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Traditional economic theory studies idealized markets in which prices alone can guide efficient allocation, with no need for central organization. Such models build from Adam Smith's famous concept of an invisible hand, which guides markets and renders regulation or interference largely unnecessary. Yet for many markets, prices alone are not enough to guide feasible and efficient outcomes, and regulation alone is not enough, either. Consider air traffic control at major airports. While prices could encourage airlines to take off and land at less congested times, prices alone do just part of the job; an air traffic control system is still indispensable to avoid disastrous consequences. With just an air traffic controller, however, limited resources can be wasted or poorly used. What's needed in this and many other real-world cases is an auction system that can effectively reveal prices while still maintaining enough direct control to ensure that complex constraints are satisfied.In Discovering Prices, Paul Milgrom-the world's most frequently cited academic expert on auction design-describes how auctions can be used to discover prices and guide efficient resource allocations, even when resources are diverse, constraints are critical, and market-clearing prices may not even exist. Economists have long understood that externalities and market power both necessitate market organization. In this book, Milgrom introduces complex constraints as another reason for market design. Both lively and technical, Milgrom roots his new theories in real-world examples (including the ambitious U.S. incentive auction of radio frequencies, whose design he led) and provides economists with crucial new tools for dealing with the world's growing complex resource allocation problems.

Auction theory. --- Auctions --- Prices --- Mathematical models.

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Do you have the tools to address recent challenges and problems in modern computer networks? Discover a unified view of auction theoretic applications and develop auction models, solution concepts, and algorithms with this multidisciplinary review. Devise distributed, dynamic, and adaptive algorithms for ensuring robust network operation over time-varying and heterogeneous environments, and for optimizing decisions about services, resource allocation, and usage of all network entities. Topics including cloud networking models, MIMO, mmWave communications, 5G, data aggregation, task allocation, user association, interference management, wireless caching, mobile data offloading, and security. Introducing fundamental concepts from an engineering perspective and describing a wide range of state-of-the-art techniques, this is an excellent resource for graduate and senior undergraduate students, network and software engineers, economists, and researchers.

Auctions --- Auction theory. --- Wireless communication systems. --- Mathematical models. --- Computer programs.

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Microeconomics --- Quantitative methods (economics) --- Recreation. Games. Sports. Corp. expression --- spellen --- micro-economie --- econometrie --- Auction theory. --- Auctions.

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The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. This is an introduction to the basic theory of auction that provided the insights for the design of auctions such as the sale of spectrum for mobiles telecommunications and the sale of former government-owned companies around the globe.

Auctions --- Economics, Mathematical --- Auction theory --- Commerce --- Business & Economics --- Marketing & Sales --- Mathematical models

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Procurement packaging has important effects on not only the bidders' bidding behavior, but also contractors' performance. By changing the size of public contracts, procurers can encourage (or discourage) market competition and improve contract performance, avoiding unnecessary cost overruns and project delays. In practice, there is no single solution about how to package public contracts. With procurement data from road projects in Nepal, this paper examines the optimal size of road contracts in rural areas. The optimum varies depending on policy objectives. To maximize the bidder participation, the length of road should be about 11 kilometers. To minimize cost overruns and delays, the contracts should be much larger at 17 and 21 kilometers, respectively. Compared with the current procurement practices, the findings suggest that procurers take more advantage of enlarging road packages, although contracts that are too large may increase the risk of discouraging firms from participating in public tenders.

Competition --- Contract Law --- Debt Markets --- Government Procurement --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market entry --- Post Conflict Reconstruction --- Public procurement --- Rural roads, auction theory --- Transport --- Transport Economics Policy & Planning