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Book
How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies
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Year: 2011 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or Misperceptions?
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Party Influence in Congress and the Economy
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Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Partisan Impacts on the Economy: Evidence from Prediction Markets and Close Elections
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Year: 2006 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Prediction Markets for Economic Forecasting
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Year: 2012 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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Testing the Waters : Behavior across Participant Pools
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Year: 2018 Publisher: National Bureau of Economic Research

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Explaining the Favorite-Longshot Bias: Is it Risk-Love or Misperceptions?
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass National Bureau of Economic Research

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The favorite-longshot bias describes the longstanding empirical regularity that betting odds provide biased estimates of the probability of a horse winning—longshots are overbet, while favorites are underbet. Neoclassical explanations of this phenomenon focus on rational gamblers who overbet longshots due to risk-love. The competing behavioral explanations emphasize the role of misperceptions of probabilities. We provide novel empirical tests that can discriminate between these competing theories by assessing whether the models that explain gamblers' choices in one part of their choice set (betting to win) can also rationalize decisions over a wider choice set, including compound bets in the exacta, quinella or trifecta pools. Using a new, large-scale dataset ideally suited to implement these tests we find evidence in favor of the view that misperceptions of probability drive the favorite-longshot bias, as suggested by Prospect Theory.


Digital
Explaining the favorite-longshot bias: is it risk-love or misperception?
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Year: 2010 Publisher: Munich CESifo

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Overconfidence in Political Behavior
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Year: 2013 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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This paper studies, theoretically and empirically, the role of overconfidence in political behavior. Our model of overconfidence in beliefs predicts that overconfidence leads to ideological extremeness, increased voter turnout, and increased strength of partisan identification. Moreover, the model makes many nuanced predictions about the patterns of ideology in society, and over a person's lifetime. These predictions are tested using unique data that measure the overconfidence, and standard political characteristics, of a nationwide sample of over 3,000 adults. Our predictions, eight in total, find strong support in this data. In particular, we document that overconfidence is a substantively and statistically important predictor of ideological extremeness and voter turnout.


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The Right Type of Legislator : A Theory of Taxation and Representation
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Year: 2018 Publisher: Cambridge, Mass. National Bureau of Economic Research

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We develop a theory of taxation and the distribution of government spending in a citizen-candidate model of legislatures. Individuals are heterogeneous in two dimensions: productive ability in the private sector and negotiating ability in politics. When these are positively correlated, rich voters always prefer a rich legislator, but poor voters face a trade-off. A rich legislator will secure more pork for the district, but will also prefer lower taxation than the poor voter. Our theory organizes a number of stylized facts across countries about taxation and redistribution, parties, and class representation in legislatures. We demonstrate that spending does not necessarily increase when the number of legislators increases, as the standard common-pool intuition suggests, and that many policies aimed at increasing descriptive representation may have the opposite effect.

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