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This paper studies the credit market implications and real effects of one the largest borrower bailout programs in history, enacted by the government of India against the backdrop of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The study finds that the stimulus program had no effect on productivity, wages, or consumption, but led to significant changes in credit allocation and an increase in defaults. Post-program loan performance declines faster in districts with greater exposure to the program, an effect that is not driven by greater risk-taking of banks. Loan defaults become significantly more sensitive to the electoral cycle after the program, suggesting the anticipation of future credit market interventions as an important channel through which moral hazard in loan repayment is intensified.

Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Borrower Bailout Program --- Credit Allocation --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Loan Defaults --- Loan Performance --- Loan Repayment --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth

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The paper discusses the main features that distinguish inter-firm international trade finance from alternative sources of financing. On the one hand, inter-firm trade finance could help overcome informational problems associated with other lending relationships; on the other, it may contribute to propagate shocks due to the interconnection among firms along credit chains. The paper evaluates the potential effects of a financial crisis on the use of trade credit for firms operating in developing countries. It argues that while the advantages of trade credit might remain largely unexploited due to poor legal institutions, the disadvantages might be exacerbated because of these firms' greater exposure to a default chain. Based on these arguments, a menu of choices is identified for what policymakers can do to boost firms' access to inter-firm trade finance in times of crisis.

Access to Finance --- Access to financing --- Asymmetric information --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Borrower --- Contract enforcement --- Credit chains --- Debt Markets --- Debts --- Developing countries --- Economic Theory and Research --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exporters --- Extensions of credit --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial crisis --- Financial markets --- Global economy --- International Bank --- International Trade --- Lender --- Monetary Fund --- Private Sector Development --- Trade credit --- Trade Finance --- Trade financing

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This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, the authors discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. They focus on the respective role of government and the private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. The findings show that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Borrower --- Credit guarantee --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial support --- Financing obstacles --- Guarantee schemes --- International bank --- Microfinance --- Partial credit --- Risk management --- Risk-based pricing --- Transaction costs

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Microfinance, the provision of small individual and business loans, has witnessed dramatic growth, reaching over 150 million borrowers worldwide. Much of its success has been attributed to overcoming the challenges of information asymmetries in uncollateralized lending. Yet, very little is known about the optimal contract structure of such loans - there is substantial variation across lenders, even within a particular setting. This paper exploits a plausibly exogenous change in the liability structure offered by a microfinance program in India, which shifted from individual to group liability lending. The analysis finds compelling evidence that contract structure matters: for the same borrower, required monthly loan installments are 6 percent less likely to be missed under the group liability setting, relative to individual liability. In addition, compulsory savings deposits are 19 percent less likely to be missed under group liability contracts.

Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Borrower --- Collateral --- Commercial banks --- Debt Markets --- Deposit Insurance --- Emerging markets --- Expenditure --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial market --- Financial support --- Income inequality --- Information asymmetries --- International bank --- Lenders --- Liability --- Loan --- Microcredit --- Microfinance --- Optimal contract --- Provision of credit --- Savings deposits --- Transaction --- Transaction costs

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June 1999 - When will a landlord prefer to supply both land and credit to a tenant rather than allow the lender to borrow from a separate moneylender? The paper shows that if tenancy contracts are obtained prior to contracting with the moneylender, and the tenant has limited liability, interlinked deals will predominate over the alternative situation where the landlord and the moneylender act as noncooperative principals. Basu, Bell, and Bose analyze the example of a landlord, a moneylender, and a tenant (the landlord having access to finance on the same terms as the moneylender). It is natural to assume that the landlord has first claim on the tenant's output (as a rule, if they live in the same village, he may have some say in when the crop is harvested). The moneylender is more of an outsider, not well placed to exercise such a claim. A landless, assetless tenant will typically not get a loan unless he has a tenancy. Without interlinkage, the landlord is likely to move first. In the noncooperative sequential game where the landlord is the first mover and also enjoys seniority of claims if the tenant defaults, interlinkage is superior, even if contracts are nonlinear - a result unchanged with the incorporation of moral hazard. The main result is that if a passive principal - one whose decisions are limited to exercising his property rights to determine his share of returns - is the first mover, allocative efficiency is impaired unless his equilibrium payoffs are uniform across states of nature. The limited liability of the tenant creates the strict superiority of interlinkage by making uniform rents nonoptimal when, with noncollusive principals, the landlord (the passive principal) is the first mover. A change in seniority of claims from the first to the second mover (the moneylender) further strengthens this result. But uniform payoffs for the first mover are not essential for allocative efficiency if he is the only principal with a continuously variable instrument of control. So, the main result is sensitive to changes in the order of play but not to changes in the priority of claims. This paper - a product of the Office of the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist, Development Economics - is part of a larger effort in the Bank to understand the institutional structure of rural markets and its welfare implications. The authors may be contacted at kbasu@worldbank.org, clive.bell@urz.uni-heidelberg.de, or psbose@cc.memphis.edu.

Amount Of Cred Borrower --- Contract Law --- Contracts --- Contractual Obligations --- Credit Contract --- Debt Markets --- Default --- Discount --- Discount Rates --- Economic Theory and Research --- Finance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Instrument --- Instruments --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Limited Liability --- Loan --- Loan Contracts --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Moneylender --- Moral Hazard --- Option --- Risk Aversion --- Risk Neutral --- Social Protections and Labor --- Unlimited Liability