designs. Hespanha looks at such standard topics as zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamics games and includes a MATLAB guide to coding.Noncooperative Game Theory offers students a fresh way of approaching engineering and computer science applications.An introduction to game theory applications for students of engineering and computer science Materials presented sequentially and in an easy-to-understand fashionTopics explore zero-sum, non-zero-sum, and dynamics gamesMATLAB commands are included

Noncooperative games (Mathematics) --- Game theory --- Cooperative games (Mathematics) --- MATLAB. --- Minimax Theorem. --- N-player game. --- Nash equilibrium. --- Separating Hyperplane Theorem. --- Sudoku puzzle. --- action space. --- action. --- admissible Nash equilibrium. --- advertising campaign. --- alternate play. --- average security level. --- battle of the sexes. --- behavioral policy. --- behavioral saddle-point equilibrium. --- best-response equivalent games. --- bilateral symmetric game. --- bimatrix game. --- bimatrix potential. --- chicken game. --- circuit design. --- completely mixed Nash equilibrium. --- computational complexity. --- computer science. --- congestion game. --- continuous time cost-to-go. --- continuous time differential. --- continuous time dynamic programming. --- continuous time dynamic. --- convex analysis. --- convex hull. --- decoupled game. --- design methodology. --- differential game. --- discrete time cost-to-go. --- discrete time dynamic programming. --- discrete time dynamic. --- distributed resource allocation. --- dummy game. --- dynamic game. --- engineering. --- extensive form game representation. --- feedback game. --- fictitious play. --- finite one-player. --- game theory. --- graphical method. --- hyperplane. --- identical interests. --- information structure. --- linear program. --- linear quadratic dynamic. --- minimum. --- mixed Nash equilibrium. --- mixed action space. --- mixed policy. --- mixed saddle-point equilibrium. --- mixed security policy. --- multi-stage game. --- network routing. --- non-feedback game. --- non-zero-sum. --- noncooperative game theory. --- open-loop policy. --- open-loop. --- optimization-based design. --- order interchangeability property. --- policy. --- potential game. --- probability distribution. --- pure N-player game. --- pure policy. --- recursive computation. --- regret. --- robust design. --- rock-paper-scissors. --- rope-pulling. --- saddle-point equilibrium. --- security level. --- security policy. --- simultaneous play. --- single-stage game. --- state feedback information structure. --- state-feedback policy. --- stochastic policy. --- strictly dominating policy. --- symmetry game. --- tic-tac-toe. --- tree structure. --- uncertainty. --- variable termination time. --- war of attrition. --- weakly dominating policy. --- zebra in the lake. --- zero sum dynamic. --- zero-sum matrix. --- zero-sum two-person. --- zero-sum. --- MATLAB. --- Minimax Theorem. --- N-player game. --- Nash equilibrium. --- Separating Hyperplane Theorem. --- Sudoku puzzle. --- action space. --- action. --- admissible Nash equilibrium. --- advertising campaign. --- alternate play. --- average security level. --- battle of the sexes. --- behavioral policy. --- behavioral saddle-point equilibrium. --- best-response equivalent games. --- bilateral symmetric game. --- bimatrix game. --- bimatrix potential. --- chicken game. --- circuit design. --- completely mixed Nash equilibrium. --- computational complexity. --- computer science. --- congestion game. --- continuous time cost-to-go. --- continuous time differential. --- continuous time dynamic programming. --- continuous time dynamic. --- convex analysis. --- convex hull. --- decoupled game. --- design methodology. --- differential game. --- discrete time cost-to-go. --- discrete time dynamic programming. --- discrete time dynamic. --- distributed resource allocation. --- dummy game. --- dynamic game. --- engineering. --- extensive form game representation. --- feedback game. --- fictitious play. --- finite one-player. --- game theory. --- graphical method. --- hyperplane. --- identical interests. --- information structure. --- linear program. --- linear quadratic dynamic. --- minimum. --- mixed Nash equilibrium. --- mixed action space. --- mixed policy. --- mixed saddle-point equilibrium. --- mixed security policy. --- multi-stage game. --- network routing. --- non-feedback game. --- non-zero-sum. --- noncooperative game theory. --- open-loop policy. --- open-loop. --- optimization-based design. --- order interchangeability property. --- policy. --- potential game. --- probability distribution. --- pure N-player game. --- pure policy. --- recursive computation. --- regret. --- robust design. --- rock-paper-scissors. --- rope-pulling. --- saddle-point equilibrium. --- security level. --- security policy. --- simultaneous play. --- single-stage game. --- state feedback information structure. --- state-feedback policy. --- stochastic policy. --- strictly dominating policy. --- symmetry game. --- tic-tac-toe. --- tree structure. --- uncertainty. --- variable termination time. --- war of attrition. --- weakly dominating policy. --- zebra in the lake. --- zero sum dynamic. --- zero-sum matrix. --- zero-sum two-person. --- zero-sum.