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China is often mentioned as a counterexample to the findings in the finance and growth literature since, despite the weaknesses in its banking system, it is one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The fast growth of Chinese private sector firms is taken as evidence that it is alternative financing and governance mechanisms that support China's growth. This paper takes a closer look at firm financing patterns and growth using a database of 2,400 Chinese firms. The authors find that a relatively small percentage of firms in the sample utilize formal bank finance with a much greater reliance on informal sources. However, the results suggest that despite its weaknesses, financing from the formal financial system is associated with faster firm growth, whereas fund raising from alternative channels is not. Using a selection model, the authors find no evidence that these results arise because of the selection of firms that have access to the formal financial system. Although firms report bank corruption, there is no evidence that it significantly affects the allocation of credit or the performance of firms that receive the credit. The findings suggest that the role of reputation and relationship based financing and governance mechanisms in financing the fastest growing firms in China is likely to be overestimated.

Access to Finance --- Alternative Financing --- Banking System --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Banks and Banking Reform --- Corruption --- Debt Markets --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Development --- Financial System --- Financial Systems --- Formal Bank --- Formal Financial Institutions --- Informal Finance --- International Bank

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Many microenterprises in developing countries have high returns to capital, but also face risky revenue streams. In principle, equity offers several advantages over debt when financing investments of this nature, but the use of equity in practice has been largely limited to investments in much larger firms. The authors develop a model contract to make self-liquidating, quasi-equity investments in microenterprises. This contract has three key parameters that can be used to shift risk between the entrepreneur and the investor, resulting in a continuum of contracts ranging from a debt-like contract that shifts little risk from the entrepreneur to a pure revenue-sharing contract in which the investor absorbs much more of the risk. The paper discusses implementation choices, and then provides lessons from a proof-of-concept carried out by an investment partner, KGC Equity, which made nine investments averaging USD 3,800 in Sri Lankan microenterprises. This pilot demonstrates that this new contract structure can work in practice, but also highlights the difficulties of micro-equity investments in an environment with weak contract enforcement.

Alternative Financing --- Contract Enforcement --- International Trade and Trade Rules --- Labor Markets --- Law and Development --- Marketing --- Micro-Equity --- Microenterprises --- Private Sector Development --- Private Sector Development Law --- Private Sector Economics --- Rural Microfinance and SME --- Social Protections and Labor