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Der vorliegende Band aus der Reihe "Institute for Law and Finance Series" (ILFS) vereint die schriftlichen Fassungen der auf der Tagung der Tagung "Too Big To Fail - Brauchen wir ein Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken?" (5.11.2010, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main) gehaltenen Vorträge und ergänzt sie um eine umfassende Einleitung. Der Band enthält sowohl deutsch- als auch englischsprachige Beiträge. Die ersten drei Aufsätze nehmen zu der Frage Stellung, ob es überhaupt eines speziellen Insolvenzrechts für Banken bedarf. Hierbei werden aktuelle gesetzgeberische Lösungsansätze auf deutscher und internationaler Ebene kritisch analysiert. Die beiden folgenden Beiträge widmen sich aus deutscher und aus rechtsvergleichender Perspektive der Frage, wie Auslöser für Bankinsolvenzverfahren beschaffen sein müssen, um ein geordnetes Verfahren rechtzeitig einzuleiten, ohne andererseits Gefahr zu laufen, zu früh in den Geschäftsbetrieb einer Bank und die Eigentumsrechte ihrer Gesellschafter einzugreifen. Die zwei anschließenden Aufsätze behandeln, wiederum aus deutscher und aus rechtsvergleichender Perspektive, die Frage, ob besondere Instrumente erforderlich sind, um ein Bankeninsolvenzverfahren erfolgreich durchführen zu können. Die beiden abschließenden Beiträge gehen auf den Gläubigerschutz in einem Sonderinsolvenzrecht für Banken ein und analysieren die aktuellen Entwicklungen im deutschen und US-amerikanischen Recht.

Bailouts (Government policy) --- Bank failure --- Banking law --- Banking law. --- Bankruptcy --- Financial institutions --- Law and legislation. --- Law and legislation --- Banks and banking --- Law, Banking --- Banking Crisis.

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This paper examines the impact of the recent banking crises in Europe and Central Asia on households' incomes and consumption patterns. The analysis is based on the 2010 wave of the Life in Transition Survey, which covers 12,704 households in eleven countries that experienced a banking crisis between 2008 and 2011. It finds that households in middle-income crisis countries are more than twice as likely to be hit by an income shock as households in high-income crisis countries. The labor market channel is the predominant source of income shocks, with wage reductions more widespread than job-losses. In reaction to income shocks, households reallocate spending from non-essential goods to staple foods. Reductions in staple-food consumption are, however, prevalent among low-income households. The paper examines potential crisis mitigators and finds that at the macro level a flexible monetary regime is associated with fewer cutbacks in household consumption. At the meso level, it finds no evidence that foreign bank ownership amplified the transmission of banking crises to households in Europe. With respect to micro-level mitigators, the analysis finds that diversified income sources as well as stocks of non-financial and financial assets help households to cushion income shocks. Access to informal and formal credit also mitigates the impact of income shocks on household consumption, with the former especially important in middle-income countries.

Access to Finance --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Consumption patterns --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging Markets --- Households' incomes --- Income shocks --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Wage reductions

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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.

Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency

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Russia had more-or-less completed the privatization of its manufacturing and natural resource sectors by the end of 1997. And in February 1998, the annual inflation rate at last dipped into the single digits. Privatization should have helped with stronger micro-foundations for growth. The conquest of inflation should have cemented macroeconomic credibility, lowered real interest rates, and spurred investment. Instead, Russia suffered a massive public debt-exchange rate-banking crisis just six months later, in August 1998. In showing how this turn of events unfolded, the authors focus on the interaction among Russia's deteriorating fiscal fundamentals, its weak micro-foundations of growth and financial globalization. They argue that the expectation of a large official bailout in the final 10 weeks before the meltdown played an important role, with Russia's external debt increasing by USD 16 billion or 8 percent of post-crisis gross domestic product during this time. The lessons and insights extracted from the 1998 Russian crisis are of general applicability, oil and geopolitics notwithstanding. These include a discussion of when financial globalization might actually hurt and a cutoff in market access might actually help; circumstances in which an official bailout could backfire; and why financial engineering tends to fail when fiscal solvency problems are present.

Access to Finance --- Bailout --- Banking crisis --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credibility --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Currency --- Debt Markets --- Debt obligations --- Emerging market --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rate --- External debt --- Face value --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Globalization --- Gross domestic product --- Inflation --- Inflation rate --- International Bank --- Market access --- Private Sector Development --- Public debt --- Real interest --- Real interest rates --- Repo --- Solvency

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This paper studies how crises prompted firms to switch borrowing across markets, impacting the amount borrowed, maturity, and currency denomination at the firm and aggregate levels. Using data on worldwide debt issuance from advanced and emerging economies, the paper shows that firms shifted their issuances between domestic and international syndicated loans and corporate bonds during financial crises. Firms reduced their borrowing in shock-hit markets but increased it in other debt markets. Firms also moved toward longer-term markets, maintaining (or even increasing) their borrowing maturity. As they moved toward domestic markets during international crises, firms reduced the share of foreign currency debt. The opposite occurred during domestic crises. Large firms were the ones that switched between international and domestic markets, affecting aggregate capital raising activity. The analysis of four distinct markets generates patterns consistent with credit supply shocks that are different from those obtained when studying the dynamics of individual markets.

Banking Crisis --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Bond Issues --- Capital Markets and Capital Flows --- Corporate Bonds --- Corporate Debt --- Corporate Finance --- Debt Markets --- Debt Maturity --- Emerging Market Economies --- Emerging Markets --- External Debt --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring --- Global Financial Crisis --- International Economics and Trade --- Private Sector Development --- Securities Markets Policy and Regulation --- Sovereign Debt --- Syndicated Loans