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Despite the recent misfortunes of many dotcoms, e-commerce will have major and lasting effects on economic activity. But the rise and fall in the valuations of the first wave of e-commerce companies show that vague promises of distant profits are insufficient. Only business models based on sound economic propositions will survive. This book provides professionals, investors, and MBA students the tools they need to evaluate the wide range of actual and potential e-commerce businesses at the microeconomic level. It demonstrates how these tools can be used to assess a variety of existing applications. Advances in web-based technology--particularly automation and delegation technologies such as smart agents, shopping bots, and bidding elves--support the further growth of e-commerce. In addition to enabling consumers to conduct automated comparisons and sellers to access visitors' background information in real time, such software programs can make decisions for individuals, negotiate with other programs, and participate in online markets. Much of e-commerce's economic value arises from this kind of automation, which not only reduces operating costs but adds value by generating new market interactions. This text teaches how to analyze the added value of such applications, considering consumer behavior, pricing strategies, incentives, and other critical factors. It discusses added value in several e-commerce arenas: online shopping, business-to-business e-commerce, application design, online negotiation (one-to-one trading), online auctions (one-to-many trading), and many-to-many electronic exchanges. Combining insights from several years of microeconomic research as well as from game theory and computer science, it stresses the importance of economic engineering in application design as well as the need for business models to take into account the "total game." As the only serious treatment of the microeconomics of e-commerce, this book should be read by anyone seeking e-commerce solutions or planning to work in the field.
stock markets. --- selling agents. --- retailers. --- protocols. --- procurement systems. --- personalization. --- online auctions. --- naïve bidders. --- matching process. --- marketplaces. --- loyalty. --- late bidding. --- information. --- incentives. --- game theory. --- exchanges. --- deadlines. --- competition. --- bilateral negotiations. --- auction design. --- alternating offers. --- adverse selection. --- Vickrey auction. --- ShopBots. --- English auctions. --- Dutch auctions. --- Bertrand paradox. --- Electronic commerce. --- naïve bidders.
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Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency.
Affiliated --- Affiliated organizations --- Auction --- Auctions --- Bid --- Bidders --- Bidding --- Competition --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Government Procurement --- Infrastructure Economics --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- International development --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Private Sector Development --- Public disclosure
Choose an application
Asymmetric auctions are among the most rapidly growing areas in the auction literature. The potential benefits from improved auction efficiency are expected to be enormous in public procurement auctions related to official development projects. Entrant bidders are considered a key to enhance competition in an auction and break potential collusive arrangements among incumbent bidders. Asymmetric auction theory predicts that weak (fringe) bidders would bid more aggressively when they are faced with a strong (incumbent) opponent. Using official development assistance procurement data, this paper finds that in the major infrastructure sectors, entrants submitted systematically aggressive bids in the presence of an incumbent bidder. The findings also show that a high concentration of incumbents in an auction would harm auction efficiency, raising procurement costs. The results suggest that auctioneers should encourage fringe bidders to actively participate in the bidding process while maintaining the quality of the projects. This is conducive to enhancing competitive circumstances in public procurements and improving allocative efficiency.
Affiliated --- Affiliated organizations --- Auction --- Auctions --- Bid --- Bidders --- Bidding --- Competition --- Debt Markets --- E-Business --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Government Procurement --- Infrastructure Economics --- Infrastructure Economics and Finance --- International development --- Investment and Investment Climate --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Markets and Market Access --- Private Sector Development --- Public disclosure
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