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Administrative bodies, not legislatures, are the primary lawmakers in our society. This book develops a theory to explain this fact based on the concept of trust. Drawing upon Law, History and Social Science, Edward H. Stiglitz argues that a fundamental problem of trust pervades representative institutions in complex societies. Due to information problems that inhere to complex societies, the public often questions whether the legislature is acting on their behalf-or is instead acting on the behalf of narrow, well-resourced concerns. Administrative bodies, as constrained by administrative law, promise procedural regularity and relief from aspects of these information problems. This book addresses fundamental questions of why our political system takes the form that it does, and why administrative bodies proliferated in the Progressive Era. Using novel experiments, it empirically supports this theory and demonstrates how this vision of the state clarifies prevailing legal and policy debates.

Administrative law --- Administrative law.

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The Reputational Premium presents a new theory of party identification, the central concept in the study of voting. Challenging the traditional idea that voters identify with a political party out of blind emotional attachment, this pioneering book explains why party identification in contemporary American politics enables voters to make coherent policy choices. Standard approaches to the study of policy-based voting hold that voters choose based on the policy positions of the two candidates competing for their support. This study demonstrates that candidates can get a premium in support from the policy reputations of their parties. In particular, Paul Sniderman and Edward Stiglitz present a theory of how partisans take account of the parties' policy reputations as a function of the competing candidates' policy positions. A central implication of this theory of reputation-centered choices is that party identification gives candidates tremendous latitude in their policy positioning. Paradoxically, it is the party supporters who understand and are in synch with the ideological logic of the American party system who open the door to a polarized politics precisely by making the best-informed choices on offer.

Political parties --- Party affiliation. --- Parties, Political --- Party systems, Political --- Political party systems --- Political science --- Divided government --- Intra-party disagreements (Political parties) --- Political conventions --- Affiliation, Party --- Political affiliation --- Public opinion. --- Membership --- American party system. --- American politics. --- Democrats. --- Republicans. --- candidate positioning. --- democratic experiment. --- democratic politics. --- elected representatives. --- electoral punishment. --- partisans. --- party identification. --- policy conviction. --- policy positions. --- policy preferences. --- policy reputations. --- policy-based voting. --- political competence. --- political landscape. --- political parties. --- political party. --- programmatic partisanship. --- programmatic party identifiers. --- reputational premium. --- spatial reasoning. --- spatial voting. --- supply-side theory. --- voters.

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Presidents often attach statements to the bills they sign into law, purporting to celebrate, construe, or object to provisions in the statute. Though long a feature of U.S. lawmaking, the President has avowedly attempted to use these signing statements as tool of strategic influence over judicial decisionmaking since the 1980s--as a way of creating "presidential legislative history" to supplement and, at times, supplant the traditional congressional legislative history conventionally used by the courts to interpret statutes. In this Article, we examine a novel dataset of judicial opinion citations to presidential signing statements to conduct the most comprehensive empirical examination of how courts have received presidential legislative history to date. Three main findings emerge from this analysis. First, contrary to the pervasive (and legitimate) fears in the literature on signing statements, courts rarely cite signing statements in their decisions. Second, in the aggregate, when courts cite signing statements, they cite them in predictably partisan ways, with judges citing Presidents' signing statements from their own political parties more often than those of the opposing parties. This effect, however, is driven entirely by the behavior of Republican-appointed appellate jurists. Third, courts predominately employ signing statements to buttress aligned statutory text and conventional sources of legislative history, and seemingly never rely on them to override contrary plain statutory text or even unified traditional legislative history. This suggests that signing statements have low rank among interpretative tools and courts primarily use them to complement rather than substitute for congressional legislative history. In this sense, Presidents have largely failed to establish an alternative corpus of valid interpretive material.

Zonder onderwerpscode: economie

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This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a "democratic" benchmark based on voter preferences, and a "republican" benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research.