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This paper proposes a novel theory of reserve accumulation that emphasizes the role of an independent central bank. Motivated by a positive correlation between reserve accumulation and central bank independence in Latin America, the paper develops a quantitative sovereign default model with an independent central bank that can accumulate a risk-free foreign asset. The findings show that if the central bank is more patient than the government and as patient as households are, in equilibrium, the government issues more debt than what is socially optimal, and the central bank accumulates reserves to undo government over-borrowing. A key insight is that the government can issue more debt for any level of reserves but chooses not to because doing so would increase sovereign spreads, making it more costly to borrow. Quantitatively, the analysis finds that the central bank independence channel accounts for 75 percent of the average reserve levels observed in Mexico from 1994 to 2017. Finally, the paper shows that accumulating reserves improves social welfare. Welfare gains come from reducing the costs of front-loading public spending.

Central Bank Independence --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Exchange Rate Regime --- External Debt --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- International Economics and Trade --- International Reserves --- Public Sector Development --- Reserve Accumulation --- Sovereign Debt

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March 2000 - Does delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies improve policy outcomes? This paper reports new theory and tests related to delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank. The authors find that delegation reduces inflation only under specific institutional and political conditions. The government's ability to credibly commit to policy announcements is critical to the successful implementation of economic policies as diverse as capital taxation and utilities regulation. One frequently advocated means of signaling credible commitment is to delegate authority to an agency that will not have an incentive to opportunistically change policies once the private sector has taken such steps as signing wage contracts or making irreversible investments. Delegating authority is suggested as a government strategy particularly for monetary policy. And existing work on the independence of central banks generally assumes that government decisions to delegate are irrevocable. But delegation - in monetary policy as elsewhere - is inevitably a political choice, and can be reversed, contend Keefer and Stasavage. They develop a model of monetary policy that relaxes the assumption that monetary delegation is irreversible. Among the testable predictions of the model are these: The presence of an independent central bank should reduce inflation only in the presence of political checks and balances. This effect should be evident in both developing and industrial countries; Political actions to interfere with the central bank should be more apparent when there are few checks and balances; The effects of checks and balances should be more marked when political decisionmakers are more polarized. The authors test these predictions and find extensive empirical evidence to support each of the observable implications of their model: Central banks are associated with better inflation outcomes in the presence of checks and balances. The turnover of central bank governors is reduced when governors have tenure protections supported by political checks and balances. And the effect of checks and balances is enhanced in more polarized political environments. This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to identify the conditions under which regulatory reforms can be effective. The authors may be contacted at pkeefer@worldbank.org or d.stasavage@lse.ac.uk.

Banks and Banking Reform --- Central Bank --- Central Bank Independence --- Central Banks --- Checks --- Contracts --- Credibility --- Credibility Problem --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Debt Markets --- Default --- Discount --- Economic Stabilization --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging Markets --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Fixed Investments --- Future --- Futures --- Holding --- ICT Applications --- Inflation --- Inflation Rate --- Information and Communication Technologies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Monetary Policy --- Money Supply --- Option --- Political Economy --- Private Sector Development --- Shocks To Income

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"The Chinese economy is now easily one of the most important and closely scrutinized economies in the world. Relatively minuscule changes in predictions of how the Chinese economy will perform can drive up or down stocks and the price of oil and other commodities. At the heart of how the Chinese economy works is its financial system-but the Chinese financial system is vastly different than most people in the West can understand. How do house prices work, for example, in a country where the very concept of property ownership is significantly different than our own? This edited volume will serve as a standard reference guide to China's financial system. With eighteen chapters, the handbook features overviews on the banking sector-the core of China's financial system and the key channel for implementing China's monetary policy-China's ongoing reforms, and the quickly growing bond and money markets, among other topics. Each chapter is written by a leading expert in the field, and as a whole the list of contributors represents an impressive mix of leading scholars and high-level policy officials, some with first-hand knowledge of setting and carrying out Chinese financial policy. The handbook will serve as the first real authoritative volume of literature in the field, and will shed extensive new light on the links between China's financial system and the real economy"--

Finance --- China --- Economic policy --- A-shares. --- British pound. --- C schemes. --- Chinese investment funds. --- Chinese mutual funds. --- Chinese rating agency. --- Euro. --- FDI. --- Fintech cities. --- IFRS. --- IMF. --- IPO reform. --- Japanese yen. --- LGFV. --- McCallum rule. --- PBC policy rates. --- Q schemes. --- QFII. --- RMB cross-border flows. --- RMB internationalization. --- RMB lending. --- RQFII, QDII. --- SOEs. --- Shanghai stock exchange. --- Shenzhen stock exchange. --- Taylor rule. --- US dollar. --- VC. --- accounting system. --- asset management. --- banking institutions. --- banking regulations. --- banking. --- basic social security. --- benchmark rates. --- bond connect. --- bond credit ratings. --- bond markets. --- capital account liberalization. --- central bank independence. --- corporate governance. --- credit extension. --- credit market rates. --- domestic assets. --- employer-sponsored annuity programs. --- equity markets. --- familiarity. --- fintech development. --- fintech regulatory developments. --- fintech. --- foreign direct investment. --- foreign exchange. --- hedge funds. --- infrastructure financing. --- interbank markets. --- interest rate liberalization. --- interest rates. --- internet usage. --- investor behavior. --- investor behavioral biases. --- limited attention. --- liquidity facility rates. --- local government financing vehicles. --- loss aversion. --- macroprudential policies. --- market economy. --- microprudential supervision initiatives. --- monetary policy instruments. --- monetary policy. --- money markets. --- mutual fund industry. --- mutual funds. --- online shopping. --- overconfidence. --- pension system. --- pensions. --- price-based policy instruments. --- private equity funds. --- public pension scheme. --- quantity-based policy instruments. --- real state market. --- representativeness bias. --- shadow banking. --- shareholder activism. --- state-owned commercial banks. --- stock connect. --- stock market regulations. --- stock market. --- venture capital funds. --- venture capital market.