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This study uses a computable general equilibrium model to analyze various policy scenarios for a carbon tax on greenhouse gas emissions from petroleum fuels and kerosene in Ethiopia. The carbon tax starts at USD 5 per ton of carbon dioxide in 2018 and rises to USD 30 per ton in 2030. Different scenarios examine the impacts with revenue recycling through a uniform sales tax reduction, reduction of labor income tax, reduction of business income tax, direct transfer back to households, and use by the government to reduce debt. Because petroleum fuels and kerosene are a relatively small part of the Ethiopian economy, the carbon tax has quite small impacts on overall economic activity while having a notable proportionate impact on greenhouse gas emissions from these energy sources, depending on the recycling scenario. The carbon tax can raise significant revenue-up to USD 800 million per year by 2030. The impacts on the poor through increased cost of living are not that large, since the share of the poor in total use of petroleum fuels and kerosene is small. In terms of income effects through employment changes, urban households tend to experience more impacts than rural households, but the results also depend on the household skill level and the revenue recycling scenario.

Carbon Tax --- CGE Model --- Computable General Equilibrium Model --- Distributional Impacts --- Environment --- Poverty Reduction --- Trade Policy

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"Pricing Carbon Emissions provides an economic critique on the utopian idea of a uniform carbon price for addressing rising carbon emissions, exposing the flaws in the economic propositions with a key focus on the EU's Emissions Trading System (ETS). After an Executive Summary of the contents, the chapters build up understanding of orthodox economics' role in protecting the neoliberal paradigm. A salient case, the ETS is successful in shielding the Business-as-Usual activities of the EU's industry, however this book argues that the system fails in creating innovation for decarbonizing production technologies. A subsequent political economy analysis by the author points to the discursive power of giant fossil fuel and electricity companies keeping up a façade of Cap-and-Trade utopia and hiding the reality of free permit donations and administrative price control, concealing financial bills mostly paid by household electricity customers. The twilights between reality and utopia in the EU's ETS are exposed, concluding an immediate end of the system is necessary for effective and just climate policy. The work argues that the proposition of shifting to a global uniform carbon tax is equally utopian. In practice, a uniform price applied on heterogeneous cases is not a source of benefits but one of ad-hoc adjustments, exceptions, and exemptions. Carbon pricing does not induce innovation, however assumed by the economic models used by IPCC for advising global climate policy. Thus, it is persuasively demonstrated by the author that these schemes are doomed to failure and room and resources need to be created for more effective and just climate politics. The book's conclusion is based on economic arguments, complementing the critique of political scientists. This book is written for a broad audience interested in climate policy eager to understand why decarbonizing progress is slow as it is. It marks a significant addition to the literature on climate politics, carbon pricing and the political economy of the environment more broadly. Aviel Verbruggen is Emeritus Professor at University of Antwerp, Belgium. His experiences and knowledge focus primarily on the subjects of politics, engineering and economics"--

Carbon dioxide mitigation. --- Carbon taxes. --- Carbon tax --- Environmental impact charges --- Emissions trading --- Atmospheric carbon dioxide mitigation --- Carbon dioxide capture --- Mitigation of carbon dioxide --- Pollution prevention

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International law --- Tax law --- Economic law --- Double taxation --- Carbon taxes. --- Carbon tax --- Environmental impact charges --- Emissions trading --- Double taxation conventions --- Gifts --- Income tax --- Inheritance and transfer tax --- Tax treaties --- Taxation

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A carbon tax is an efficient economic instrument to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide released from fossil fuel burning. Its impacts on production of renewable energy depend on how it is designed-particularly in the context of the penetration of biofuels into the energy supply mix for road transportation. Using a multi-sector, multi-country computable general equilibrium model, this study shows first that a carbon tax with the entire tax revenue recycled to households through a lump-sum transfer does not stimulate biofuel production significantly, even at relatively high tax rates. This reflects the high cost of carbon dioxide abatement through biofuels substitution, relative to other energy substitution alternatives; in addition, the carbon tax will have negative economy-wide consequences that reduce total demand for all fuels. A combined carbon tax and biofuel subsidy policy, where part of the carbon tax revenue is used to finance a biofuel subsidy, would significantly stimulate market penetration of biofuels. Although the carbon tax and biofuel subsidy policy would cause higher loss in global economic output compared with the carbon tax with lump sum revenue redistribution, the incremental output loss is relatively small.

Biofuels --- Carbon Tax --- CGE Modeling --- Climate Change --- Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases --- Energy --- Energy and Environment --- Environment --- Environment and Energy Efficiency --- Policy Instruments --- Taxation & Subsidies --- Transport Economics Policy & Planning

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The paper uses a new country-level, panel data set to study the effect of public sector wages on corruption. The results show that wage inequality in the public sector is an important determinant of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies. Increasing the wages of public officials could help reduce corruption in countries with low public sector wage inequality. In countries where public sector wages are highly unequal, however, raising the wages of government employees could increase corruption. These results are robust to a wide range of empirical model specifications, estimation methods, and distributional assumptions. The relation persists when controlling for latent omitted variables, using the share of contracts in the private sector as an instrument for the public-private wage differential. Combining increases in public sector wages with policies affecting the wage distribution could help policy makers design cost-effective programs to reduce corruption in their countries.

Carbon Policy and Trading --- Carbon Tax --- Climate Change Mitigation and Green House Gases --- Environment --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Environmental Tax --- Greenhouse Gas Emissions --- Income Tax --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Regime Dependence --- Tax Multiplier --- Taxation and Subsidies