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This report examines the possible outcomes of the North Korean threat to withdraw from the NPT and outlines alternative approaches for accomplishing U.S. security objectives affected by this situation. The report evaluates four approaches -- constructive engagement, grand deal, pressure, and graduated incentives -- in terms of whether the approaches help accomplish U.S. security objectives, whether they can be implemented given the other regional players involved, and whether they are robust given the fluidity of the situation in Korea. The report concludes that an approach that combines graduated incentives with pressure if the first approach fails is the most effective approach for meeting all three criteria. Specifically, the graduated incentives approach could accomplish all the U.S. security objectives, while the pressure approach could accomplish the major ones; in terms of implementation, graduated incentives is supported now and would lay the groundwork for regional support for pressure by demonstrating the United States has "gone the extra mile"; and in terms of robustness, graduated incentives would be effective if the North Korean "price" is low enough, while pressure could be effective regardless of North Korean motivation and would be consistent with a policy of counterproliferation.

Nuclear weapons --- Nuclear nonproliferation. --- United States --- Military policy.

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This report presents an overview of three fundamental negotiating strategies for dealing with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on arms control issues. The first strategy would maintain international pressure on the DPRK to accept both the routine and the challenge inspections required under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and to proceed with the bilateral North-South inspections endorsed by both sides in 1991. The second strategy would try to influence the future direction of DPRK development. The third strategy would use leverage for prying or dislodging the North from its uncertainty about making constructive arms control arrangements with the South. By treating arms control as a tool of international policymaking that can positively affect the political-military decisions of governments and actively contribute to the achievement of worthwhile objectives (e.g., security, stability, and non-proliferation on the Korean peninsula), the third strategy is the most creative. However, this strategy only works if DPRK nuclear policy is uncertain enough to be susceptible to inducement, or at least capable of movement in one direction or the other.

Arms control