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This paper summarizes the estimates of what Russia will get from World Trade Organization accession and why. A key finding is the estimate that Russia will gain about USD 53 billion per year in the medium term from World Trade Organization accession and USD 177 billion per year in the long term, due largely to its own commitments to reform its own business services sectors. The paper summarizes the principal reform commitments that Russia has undertaken as part of its World Trade Organization accession negotiations, and compares them with those of other countries that have acceded to the World Trade Organization. It finds that the Russian commitments represent a liberal offer to the members of the World Trade Organization for admission, but they are typical of other transition countries that have acceded to the World Trade Organization. The authors discuss the outstanding issues in the Russian World Trade Organizaiton accession negotiations, and explain why Russian accession will result in the elimination of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment against Russia. They discuss Russian policies to attract foreign direct investment, including an assessment of the impact of the 2008 law on strategic sectors and the increased role of the state in the economy. Finally, the authors assess the importance of Russian accession to Russia and to the international trading community, and suggestions for most efficiently meeting the government's diversification objective.

Consumers --- Debt Markets --- Economic Theory & Research --- Economics --- Emerging Markets --- Exchange rates --- Finance and Financial Sector Development --- Free rider --- Free rider problem --- Free Trade --- GDP --- Growth rate --- Industrialization --- International Economics and Trade --- International trade --- Macroeconomics and Economic Growth --- Marginal benefits --- Open economies --- Open economy --- Political economy --- Private Sector Development --- Purchasing Power --- Telecommunications --- Trade disputes --- Trade liberalization --- Trade policy --- World Trade Organization --- WTO

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We study the effect of media coverage on corporate governance by focusing on Russia in the period 1999-2002. This setting offers us three ideal conditions for such a study: plenty of corporate governance violations, no alternative mechanisms to address them, and the presence of an investment fund (the Hermitage) that actively lobbies the international press to shame companies perpetrating those violations. We find that Hermitage’s lobbying is effective in increasing the coverage of corporate governance violations in the Anglo-American press. We also find that coverage in the Anglo-American press increases the probability that a corporate governance violation is reversed. This effect is present even when we instrument coverage with an exogenous determinant, i.e. the Hermitage’s portfolio composition at the beginning of the period. The Hermitage’s strategy seems to work in part by impacting Russian companies’ reputation abroad and in part by forcing regulators into action.