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This book sheds new light on the history of the philosophically crucial notion of intentionality, which accounts for one of the most distinctive aspects of our mental life: the fact that our thoughts are about objects. Intentionality is often described as a certain kind of relation. Focusing on Franz Brentano, who introduced the notion into contemporary philosophy, and on the Aristotelian tradition, which was Brentano’s main source of inspiration, the book reveals a rich history of debate on precisely the relational nature of intentionality. It shows that Brentano and the Aristotelian authors from which he drew not only addressed the question whether intentionality is a relation, but also devoted extensive discussions to what kind of relation it is, if any. The book aims to show that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from two other relations with which it might be confused, namely, causality and reference, which also hold between thoughts and their objects. Intentionality accounts for the aboutness of a thought; causality, by contrast, explains how the thought is generated, and reference, understood as a sort of similarity, occurs when the object towards which the thought is directed exists. Brentano claims to find some anticipation of his views in Aristotle. This book argues that, whether or not Brentano’s interpretation of Aristotle is correct, his claim is true of the Aristotelian tradition as a whole, since followers of Aristotle more or less explicitly made some or all of Brentano’s distinctions. This is demonstrated through examination of some major figures of the Aristotelian tradition (broadly understood), including Alexander of Aphrodisias, the Neoplatonic commentators, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Francisco Suárez. This book combines a longue durée approach – focusing on the long-term evolution of philosophical concepts rather than restricting itself to a specific author or period – with systematic analysis in the history of philosophy. By studying Brentano and the Aristotelian authors with theoretical sensitivity, it also aims to contribute to our understanding of intentionality and cognate features of the mind.

Philosophy (General). --- Phenomenology . --- Psychology --- History of Philosophy. --- Phenomenology. --- History of Psychology. --- Philosophy, Modern --- History. --- Philosophy. --- Psychology. --- Behavioral sciences --- Mental philosophy --- Mind --- Science, Mental --- Human biology --- Philosophy --- Soul --- Mental health --- Humanities

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Anton Marty (Schwyz, 1847–Prague, 1914) contributed significantly to some of the central themes of Austrian philosophy. This collection contributes to assessing the specificity of his theses in relation with other Austrian philosophers. Although strongly inspired by his master, Franz Brentano, Marty developed his own theory of intentionality, understood as a sui generis relation of similarity. Moreover, he established a comprehensive philosophy of language, or "semasiology", based on descriptive psychology, and in which the utterer’s meaning plays a central role, anticipating Grice’s pragmatic semantics. The present volume, including sixteen articles by scholars in the field of the history of Austrian philosophy and in contemporary philosophy, aims at exposing some of Marty’s most important contributions in philosophy of mind and language, but also in other fields of research such as ontology and metaphysics. As archive material, the volume contains the edition of a correspondence between Marty and Hans Cornelius on similarity. This book will interest scholars in the fields of the history of philosophy in the 19th and 20th centuries, historians of phenomenology, and, more broadly, contemporary theoretical philosophers.

Linguistics --- Philosophy, Austrian --- Philosophy. --- Marty, Anton, --- Marty, Martin Anton Maurus, --- Marty, A. --- Franz Brentano. --- Intention. --- meaning. --- similarity. --- Philosophy --- Marty, Anton

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Mark Lewis travaille aux confins du white cube et de la black box, explorant les limites et les potentialités du cinéma. Il étudie, par exemple, les conventions cinématographiques standardisées telles que les génériques, les séquences de fin et les scènes entre les actions, ainsi que les dispositifs cinématographiques élémentaires, y compris les mouvements de caméra, les zooms ou les panoramiques. Partant d’une perspective dé-constructionniste, Mark Lewis avait développé son propre langage formel, rappelant les débuts du cinéma à l’ère post-conceptuelle. Ce volume comprend un portfolio de Mark Lewis, un entretien avec l’artiste et une série d’essais qui s’appuient sur des outils forgés dans les domaines de l’histoire de l’art, de la philosophie et des études cinématographiques. La publication donne accès, sur internet, à une sélection de films de Mark Lewis, représentatifs de sa vaste approche formelle et conceptuelle, depuis ses premiers films, « impossibles », jusqu’à ses œuvres ultérieures, « possibles ».

Cinéma expérimental --- Art conceptuel --- Lewis, Mark --- Lewis, Mark - 1947-