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Philosophical anthropology --- General ethics --- Ethics --- Psychology and philosophy --- Philosophy and psychology --- Philosophy --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Values --- Ethics. --- Psychology and philosophy.

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Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas. The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Themes that are addressed include reason, desire, and the will; responsibility, identification, and emotion; and the relation between morality and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason, and they articulate and defend a unified framework for thinking about those issues. The volume also features a helpful new introduction.

Normativity (Ethics). --- Practical reason. --- Will. --- Normativity (Ethics) --- Practical reason --- Will --- Cetanā --- Conation --- Volition --- Ethics --- Philosophy --- Psychology --- Self --- Practical rationality --- Practical reasoning --- Rationality, Practical --- Reasoning, Practical --- Reason --- Ethical norms --- Normativeness (Ethics)

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The View from Here is a study of our must fundamental attitudes toward the past. The book explores the dynamics of affirmation and regret, tracing the connections of each to our ongoing attachments. The focus is on situations in which our attachments commit us to affirming events or decisions that we know to have been unfortunate or regrettable.

Life --- Life change events --- Regret --- Values --- Axiology --- Worth --- Aesthetics --- Knowledge, Theory of --- Metaphysics --- Psychology --- Ethics --- Emotions --- Events, Life change --- Experiences, Stressful life --- Life events, Stressful --- Life experiences, Stressful --- Stressful events --- Stressful life events --- Developmental psychology --- Experience --- Stress (Psychology) --- Philosophy --- Life. --- Values. --- Life change events. --- Regret. --- Philosophical anthropology --- General ethics

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General ethics

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The Moral Nexus develops and defends a new interpretation of morality-namely, as a set of requirements that connect agents normatively to other persons in a nexus of moral relations. According to this relational interpretation, moral demands are directed to other individuals, who have claims that the agent comply with these demands. Interpersonal morality, so conceived, is the domain of what we owe to each other, insofar as we are each persons with equal moral standing.The book offers an interpretative argument for the relational approach. Specifically, it highlights neglected advantages of this way of understanding the moral domain; explores important theoretical and practical presuppositions of relational moral duties; and considers the normative implications of understanding morality in relational terms.The book features a novel defense of the relational approach to morality, which emphasizes the special significance that moral requirements have, both for agents who are deliberating about what to do and for those who stand to be affected by their actions. The book argues that relational moral requirements can be understood to link us to all individuals whose interests render them vulnerable to our agency, regardless of whether they stand in any prior relationship to us. It also offers fresh accounts of some of the moral phenomena that have seemed to resist treatment in relational terms, showing that the relational interpretation is a viable framework for understanding our specific moral obligations to other people.--

Ethics. --- Normativity (Ethics).