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Effective risk management at central banks is best enabled by a sound framework embedded throughout the organization that supports the design and execution of risk management activities. To evaluate the risk management practices at a central bank, the Safeguards Assessments Division of the IMF’s Finance Department developed a tool that facilitates stocktaking of elements that are present and categorizes the function based on its maturity. Tailored recommendations are then provided to the central bank which provide a roadmap to advance the risk management function.
Banks and Banking --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banking --- Central bank risk management --- Banks and banking
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Effective risk management at central banks is best enabled by a sound framework embedded throughout the organization that supports the design and execution of risk management activities. To evaluate the risk management practices at a central bank, the Safeguards Assessments Division of the IMF’s Finance Department developed a tool that facilitates stocktaking of elements that are present and categorizes the function based on its maturity. Tailored recommendations are then provided to the central bank which provide a roadmap to advance the risk management function.
Banks and Banking --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Central Banks and Their Policies --- Banking --- Central bank risk management --- Banks and banking
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The standard macro(prudential) models focus on externalities and treat all prudential instruments as alternative, but equivalent, forms of Pigouvian taxes. This paper explicitly models individual banks' risk choices and shows that different prudential instruments affect banks' risk-taking incentives differently. Thus, conflicts may arise between the micro and macro prudential stance.
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Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads to excessive risk-taking. This paper examines the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading to and during the recent financial crisis. It finds that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared with the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, the analysis finds that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.
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Deposit insurance is widely offered in a number of countries as part of a financial system safety net to promote stability. An unintended consequence of deposit insurance is the reduction in the incentive of depositors to monitor banks, which leads to excessive risk-taking. This paper examines the relation between deposit insurance and bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading to and during the recent financial crisis. It finds that generous financial safety nets increase bank risk and systemic fragility in the years leading up to the global financial crisis. However, during the crisis, bank risk is lower and systemic stability is greater in countries with deposit insurance coverage. The findings suggest that the "moral hazard effect" of deposit insurance dominates in good times while the "stabilization effect" of deposit insurance dominates in turbulent times. Nevertheless, the overall effect of deposit insurance over the full sample remains negative since the destabilizing effect during normal times is greater in magnitude compared with the stabilizing effect during global turbulence. In addition, the analysis finds that good bank supervision can alleviate the unintended consequences of deposit insurance on bank systemic risk during good times, suggesting that fostering the appropriate incentive framework is very important for ensuring systemic stability.
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Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries' abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of government indebtedness and deficits on bank stock prices and credit default swap spreads. Overall, bank stock prices reflect a negative capitalization of government debt and they respond negatively to deficits. The authors present evidence that in 2008 systemically large banks saw a reduction in their market valuation in countries running large fiscal deficits. Furthermore, the change in bank credit default swap spreads in 2008 relative to 2007 reflects countries' deterioration of public deficits. The results of the analysis suggest that some systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, as they have become too big to save, potentially reversing the trend to ever larger banks. The paper also documents that a smaller proportion of banks are systemically important - relative to gross domestic product - in 2008 than in the two previous years, which could reflect private incentives to downsize.
Access to Finance --- Bank failures --- Bank mergers --- Bank risk --- Bank size --- Banking crises --- Banking system --- Banking systems --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks --- Banks & Banking Reform --- Capitalization --- CDS --- Debt --- Debt Markets --- Deficits --- Deposit insurance --- Economic Theory & Research --- European central bank --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial safety nets --- Fiscal deficits --- Government finance --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Profitability --- Small banks --- Taxation
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This paper studies whether compliance with the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision is associated with bank soundness. Using data for more than 3,000 banks in 86 countries, the authors find that neither the overall index of compliance with the Basel Core Principles nor the individual components of the index are robustly associated with bank risk measured by Z-scores. The results of the analysis cast doubt on the usefulness of the Basel Core Principles in ensuring bank soundness.
Accounting --- Bank ratings --- Bank risk --- Banking sector --- Banking supervision --- Banks --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Capital standards --- Commercial banks --- Deposit insurance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial institutions --- Financial regulation --- Financial risk --- Financial strength --- International accounting standards --- Laws --- Rating agencies --- Regulatory approaches --- Small banks --- Supervisory agencies --- Supervisory framework --- Urban Development
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The existence of financial intermediaries is arguably an artifact of information asymmetry. Beyond simple financial transactions, financial intermediation provides a mechanism for information transmission, which can reduce the degree of information asymmetry and consequently increase market efficiency. During the process of information transmission, the bank is able to provide unique services in the production and exchange of information. Therefore, banks have comparative advantages in information production, transmission, and utilisation. This book provides an overview of commercial banking and includes empirical methods in banking such risk and bank performance, capital regulation, bank competition and foreign bank entry, bank regulation on bank performance, and capital adequacy and deposit insurance.
Coins, banknotes, medals, seals (numismatics) --- deposit insurance --- capital adequacy --- bank risk --- foreign bank entry --- bank competition --- H-statistics --- pooled regression --- dynamic panel models --- risk-taking behavior --- banks --- efficiency --- data envelopment analysis --- Asia-Pacific --- regulations --- bank capital --- meta-analysis --- Bayesian model-averaging --- capital regulation --- competition --- Indian banking sector --- panel data --- revenue diversification --- bank risks --- bank performance --- net interest income --- non-interest income --- risks --- capital
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Banks restructured after East Asia's crisis of 1997 - most of them family-owned or company-owned and almost never foreign-owned - tended to be heavy risk takers. Most of them had excessive credit growth; Laeven uses a linear programming technique (data envelopment analysis) to estimate the inefficiencies of banks in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. He applies this technique to the precrisis period 1992-96. Assessing a bank's overall performance requires assessing both efficiency and risk factors, so Laeven also introduces a measure of risk taking. This risk measure helps predict which banks were restructured after the crisis of 1997. Laeven finds that foreign-owned banks took little risk relative to other banks in East Asia, and that family-owned and company-owned banks were among the highest risk takers. Banks restructured after the 1997 crisis had excessive credit growth, were mostly family-owned or company-owned, and were almost never foreign-owned. This paper - a product of the Financial Sector Strategy and Policy Department - is part of a larger effort in the department to study the causes and resolution of financial distress. The author may be contacted at llaeven@worldbank.org.
Bank --- Bank Risk --- Banking --- Banks --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Cred Deposits --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Crisis Management and Restructuring --- Financial Institutions --- Financial Intermediation --- Financial Literacy --- Financial Services --- Governance --- Interest --- Lending --- Nonperforming Loans --- Operating Costs --- Principal --- Real Sector --- Risk --- Risk Factors --- Risk Management --- Risk Taking --- Services
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This paper studies whether compliance with the Basel Core Principles for effective banking supervision is associated with bank soundness. Using data for more than 3,000 banks in 86 countries, the authors find that neither the overall index of compliance with the Basel Core Principles nor the individual components of the index are robustly associated with bank risk measured by Z-scores. The results of the analysis cast doubt on the usefulness of the Basel Core Principles in ensuring bank soundness.
Accounting --- Bank ratings --- Bank risk --- Banking sector --- Banking supervision --- Banks --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Capital standards --- Commercial banks --- Deposit insurance --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial institutions --- Financial regulation --- Financial risk --- Financial strength --- International accounting standards --- Laws --- Rating agencies --- Regulatory approaches --- Small banks --- Supervisory agencies --- Supervisory framework --- Urban Development
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