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Book
Optimal Mechanism to Fund the Development of Vaccines Against Emerging Epidemics
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Year: 2022 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Book
Microeconomic theory : basic principles and extensions
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ISBN: 9780324645088 9780324585377 0324645082 0324585373 Year: 2008 Publisher: Mason (OH): South-Western,

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Book
Microeconomic theory : basic principles and extensions
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ISBN: 9781305505797 1305505794 Year: 2016 Publisher: Boston, MA: Cengage learning,

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Microeconomics


Book
Theory and application of intermediate microeconomics
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ISBN: 9780324599497 0324599498 Year: 2010 Publisher: Mason (OH): South-Western/Cengage learning,

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Microeconomics


Digital
When Is Prevention More Profitable than Cure? The Impact of Time-Varying Consumer Heterogeneity
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Year: 2013 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We argue that in pharmaceutical markets, variation in the arrival time of consumer heterogeneity creates differences between a producer's ability to extract consumer surplus with preventives and treatments, potentially distorting R&D decisions. If consumers vary only in disease risk, revenue from treatments—sold after the disease is contracted, when disease risk is no longer a source of private information—always exceeds revenue from preventives. The revenue ratio can be arbitrarily high for sufficiently skewed distributions of disease risk. Under some circumstances, heterogeneity in harm from a disease, learned after a disease is contracted, can lead revenue from a treatment to exceed revenue from a preventative. Calibrations suggest that skewness in the U.S. distribution of HIV risk would lead firms to earn only half the revenue from a vaccine as from a drug. Empirical tests are consistent with the predictions of the model that vaccines are less likely to be developed for diseases with substantial disease-risk heterogeneity.


Digital
Preventives Versus Treatments Redux : Tighter Bounds on Distortions in Innovation Incentives with an Application to the Global Demand for HIV Pharmaceuticals
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Year: 2018 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Kremer and Snyder (2015) show that demand curves for a preventive and treatment may have different shapes though they target the same disease, biasing the pharmaceutical manufacturer toward developing the lucrative rather than the socially desirable product. This paper tightens the theoretical bounds on the potential deadweight loss from such biases. Using a calibration of the global demand for HIV pharmaceuticals, we demonstrate the dramatically sharper analysis achievable with the new bounds, allowing us to pinpoint potential deadweight loss at 62% of the global gain from curing HIV. We use the calibration to perform policy counterfactuals, assessing welfare effects of government policies such as a subsidy, reference pricing, and price-discrimination ban. The fit of our calibration is good: we find that a hypothetical drug monopolist would price an HIV drug so high that only 4% of the infected population worldwide would purchase, matching actual drug prices and quantities in the early 2000s before subsidies in low-income countries ramped up.


Digital
Worst-Case Bounds on R&D and Pricing Distortions : Theory with an Application Assuming Consumer Values Follow the World Income Distribution
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Year: 2018 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We prove that, for general demand and cost conditions and market structures, the fraction of first-best surplus that a monopolist is unable to extract in a market provides a tight upper bound on the relative distortions arising from firms' equilibrium decisions at all margins (entry and pricing). Continuing with this worst-case perspective, we show that a symmetrically truncated Zipf (STRZ) distribution of consumer values generates the lowest producer surplus among those with a given mean and maximum value. This allows us to relate potential deadweight loss from all margins in a market to the Zipf-similarity of its demand curve. The STRZ distribution also bounds deadweight loss at just the pricing margin. We leverage existing results from industrial organization (e.g., on demand curvature) and statistics (e.g., on the relation between means and medians) to bound producer surplus in an array of important special cases. Calibrations based on the world distribution of income generate extremely Zipf-similar demand curves, suggesting a large potential for deadweight loss in global markets. We gauge the extent to which various policies--such as progressive taxation or price discrimination--might ameliorate this potential deadweight loss.


Digital
Why are drugs more profitable than vaccines?
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Year: 2003 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. NBER

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Digital
An empirical study of pricing strategies in an online market with high-frequency price information
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Year: 2014 Publisher: Munich CESifo

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Digital
Open Access as a Crude Solution to a Hold-up Problem in the Two-Sided Market for Academic Journals
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Year: 2016 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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The move from traditional to open-access journals--which charge no subscription fees, only submission fees--is gaining support in academia. We analyze a two-sided-market model in which journals cannot commit to subscription fees when authors (who prefer low subscription fees because this boosts readership) make submission decisions. This leads to a hold-up problem, manifested as excessive subscription fees. Open access is a crude attempt to avoid hold up by eliminating subscription fees. We compare the efficiency and profitability of traditional versus open access under various market structures (monopoly, Bertrand competition) and extensions (non-profit journals, bundling, hybrid pricing), using our theoretical findings to understand the evolution of the market for academic journals in the Internet age.

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