Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

International economic relations --- United States of America

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

This paper re-explores the relation between a country's level of wealth and the mix of products it exports. We argue that both are simultaneously determined by countries' capabilities i.e. by countries' productivity and quality levels for each good. Our theoretical setup has two features. (1) Some goods have fewer high-quality producers/countries than others i.e. there is Ricardian comparative advantage. (2) Imperfect competition allows high- and low-quality producers to coexist, which we refer to as 'product ranges'. These two features generate a very particular non-monotonic, general equilibrium relationship between a country's export mix and its wage (GDP per capita). We show that this non-monotonicity permeates the 1980-2005 international data on trade and GDP per capita. Our setup also explains two other facets of the data: (1) Product ranges are huge and (2) for the poorest third of countries, changes in export mix substantially over-predict growth in GDP per capita. This suggests that the main challenge for low-income countries is to raise quality and productivity in their existing product lines.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

Choose an application

• Reference Manager
• EndNote
• RefWorks (Direct export to RefWorks)

International trade can have profound effects on domestic institutions. We examine this proposition in the context of medieval Venice circa 800-1350. We show that (initially exogenous) increases in long-distance trade enriched a large group of merchants and these merchants used their new-found muscle to push for constraints on the executive i.e., for the end of a de facto hereditary Doge in 1032 and for the establishment of a parliament or Great Council in 1172. The merchants also pushed for remarkably modern innovations in contracting institutions (such as the colleganza) that facilitated large-scale mobilization of capital for risky long-distance trade. Over time, a group of extraordinarily rich merchants emerged and in the almost four decades following 1297 they used their resources to block political and economic competition. In particular, they made parliamentary participation hereditary and erected barriers to participation in the most lucrative aspects of long-distance trade. We document this 'oligarchization' using a unique database on the names of 8,103 parliamentarians and their families' use of the colleganza. In short, long-distance trade first encouraged and then discouraged institutional dynamism and these changes operated via the impacts of trade on the distribution of wealth and power.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie