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Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification.
Access to Finance --- Bank competition --- Bank concentration --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credit risk --- Debt Markets --- Default risk --- Distance to default --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Lerner index --- Merton model --- Private Sector Development --- Systemic risk
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Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, they examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. They find that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, with generous deposit insurance and greater government ownership of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with low levels of foreign ownership, weak investor protections, generous safety nets, and where the authorities provide limited guidance for bank asset diversification.
Access to Finance --- Bank competition --- Bank concentration --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Credit risk --- Debt Markets --- Default risk --- Distance to default --- Emerging Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Intermediation --- Lerner index --- Merton model --- Private Sector Development --- Systemic risk
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This paper explores the empirical relationship between bank competition, bank concentration, and the emergence of credit reporting institutions. The authors find that countries with lower entry barriers into the banking market (that is, a greater threat of competition) are less likely to have a credit bureau, presumably because banks are less willing to share proprietary information when the threat of market entry is high. In addition, a credit bureau is significantly less likely to emerge in economies characterized by a high degree of bank concentration. The authors argue that the reason for this finding is that large banks stand to lose more monopoly rents from sharing their extensive information with smaller players. In contrast, the data show no significant relationship between bank competition or concentration and the emergence of a public credit registry, where banks' participation is mandatory. The results highlight that policies designed to promote the voluntary creation of a credit bureau need to take into account banks' incentives to extract monopoly rents from proprietary credit information.
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Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events-such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode-has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risk
Private finance --- Financial institutions. --- Financial institutions --- Risk --- Financial crises --- Finance - General --- Finance --- Business & Economics --- E-books --- banks, financial institutions, risk, investment, profit, success, trade, finance, economics, capital management, bond market, debt crises, emerging markets, capitalism, regulation, stability, congress, liquidity, equity, bank concentration, collateral, securitization, credit, global business cycles, hedge funds, fragility, deposits, nonfiction.
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