Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Adverse selection (Insurance) --- Health insurance --- Econometric models.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Health plans paid by capitation have an incentive to distort the quality of services they offer to attract profitable and to deter unprofitable enrollees. We characterize plans' rationing as imposing a show that the profit maximizing shadow price depends on the dispersion in health costs, how well individuals forecast their health costs, the correlation between use in different illness categories, and the risk adjustment system used for payment. We further show how these factors can be combined in an empirically implementable index that can be used to identify the services that will be most distorted in competition among managed care plans. A simple welfare measure is developed to quantify the distortion caused by selection incentives. We illustrate the application of our ideas with a Medicaid data set, and conduct policy analyses of risk adjustment and other options for dealing with adverse selection.

Managed care plans (Medical care) --- Adverse selection (Insurance)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via

Social law. Labour law --- Netherlands --- Insurance, Disability --- Adverse selection (Insurance) --- Insurance premiums --- Insurance, Disability - Netherlands. --- Adverse selection (Insurance) - Netherlands. --- Insurance premiums - Netherlands.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

There may be a price to pay (in terms of inefficient coverage) if competition among health insurers is encouraged as a way to give patients greater choice and to achieve better control over insurance providers.

Adverse selection (Insurance) --- Health insurance --- Managed care plans (Medical care) --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models. --- Mathematical models.

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper explores the evolution of OECD imports over time and as a function of income levels, measuring the concentration of those imports across origin countries at the product level. The authors find evidence of diversification followed, in the last years of the sample period (post-2000), by a slight re-concentration. This re-concentration is entirely explained by the growing importance of Chinese products in OECD imports. They also find evidence of relatively more volatile concentration levels for differentiated goods, consistent with a simple model of adverse selection and screening of suppliers by OECD buyers. Finally, they find that "accession" to OECD markets occurs directly (rather than after acquiring prior export experience on other markets) for more than half of the (extra-OECD) exporter/product pairs, but that one to eight years of experience enhances subsequent survival on OECD markets. Exports that reach OECD markets after more than eight years of experience elsewhere tend to survive less.

Adverse selection --- Barriers to entry --- Contestability --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Emerging markets --- Export growth --- Exports --- Externalities --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Income --- Income levels --- International Trade --- Labor Policies --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Market Entry --- Market share --- Markets and Market Access --- Microfinance --- Monopoly --- Monopoly price --- Product quality --- Social Protections and Labor --- Substitution --- Supplier --- Suppliers --- Supply chains --- Volatility