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Can nuclear agreements like the Iran deal work ? This book develops formal bargaining models to show that they can over time, despite apparent incentives to cheat. Existing theories of nuclear proliferation fail to account for the impact of bargaining on the process. The author explores how credible agreements exist in which rival states make concessions to convince rising states not to proliferate and argues in support of nuclear negotiations as effective counter-proliferation tools. This book proves not only the existence of settlements but also the robustness of the inefficiency puzzle. In addition to examining existing agreements, the model used by the author serves as a baseline for modeling other concerns about nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION --- NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

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Militant groups often use violence, perversely, to gain attention and resources. In this book, the authors analyze how terrorist and rebel organizations compete with one another to secure funding and supporters. The authors develop a strategic model of competitive violence among militant groups and test the model's implications with statistical analysis and case studies. A series of model extensions allow the authors to incorporate the full range of strategic actors, focusing in particular on government efforts to counter and deter violence. The results indicate that the direct effects of competition are not as clear as they may seem, and interventions to alter competitive incentives may backfire if states are not careful. This is a timely contribution to a growing body of political economy research on militant group fragmentation, rivalry, fratricide and demonstrative violence.

Terrorism --- Endogenous growth (Economics) --- Competition. --- Political violence --- Terrorist organizations --- Public opinion. --- Prevention --- Social aspects. --- Decision making --- Mathematical models. --- Acts of terrorism --- Attacks, Terrorist --- Global terrorism --- International terrorism --- Political terrorism --- Terror attacks --- Terrorist acts --- Terrorist attacks --- World terrorism --- Direct action --- Insurgency --- Political crimes and offenses --- Subversive activities --- Terror --- Violence --- Competition --- Competition (Economics) --- Competitiveness (Economics) --- Economic competition --- Commerce --- Conglomerate corporations --- Covenants not to compete --- Industrial concentration --- Monopolies --- Open price system --- Supply and demand --- Trusts, Industrial --- Economic development --- Terror organizations --- Terrorist groups --- Associations, institutions, etc. --- Economic aspects