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Zonder onderwerpscode: wereldeconomie, ontwikkelingsproblematiek

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Using nationally representative, economywide data, this paper investigates the relative importance of trade-mandated effects on industry wage premia; industry and economywide skill premia; and employment flows in accounting for changes in the wage distribution in Brazil during the 1988-95 trade liberalization. Unlike in other Latin American countries, trade liberalization appears to have made a significant contribution toward a reduction in wage inequality. These effects have not occurred through changes in industry-specific (wage or skill) premia. Instead, they appear to have been channeled through substantial employment flows across sectors and formality categories. Changes in the economywide skill premium are also important.

Agriculture --- Debt Markets --- Development --- Distribution --- Economic Theory and Research --- Economy --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Financial Literacy --- Free Trade --- Goods --- Growth Rate --- Income --- Industry --- Inequality Measures --- International Economics & Trade --- Labor Markets --- Labor Policies --- Law and Development --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Per Capita Incomes --- Prices --- Private Sector Development --- Public Sector Development --- Social Protections and Labor --- Theory --- Total Factor Productivity --- Total Factor Productivity Growth --- Trade --- Trade Law --- Trade Liberalization --- Trade Policy --- Trade Reforms --- Trends --- Value --- Wages --- Water and Industry --- Water Resources

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Facing a fiscal crisis, the Islamic Republic of Iran decided to increase gasoline prices at the end of 2019. This paper estimates the impact of the price increase on household welfare and government revenue, using the most recent Household Expenditure and Income Survey conducted by the Statistical Center of Iran in March 2018-March 2019. The paper looks at the direct and indirect impacts of the reform and quantifies the compensatory cash transfer program the government instituted. Despite very regressive gasoline subsidies benefitting the rich the most, the increase in gasoline prices is found to affect the poor to a greater extent due to larger negative indirect impacts as well as their relatively low incomes. In total, poverty is estimated to increase by about 2.9 percentage points, with the direct impact accounting for a third of this increase. The proposed government scheme, if targeted perfectly to the poorest 18 million households, would fully compensate the poorest bottom 50 percent of the population and reduce poverty to below pre-reform levels. The annual cost of the program will be around 338 trillion rials, which accounts for 77 percent of the estimated total savings from the subsidies reform (439 trillion rials).

Cash Transfers --- Energy Demand --- Energy Policies and Economics --- Fiscal Impact --- Fiscal Trends --- Gasoline Price --- Income Elasticity --- Inequality --- Oil and Gas --- Oil Prices --- Poverty --- Services and Transfers to Poor --- Subsidies --- Taxation and Subsidies

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Human services. --- Public welfare.

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Economic theory suggests that, when designing aid programs, ordeal mechanisms that impose differential costs for rich and poor can induce self-selection and hence improve targeting ("self-targeting"). We first re-examine this theory and show that ordeal mechanisms may actually have theoretically ambiguous effects on targeting: for example, time spent applying imposes a higher monetary cost on the rich, but may impose a higher utility cost on the poor. We then examine these issues empirically by conducting a 400-village field experiment within Indonesia's Conditional Cash Transfer program. Targeting in the program is usually conducted by automatically enrolling candidates who pass an asset test. We compare whether instituting an ordeal mechanism, where villagers come to a central application site to apply and take the asset test, improves targeting over the existing automatic enrollment system. Within self-targeting villages, we find that the poor are more likely to apply, even conditional on whether they would pass the asset test. On net, self-targeting villages have a much poorer group of beneficiaries than status quo villages. However, marginally increasing the ordeal does not necessarily improve targeting: while experimentally increasing the distance to the application site reduces the number of applicants, it screens out both rich and poor in roughly equal proportions. Estimating the model structurally, we show that only one would need to increase the ordeal dramatically (e.g. tripling wait times to 9 hours or more) to induce detectable additional selection. In short, ordeal mechanisms can induce self-selection, but marginally increasing the ordeal can impose additional costs on applicants without necessarily improving targeting.