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This paper estimates a model of a government making trade policy adjustments under a self-enforcing trade agreement in the presence of economic shocks. The empirical model is motivated by the formal theories of cooperative trade agreements. The authors find evidence that United States' use of its antidumping policy during 1997-2006 is consistent with increases in time-varying "cooperative" tariffs, where the likelihood of antidumping is increasing in the size of unexpected import surges, decreasing in the volatility of imports, and decreasing in the elasticities of import demand and export supply. The analysis finds additional support for the theory that some US antidumping use is consistent with cooperative behavior through a second empirical examination of how trading partners responded to these new US tariffs. Even after controlling for factors such as the expected cost and benefit to filing a WTO dispute or engaging in antidumping retaliation, the analysis find that trading partners are less likely to challenge such "cooperative" US antidumping tariffs that were imposed under terms-of-trade pressure suggested by the theory.

Antidumping --- Antidumping duties --- Antidumping policies --- Antidumping policy --- Bilateral trade --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Domestic industries --- Economic Theory & Research --- Export supply --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free Trade --- International Economics and Trade --- International Trade and Trade Rules --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market access --- Tariff reduction --- Terms of trade --- Trade agreement --- Trade agreements --- Trade barriers --- Trade effect --- Trade flows --- Trade motives --- Trade policies --- Trade Policy --- World trade --- World trade organization

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Since the 1995 inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO), developing countries have become some of the most frequent users of the WTO-sanctioned antidumping trade policy instrument. This paper exploits newly available data to examine the pattern of actual industrial use of antidumping in nine of the major "new user" developing countries - Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and Venezuela. For these countries we are able to match data from two newly available sources: data on production in 28 different 3-digit ISIC industries from the Trade, Production and Protection Database to data on antidumping investigations, outcomes and imports at the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level from the Global Antidumping Database. Our econometric analysis is to estimate a two-stage model of the industry-level decision to pursue an antidumping investigation and the national government's decision of whether and how much antidumping import protection to provide. First, we find evidence consistent with the theory of endogenous trade policy: larger industries that face substantial import competition are more likely to pursue an antidumping investigation, and larger and more concentrated industries receive greater antidumping protection from imports. Second, we find that industries that use antidumping are more likely to face the changing economic conditions specified by the technical evidentiary criteria of the WTO Antidumping Agreement: industries that face rapidly falling import prices are more likely to pursue an investigation, and industries that are more susceptible to cyclical dumping due to greater capital investment expenditures and that face rapidly increasing competition from imports receive greater antidumping protection.

Access --- Antidumping --- Antidumping Database --- Antidumping Measures --- Antidumping Policy --- Currencies and Exchange Rates --- Domestic Industries --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economic Welfare --- Exporters --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free Trade --- Globalization and Financial Integration --- Import Competition --- Import Penetration --- Import Prices --- Import Protection --- Import Restrictions --- Industrial Management --- Industry --- International Economics & Trade --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Price Discrimination --- Public Sector Development --- Tariffs --- Trade Law --- Trade Liberalization --- Trade Policies --- Trade Policy --- Water and Industry --- Water Resources --- World Trade --- World Trade Organization