Listing 1 - 10 of 26 | << page >> |
Sort by
|
Choose an application
Why is it difficult to restructure sovereign debt in a timely manner? In this paper we present a theory of the sovereign debt restructuring process in which delay arises as individual creditors hold-up a set- tlement in order to extract greater payments from the sovereign. We then use the theory to analyze recent policy proposals aimed at ensuring equal repayment of creditor claims. Strikingly, we show that such collective action policies may increase delay by encouraging free-riding on negotiation costs, even while preventing hold-up and reducing total negotiation costs. A calibrated version of the model can account for observed delays, and finds that free riding is quantitatively relevant: whereas in sim- ple low-cost debt restructuring operations collective mechanisms will reduce delay by more than 60%, in high-cost complicated restructurings the adoption of such mechanisms results in a doubling of delay.
Choose an application
Financial crises in emerging market countries appear to be very costly: both output and a host of partial welfare indicators decline dramatically. The magnitude of these costs is puzzling both from an accounting perspective -- factor usage does not decline as much as output, resulting in large falls in measured productivity -- and from a theoretical perspective. Towards a resolution of this puzzle, we present a framework that allows us to (i) account for changes in a country's measured productivity during a financial crises as the result of changes in the underlying technology of the economy, the efficiency with which resources are allocated across sectors, and the efficiency of the resource allocation within sectors driven both by reallocation amongst existing plants and by entry and exit; and (ii) measure the change in the country's welfare resulting from changes in productivity, government spending, the terms of trade, and a country's international investment position. We apply this framework to the Argentine crisis of 2001 using a unique establishment level data-set and find that more than half of the roughly 10% decline in measured total factor productivity can be accounted for by deterioration in the allocation of resources both across and within sectors. We measure the decline in welfare to be on the order of one-quarter of one years GDP.
Choose an application
In this essay we review the empirical literature about sovereign debt and default. As we survey the work of economists, historians, and political scientists, we also emphasize parallel developments by theorists and recommend steps to improve the correspondence between theory and data.
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
Choose an application
This solutions manual is a companion volume to the classic textbook Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics by Nancy L. Stokey and Robert E. Lucas. Efficient and lucid in approach, this manual will greatly enhance the value of Recursive Methods as a text for self-study.
Economics, Mathematical --- Recursive Functions --- Dynamic programming --- Economics, Mathematical. --- Recursive functions. --- Dynamic programming. --- Recursive functions --- E-books --- Mathematical optimization --- Programming (Mathematics) --- Systems engineering --- Functions, Recursive --- Algorithms --- Arithmetic --- Logic, Symbolic and mathematical --- Number theory --- Recursion theory --- Decidability (Mathematical logic) --- Economics --- Mathematical economics --- Econometrics --- Mathematics --- Foundations --- Methodology --- Mathématiques économiques --- Récursivité, Théorie de la --- Économétrie --- Programmation dynamique --- Économie politique --- Modèles mathématiques --- Mathématiques économiques --- Récursivité, Théorie de la --- Économétrie --- Économie politique --- Modèles mathématiques
Choose an application
The stock of sovereign debt is typically measured at face value. This is a misleading indicator when debts are issued with different contractual forms. In this paper we construct a new measure of the stock of external sovereign debt for 100 developing countries from 1979 to 2006 that is invariant to contractual form, and illustrate five problems with debt stocks measured at face value. First, we show that correcting for differences in the contractual form of debt paints a very different quantitative, and in some cases also qualitative, picture of the stock of developing country external sovereign debt. Second, rankings of indebtedness across countries, which were historically used to define eligibility for debt forgiveness, are sometimes inverted once we correct for differences in contractual form. Third, the empirical performance of the benchmark quantitative model of sovereign debt deteriorates by between 40 to 70 percent once model-consistent measures of debt are used. Fourth, we show how the spread of aggregation clauses in debt contracts which award creditors voting power in proportion to the contractual face value may introduce inefficiencies into the process of restructuring sovereign debts. Fifth, we show how the use of contractual face values gives issuing countries the ability to manipulate their debt stock data, and illustrate the use of these techniques in practice.
Listing 1 - 10 of 26 | << page >> |
Sort by
|