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Economics of Women's Rights
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Year: 2022 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Who Owns Children and Does it Matter?
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? In this paper we propose and analyze a particular market failure that may lead to inefficiently low equilibrium fertility and therefore to a need for government intervention. The friction we investigate is related to the ownership of children. If parents have no claim on their children's income, then the private benefit from producing a child may be smaller than the social benefit. We present an overlapping-generations (OLG) model with fertility choice and altruism, and model ownership by introducing a minimum constraint on transfers from parents to children. Using the efficiency concepts proposed in Golosov, Jones, and Tertilt (2007), we find that whenever the transfer floor is binding, fertility choices are inefficient. We show how this inefficiency relates to dynamic inefficiency in standard OLG models with exogenous fertility and Millian efficiency in models with endogenous fertility. In particular, we show that the usual conditions for efficiency are no longer sufficient. Further, we analyze several government policies in this context. We find that, in contrast to settings with exogenous fertility, a PAYG social security system cannot be used to implement the efficient allocation. To achieve the efficient outcome, government transfers need to be tied to a person's fertility choice in order to provide incentives for child-bearing.


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Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development?
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to fathers) increases expenditures on children. From this, should we infer that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative model of household decision making to answer this question. We show that when women have lower wages than men, they may spend more on children, even when they have exactly the same preferences as their husbands. However, this does not necessarily mean that giving money to women is a good development policy. We show that depending on the nature of the production function, targeting transfers to women may be beneficial or harmful to growth. In particular, such transfers are more likely to be beneficial when human capital, rather than physical capital or land, is the most important factor of production.


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Does female empowerment promote economic development?
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Munich CESifo

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Families in Macroeconomics
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Year: 2016 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Much of macroeconomics is concerned with the allocation of physical capital, human capital, and labor over time and across people. The decisions on savings, education, and labor supply that generate these variables are made within families. Yet the family (and decision-making in families) is typically ignored in macroeconomic models. In this chapter, we argue that family economics should be an integral part of macroeconomics, and that accounting for the family leads to new answers to classic macro questions. Our discussion is organized around three themes. We start by focusing on short and medium run fluctuations, and argue that changes in family structure in recent decades have important repercussions for the determination of aggregate labor supply and savings. Next, we turn to economic growth, and describe how accounting for families is central for understanding differences between rich and poor countries and for the determinants of long-run development. We conclude with an analysis of the role of the family as a driver of political and institutional change.


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Women's liberation: what's in it for men?
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Year: 2008 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

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Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development?
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Year: 2011 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? The authors develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. Then they assess the policy implications of these models. The authors find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.


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Women's liberation: what's in it for men?
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Year: 2008 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research

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Who owns children and does it matter?
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Year: 2010 Publisher: London Centre For Economic Policy Research

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Book
Does Female Empowerment Promote Economic Development?
Authors: ---
Year: 2011 Publisher: Washington, D.C., The World Bank,

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Abstract

Empirical evidence suggests that money in the hands of mothers (as opposed to their husbands) benefits children. Does this observation imply that targeting transfers to women is good economic policy? The authors develop a series of noncooperative family bargaining models to understand what kind of frictions can give rise to the observed empirical relationships. Then they assess the policy implications of these models. The authors find that targeting transfers to women can have unintended consequences and may fail to make children better off. Moreover, different forms of empowering women may lead to opposite results. More research is needed to distinguish between alternative theoretical models.

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