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Phenomenology --- Transcendence (Philosophy) --- Phénoménologie --- Transcendance (Philosophie) --- Phénoménologie

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This edited collection explores the problem of violence from the vantage point of meaning. Taking up the ambiguity of the word ‘meaning’, the chapters analyse the manner in which violence affects and in some cases constitutes the meaningful structure of our lifeworld, on individual, social, religious and conceptual levels. The relationship between violence and meaning is multifaceted, and is thus investigated from a variety of different perspectives within the continental tradition of philosophy, including phenomenology, post-structuralism, critical theory and psychoanalysis. Divided into four parts, the volume explores diverging meanings of the concept of violence, as well as transcendent or religious violence- a form of violence that takes place between humanity and the divine world. Going on to investigate instances of immanent and secular violence, which occur at the level of the group, community or society, the book concludes with an exploration of violence and meaning on the individual level: violence at the level of the self, or between particular persons. With its focus on the manifold of relations between violence and meaning, as well as its four part focus on conceptual, transcendent, immanent and individual violence, the book is both multi-directional and multi-layered.

Violence --- Philosophy. --- Social sciences—Philosophy. --- Ethics. --- Political philosophy. --- Phenomenology . --- Social Philosophy. --- Moral Philosophy. --- Political Philosophy. --- Phenomenology. --- Philosophy, Modern --- Political philosophy --- Deontology --- Ethics, Primitive --- Ethology --- Moral philosophy --- Morality --- Morals --- Philosophy, Moral --- Science, Moral --- Philosophy --- Values --- Social sciences --- Political science --- Moral Philosophy and Applied Ethics. --- Social philosophy --- Social theory

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Heidegger possessed a language of crisis and danger throughout his career which he never relinquished. He suspected that the western world was descending into nihilism, and that hope for philosophy and the sciences was threatened in their essences. The source of this threat in his view was modern technology, seen as the consummation of the history of metaphysics. At one level, Heidegger’s thinking is representative of many contemporaries in German interwar conservative and reactionary circles. Yet Heidegger’s notion of modern technology was especially shaped by the works of Ernst Jünger. Their relationship, and the relationship of their ideas can illuminate what Heidegger had in mind when he questioned technology, and the vision he had both of history and of the future. Despite the broad insights they share, Jünger and Heidegger however, end up with significantly different dispositions; whereas, the former exalts in technology and the age it brought about, Heidegger expressed fear and apprehension. This paper will seek to explain Jünger and Heidegger’s respective approaches to technology and history, and furthermore identify the precise points of resonance between them. It shall follow their vision in order to understand why Heidegger concluded that Jünger’s reading of history and technology was not only incorrect, but dangerous.

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The present text discusses the phenomenon of death and its impact on the self-understanding of the human being. I try to show that Levinas’ reflections on death can be read as a viable alternative to Heidgger’s approach to the same topic. Heidegger’s analysis of death reveals the irreplaceable character of Dasein and the responsibility that Dasein has towards itself. However, it meets its limits when confronted by questions relating to the death of the other human being. In Heidegger the death of the other does not become relevant in the problem of Dasein’s authenticity. In contrast to Heidegger, Levinas puts the death of the other in the center of his thinking. More precisely, he states that the death of the fellow human being is a source of passivity and affectivity; like the manifestation of the other as face, death reveals the intersubjective character of human existence. For Levinas, the death or dying of the other inspires awareness of our responsibility. I also argue that Levinasian thought finds application in concrete life situations, such as those that involve dementia care. Like the encounter with the face of the other, the vulnerability of demented people provokes an experience of pure passivity and affectivity. Interdependency and human suffering are not marks of weakness, but are fundamental characteristics of human existence: they point to our basic responsibility for the other.