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The U.S. Army perceives a gap between its current light and heavy forces: light forces deploy rapidly, but lack staying power; heavy forces have immense power, but take too long to deploy. To close this gap and also to experiment with new tactics, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, has begun a transformation process that will field medium-weight brigade combat teams beginning in 2003. The Army goal is to make these brigades light enough to deploy anywhere in the world in 4 days. Initially, these brigades will supplement the light and heavy forces. Over the next 20 to 30 years,

Airlift, Military. --- Military sealift. --- Unified operations (Military science). --- Armies --- Military & Naval Science --- Law, Politics & Government --- Unified operations (Military science) --- Airlift, Military --- Military sealift --- United States. --- Reorganization. --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Foreign service. --- Naval transportation --- Sea lift, Military --- Sealift, Military --- Joint operations (Military science) --- Unified commands (Military science) --- U.S. Army --- US Army --- Transportation, Military --- Military art and science --- Strategy --- Tactics

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Air power --- Historiography. --- United States. --- Public opinion --- History.

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"Good posture planning must distinguish powerful long-term trends from headline-grabbing events, have sufficient breadth to capture a wide range of possible posture demands, and be robust in the face of the inevitable uncertainties about where, when, and how U.S. interests will be challenged. U.S. Air Force (USAF) planners must design a posture that can evolve to meet changing global demands over a multidecade period, while making immediate adaptations to meet the demands of today's crises and contingencies. Planning processes typically are based on assumptions, making judgments about the relative probability and importance of demands and other factors, but at least some of these assumptions are bound to be wrong. The planning process should seek to reduce the importance of assumptions by designing a posture that is robust across many alternative futures, including diverse assumptions and a wide range of demands. Massive scenario generation and contingent event analysis can test future posture options across a wide range of demands. Planners should also combine sufficient posture "stickiness" to maintain enduring access in key locations and sufficient agility to surge from these locations to meet out-of-area demands and shrink back as operational demands end"--Publisher's description.

National security --- Strategy. --- Planning. --- United States. --- Operational readiness. --- United States --- Defenses --- Military policy

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In reviewing the history of the USAF in lesser conflicts, the authors of this report were struck by two facts: (1) The USAF has faced light infantry opponents (or light forces) many times over the years and (2) it is increasingly being called upon to detect and engage such forces (e.g., in Somalia and Bosnia). Despite the salience of this target set, light forces have received little attention from the USAF or aerospace community since the end of the Vietnam War. Although R & D has not been directed at this specific problem, the project team believed that many of the sensor programs designed to detect critical mobile targets or armor could be applied to infantry also. Major advances in detector material design and fabrication, combined with 30 years of progress in the computer field, suggested to the authors that, if it desired, the USAF could make a great leap forward in offensive capabilities against light infantry by applying technologies already developed for these other purposes. The objective of this effort was to explore the signatures and vulnerabilities of adversary light forces, to identify promising sensor and weapon technologies applicable to this target set, and to develop new concepts of operation (OPCONs) that would bring together sensors, weapons, aircraft, and tactics to defeat this opponent. This report presents the results of that effort, including 12 such OPCONs. It should be of interest to USAF personnel in operations, plans, intelligence, and acquisition billets. It also may interest Army, Navy, and Marine aviators, the Special Operations community, and scientists at DoD laboratories.

Light infantry. --- United States. --- Drill and tactics.

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In air-to-air combat, the unseen opponent is the greatest threat. An enemy pilot who slips onto your tail, your "six o'clock," is the one who is most likely to shoot you down. The classic fighter dictum, "keep checking six," may be as applicable on the ramp and on the runways as it is at 20,000 feet. This report explores the possibility that future adversaries will use ground attacks on U.S. Air Force (USAF) bases as at least a partial countermeasure to overwhelming U.S. air superiority. It also identifies, in broad terms, the types of initiatives that have the most potential to counter this evolving threat. The means, motives, and opportunity for ground attacks are converging to create a worsening ground threat to USAF air bases. Base vulnerability will be exacerbated by the kinds of expeditionary operations that are likely to be the most common military action in the future. Standoff attacks from perhaps several miles outside the base's perimeter pose the greatest danger, a danger that is amplified by the ongoing diffusion of affordable-yet-sophisticated weapon technologies and military gear. Surveillance and detection of enemy attack teams well outside the base perimeter will be key to protecting the base, its assets, and its personnel. The authors suggest that increasing the capabilities of the Security Police (SP) against the standoff threat will require some changes in USAF training policies and utilization of passive measures (e.g., deception, camouflage, and hardening) to protect key USAF assets. Finally, whereas defense of air bases against ground attack has been traditionally viewed within the USAF as an SP problem, the authors judge that it should be more properly seen as a challenge to airpower itself, since without secure bases, USAF operations could be severely impeded

Air bases --- Security measures --- United States. --- Security measures.