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ISBN: 9780262731874 9780262286046 0262286041 1282097474 9786612097478 1423790294 9781423790297 0262232561 9780262232562 Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge MIT Press
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Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
347.7 --- 347.7 Handelsrecht --- Handelsrecht --- Antitrust law --- Economic aspects --- ECONOMICS/Political Economy --- ECONOMICS/Microeconomics --- SOCIAL SCIENCES/Political Science/Public Policy & Law
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Year: 1990 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Year: 1989 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Year: 1996 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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ISBN: 007290027X 9780072900279 Year: 2008 Publisher: New York McGraw-Hill
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ISBN: 0195102681 0195073401 9780195073409 9780195102680 Year: 1995 Publisher: Oxford Oxford University Press
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Microeconomics --- Microeconomics. --- Micro-économie --- 000.1 --- 330.104 --- 338.5 --- Price theory --- Economics --- Algemene werken --- Micro-economie --- Micro-économie --- 330.1 --- 330.1 Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie --- Economische grondbegrippen. Algemene begrippen in de economie
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Year: 1995 Publisher: Oxford Oxford university press
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Year: 2013 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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This paper studies regulated health insurance markets known as exchanges, motivated by their inclusion in the Affordable Care Act (ACA). We use detailed health plan choice and utilization data to model individual-level projected health risk and risk preferences. We combine the estimated joint distribution of risk and risk preferences with a model of competitive insurance markets to predict outcomes under different regulations that govern insurers' ability to use health status information in pricing. We investigate the welfare implications of these regulations with an emphasis on two potential sources of inefficiency: (i) adverse selection and (ii) premium reclassification risk. We find that market unravelling from adverse selection is substantial under the proposed pricing rules in the Affordable Care Act (ACA), implying limited coverage for individuals beyond the lowest coverage (Bronze) health plan permitted. Although adverse selection can be attenuated by allowing (partial) pricing of health status, our estimated risk preferences imply that this would create a welfare loss from reclassification risk that is substantially larger than the gains from increasing within-year coverage, provided that consumers can borrow when young to smooth consumption or that age-based pricing is allowed. We extend the analysis to investigate some related issues, including (i) age-based pricing regulation (ii) exchange participation if the individual mandate is unenforceable and (iii) insurer risk-adjustment transfers.
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