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This paper examines heterogeneity in the responsiveness to default options in a large state retirement plan, focusing on individuals' decision-making approaches as well as their economic and demographic characteristics. Using a survey of plan participants, we find that procrastination and the need for cognitive closure are important determinants of the likelihood of default. We also explore an important implication of defaulting - individuals who default are significantly more likely to subsequently express a desire to enroll in a different plan. The desire to change plans is also correlated with numerous economic and decision-making characteristics, including procrastination.
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This paper provides evidence on the investment behavior of 27 state pension plans that manage their own equity portfolios. Even though these state plans typically hold broadly diversified portfolios, they substantially over-weight the equity of companies that are headquartered in-state. The over-weighting of within-state stocks by these plans is three times larger than that of other institutional investors. We explore three possible reasons for this in-state bias: familiarity bias, information-based investing, and political considerations. While there is a substantial preference for in-state stocks, there is no similar tilt toward holding stocks from neighboring states or out-of-state stocks in the state's primary industry. States generate excess returns through their in-state investment activities, particularly among smaller stocks in the state's primary industry. We also find that state pension plans are more likely to hold a within-state stock if the headquarters of the firm is located in a county that gave a high fraction of its campaign contributions to the current governor. These politically-motivated holdings yield excess returns for the pension fund.
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Because of differences in accrued gains and investors' tax-sensitivity, capital gains “lock-in” varies across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Using this variation, we show that tax lock-in affects funds' governance decisions. Higher tax lock-in decreases the likelihood a fund sells a stock prior to contentious votes, and increases the likelihood the fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivations, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. High aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predicts a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.
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