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We study a model where an employer, trying to fill a vacancy, engages in optimal sequential search by drawing from two subpopulations of candidates who differ in their "discourse systems": during an interview, a minority candidate with a discourse system not shared with the employer conveys a noisier unbiased signal of ability than does a majority candidate. We show that, when the employer is "selective," minority candidates are underrepresented in the permanent workforce, fired at greater rates, and underrepresented among initial hires, even though the employer has no taste for discrimination and the populations are alike in their average ability. Furthermore, workplace diversity is increased if: (1) the cost of firing is reduced, (2) the cost of interviewing is increased, (3) the opportunity cost of leaving the position unfilled is increased, or (4) the prior probability that a candidate can perform the job is increased. Indeed, if the prior probability is sufficiently high, or the cost of firing sufficiently low, then minority candidates may be overrepresented in the permanent workforce.

Diversity in the workplace. --- Electronic books. -- local. --- Multiculturalism. --- Cultural diversity policy --- Cultural pluralism --- Cultural pluralism policy --- Ethnic diversity policy --- Multiculturalism --- Cultural diversity in the workplace --- Cultural diversity in workforce --- Diversity in the workforce --- Diversity in the work place --- Multicultural diversity in the workplace --- Multicultural workforce --- Workforce diversity --- Government policy --- Social policy --- Anti-racism --- Ethnicity --- Cultural fusion --- Personnel management --- Labor --- Demography --- Firm Behavior --- Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement --- Labor Discrimination --- Labor Discrimination: Public Policy --- Demographic Economics: General --- Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search --- Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure --- Demand and Supply of Labor: General --- Labour --- income economics --- Population & demography --- Population and demographics --- Labor force --- Unemployment --- Unemployment rate --- Labor markets --- Population --- Labor market --- Netherlands, The --- Income economics

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The Limits of Meritocracy.

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We study vote buying by competing interest groups in a variety of electoral and contractual settings. While increasing the size of a voting body reduces its buyability in the absence of competition, we show that larger voting bodies may be more buyable than smaller voting bodies when interest groups compete. In contrast, imposing the secret ballot---which we model as forcing interest groups to contract on outcomes rather than votes---is an effective way to fight vote buying in the presence of competition, but much less so in its absence. We also study more sophisticated vote buying contracts. We show that, regardless of competition, the option to contract on both votes and outcomes is worthless, as it does not affect buyability as compared to contracting only on votes. In contrast, when interest groups can contract on votes and vote shares, we show that voting bodies are uniquely at risk of being bought.

Finance: General --- Taxation --- Criminology --- Social Choice --- Clubs --- Committees --- Associations --- Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior --- Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation --- General Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data) --- Bureaucracy --- Administrative Processes in Public Organizations --- Corruption --- Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General --- Finance --- Corporate crime --- white-collar crime --- Public finance & taxation --- Competition --- Tax incentives --- Financial markets --- Crime --- Taiwan Province of China --- Voting research. --- Elections --- Lobbying. --- Pressure groups. --- Corrupt practices. --- White-collar crime

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We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking incontests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and isPareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement andcomplacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy maybe optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity.

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This paper offers novel evidence on the impact of raising bank capital requirements in the context of an emerging market: Peru. Using quarterly bank-level data and exploiting the adoption of bank-specific capital buffers, we find that higher capital requirements have a short-lived, negative impact on bank credit in Peru, although this effect becomes statistically insignificant in about half a year. This finding is robust to estimating different specifications to address concerns about the exogeneity of capital requirements. The fact that the reform was gradual and pre-announced and that banks were highly profitable at the time could explain the short-lived effects on credit.

Banks and Banking --- Money and Monetary Policy --- Industries: Financial Services --- Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy --- Banks --- Depository Institutions --- Micro Finance Institutions --- Mortgages --- Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation --- Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: General --- Banking --- Monetary economics --- Financial services law & regulation --- Finance --- Bank credit --- Credit --- Countercyclical capital buffers --- Loans --- Money --- Financial institutions --- Financial regulation and supervision --- Capital adequacy requirements --- Banks and banking --- Asset requirements --- Peru