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There are two main ways in which things with minds, like us, differ from things without minds, like tables and chairs. First, we are conscious—there is something that it is like to be us. We instantiate phenomenal properties. Second, we represent, in various ways, our world as being certain ways. We instantiate representational properties. Jeff Speaks attempts to make progress on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? How are the phenomenal and the representational related?

Philosophy of language --- Theory of knowledge --- Phénoménologie --- Phenomenology --- Representation (Philosophy) --- Consciousness --- Phénoménologie.

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Philosophy, science, and common sense all refer to propositions - things we believe and say, and things which are true or false. But there is no consensus on what sorts of things these entities are. Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames, and Jeff Speaks argue that commitment to propositions is indispensable, and each defend their own views on the debate.

Proposition (Logic)