Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Can perceptions data help us understand investment climate constraints facing the private sector? Or do firms simply complain about everything? In this paper, the authors provide a picture of how firms' views on constraints differ across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys database, they find that reported constraints reflect country characteristics and vary systematically by level of income-the most elemental constraints to doing business (power, access to finance, ability to plan ahead) appear to be most binding at low levels of income. As countries develop and these elemental constraints are relaxed, governance-related constraints become more problematic. As countries move further up the income scale and the state becomes more capable, labor regulation is perceived to be more of a problem-business is just one among several important constituencies. The authors also consider whether firm-level characteristics-such as size, ownership, exporter status, and firms' own experience-affect firms' views on the severity of constraints. They find that, net of country and sector fixed effects and firm characteristics, firms' views do reflect their experience as evidenced by responses to other questions in surveys. The results suggest that there are both country-level and firm-level variations in the investment climate. Turning to the concept of "binding constraints," the Enterprise Surveys do not generally suggest one single binding constraint facing firms in difficult business climates. However, there do appear to be groups of constraints that matter more at different income levels, with a few elemental constraints being especially important at low levels and a few regulatory constraints at high levels, but a difficult range of governance-related constraints at intermediate levels. Adjusting to a constraint does not mean that firms then do not recognize it-for example, generator-owning firms are not distinguishable from other firms when ranking electricity as a constraint. Overall, firms do appear to discriminate between constraints in a reasonable way. Their views can provide a useful first step in the business-government consultative process and help in prioritizing more specific behavioral analysis and policy reforms.

Access to Credit --- Access to Finance --- Corruption --- Discrimination --- Earnings --- Economic Cooperation --- Emerging Markets --- Entrepreneurs --- Environment --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- International Bank --- Microfinance --- Multinationals --- Private Sector Development --- Sales Growth

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper provides evidence that commercial lenders in Peru free ride off their peers' screening efforts. Leveraging a discontinuity in the loan approval process of a large bank, the study finds that competing lenders responded to additional loan approvals by issuing approvals of their own. Competing lenders captured almost three-quarters of the new loans to previously financially excluded borrowers, greatly diminishing the profits accruing to the initiating bank. Lenders may therefore underinvest in screening new borrowers and expanding financial inclusion, as their competitors reap some of the benefit. The results highlight that information spillovers between lenders may operate outside credit registries.

Access to Credit --- Access to Finance --- Asymmetric Information --- Banking --- Credit Market Competition --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Inclusion --- Private Sector Development --- Small and Medium Size Enterprises --- SME Finance

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Can perceptions data help us understand investment climate constraints facing the private sector? Or do firms simply complain about everything? In this paper, the authors provide a picture of how firms' views on constraints differ across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. Using the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys database, they find that reported constraints reflect country characteristics and vary systematically by level of income-the most elemental constraints to doing business (power, access to finance, ability to plan ahead) appear to be most binding at low levels of income. As countries develop and these elemental constraints are relaxed, governance-related constraints become more problematic. As countries move further up the income scale and the state becomes more capable, labor regulation is perceived to be more of a problem-business is just one among several important constituencies. The authors also consider whether firm-level characteristics-such as size, ownership, exporter status, and firms' own experience-affect firms' views on the severity of constraints. They find that, net of country and sector fixed effects and firm characteristics, firms' views do reflect their experience as evidenced by responses to other questions in surveys. The results suggest that there are both country-level and firm-level variations in the investment climate. Turning to the concept of "binding constraints," the Enterprise Surveys do not generally suggest one single binding constraint facing firms in difficult business climates. However, there do appear to be groups of constraints that matter more at different income levels, with a few elemental constraints being especially important at low levels and a few regulatory constraints at high levels, but a difficult range of governance-related constraints at intermediate levels. Adjusting to a constraint does not mean that firms then do not recognize it-for example, generator-owning firms are not distinguishable from other firms when ranking electricity as a constraint. Overall, firms do appear to discriminate between constraints in a reasonable way. Their views can provide a useful first step in the business-government consultative process and help in prioritizing more specific behavioral analysis and policy reforms.

Access to Credit --- Access to Finance --- Corruption --- Discrimination --- Earnings --- Economic Cooperation --- Emerging Markets --- Entrepreneurs --- Environment --- Environmental Economics and Policies --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Governance --- Governance Indicators --- International Bank --- Microfinance --- Multinationals --- Private Sector Development --- Sales Growth

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

The importance of gender equality is reflected not only in the Millennium Development Goals, but also in the World Bank's Gender Action Plan launched in 2007 as well as in other treaties and actions undertaken at regional and international levels. Unlike other work on gender and poverty, which is mostly based on monetary measurement, the present study makes use of a counting approach to examine gender issues in Burkina Faso and Togo using household surveys. Focusing on six dimensions (housing, basic utilities, assets, education, employment, and access to credit) largely recognized as Millennium Development Goal targets, the main findings of the study indicate that overall individuals are the most deprived in education in Burkina Faso, while the reverse situation is true in Togo. Gender inequality is observed in all dimensions since women always seem to be more deprived than men. The situation is also marked by regional disparities. Moreover, the assessment of dimensional contributions shows different patterns for each country. While employment proves to be the main contributor of gender inequality in Burkina Faso, three dimensions (assets, access to credit, and employment) account together for most of the total contribution to gender inequality in Togo. There is also a positive correlation between multidimensional deprivation and women's age in Burkina Faso, whereas both measures seem to be uncorrelated in Togo.

Access to credit --- Assets --- Basic utilities --- Deprivation rates --- Education --- Employment --- Gender and Development --- Gender and Law --- Gender inequality --- Housing --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Multidimensional poverty --- Population Policies --- Poverty Reduction --- Regional Economic Development --- Rural Poverty Reduction

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

How do borrowers respond to improvements in a lender's ability to punish defaulters? This paper reports the results of a randomized field experiment in rural Malawi that examines the impact of fingerprinting borrowers in a context where a unique identification system is absent. Fingerprinting allows the lender to more effectively use dynamic repayment incentives: withholding future loans from past defaulters while rewarding good borrowers with better loan terms. Consistent with a simple model of borrower heterogeneity and information asymmetries, fingerprinting led to substantially higher repayment rates for borrowers with the highest ex ante default risk, but had no effect for the rest of the borrowers. The change in repayment rates is driven by reductions in adverse selection (smaller loan sizes) and lower moral hazard (for example, less diversion of loan-financed fertilizer from its intended use on the cash crop).

Access to credit --- Access to Finance --- Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress --- Borrower --- Collateral --- Credit market --- Credit markets --- Debt Markets --- Defaulters --- Economic Theory & Research --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Information asymmetries --- International bank --- Lender --- Lenders --- Loan --- Loan sizes --- Loan terms --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Microfinance --- Moral hazard --- Profitability --- Public policy --- Repayment --- Repayment rates --- Rural credit