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Book
Year: 2020 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research
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Year: 2011 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research
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Digital
Year: 2003 Publisher: Munich CESifo
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Year: 2014 Publisher: London Centre for economic policy research
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Digital
Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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A principal provides budgets to agents (e.g., divisions of a firm or the principal's children) whose expenditures provide her benefits, either materially or because of altruism. Only agents know their potential to generate benefits. We prove that if the more "productive" agents are also more risk-tolerant (as holds in the sample of individuals we surveyed), the principal can screen agents and bolster target efficiency by offering a choice between a nonrandom budget and a two-outcome risky budget. When, at very low allocations, the ratio of the more risk-averse type's marginal utility to that of the other type is unbounded above (e.g., as with CRRA), the first-best is approached. -- A biblical opening enlivens the analysis.
Digital
Year: 2015 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This reaction reflects reasonably rational use of information. "Tone surprise" - the residual when negativity in managerial tone is regressed on the firm's recent economic performance and CEO fixed effects - predicts future earnings and analyst uncertainty. Prices move more, as hypothesized, in firms where tone surprise predicts more strongly. Experienced analysts respond appropriately in revising their forecasts; inexperienced analysts overreact (underreact) to tone surprises in presentations (answers). Post-call price drift, like post-earnings announcement drift, suggests less-than-full-use of information embedded in managerial tone.
Digital
Year: 2017 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Managers conducting earnings conference calls display distinctive styles in their word choice. Some CEOs and CFOs are straight talkers. Others, by contrast, are vague talkers. Vague talkers routinely use qualifying words indicating uncertainty, such as "approximately", "probably", or "maybe". Analysts and the stock market attend to the style of managerial talk. They find earnings news less informative when managers are vague; they respond less and more slowly as a result. Thus, quantitative information and straightforward contextual information prove to be complements. Vague communications have the potential benefit of tamping down over-optimistic analysts expectations.
Digital
Year: 2018 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research
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Donald Trump's 2016 election and the subsequent nomination of Scott Pruitt, a climate skeptic, to lead the Environmental Protection Agency drastically downshifted expectations on US climate change policy. Firms' stock-price reactions to these events reveal whether their climate strategies affected their valuations. As widely reported, firms in industries with high carbon intensity benefited, at least briefly. It might be expected that companies with "responsible" strategies on climate change would also have lost value, since they were paying for actions that seemed less urgent. In fact, investors actually rewarded such firms. The analysis shows that this observed climate responsibility premium results, at least in part, from the strategic behavior of long-horizon investors who looked into the future to assess the valuation of corporations.
Book
Year: 2015 Publisher: London Centre for economic policy research
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