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Many managers and executives responsible for weapons acquisition, both in industry and the Department of Defense, argue that regulations are inhibiting the timely and economical development of weapon systems. This report presents quantitative analyses of the effects of regulations and controls on management practices and overall outcomes of weapons acquisition projects. The authors conclude that, on the basis of currently available information, it is not possible to correlate regulatory activity and program outcomes--no cause-and-effect relationships can be inferred
Defense industries --- Law and legislation --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Weapons systems. --- Procurement. --- Defenses --- Law and legislation.
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This study examines the role of prototypes in the contemporary environment of weapon system acquisition. The research draws on case studies of four systems (two Air Force airplanes and two Army helicopters) that were developed in the early 1970s and that used prototypes in various ways. These were compared with a broad range of acquisition programs that used other acquisition strategies. The objective of the study is to sharpen the understanding of advantages and disadvantages of prototyping and conditions under which its use may be advantageous. Section II presents an outline of the different kinds of prototypes, and the various objectives that might be sought in a prototype phase. The section concludes with a description of the analysis procedure, a summary of the four systems examined, and the source of data on nonprototype programs used for comparison. Section III summarizes the results of the research, and Sec. IV contains the conclusions. Four appendixes are attached, each describing one of the case studies.
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Surveys acquisition of 32 major weapon systems that entered full scale development during the 1970s. Changes occurred in both acquisition practice and program outcomes in response to policy initiatives introduced at the beginning of the decade. The amount of test information available at major decision points (DSARC milestones) increased substantially; the program manager's position was strengthened through better training, longer tenure, and better promotion prospects; and competition has increased, especially in the early phases of development. A typical program experienced cost growth of roughly 20 percent, slipped its schedule by just over 10 percent, and generally met its performance goals. Programs surveyed here equalled or surpassed a similar set of 1960s programs in schedule and performance goals and came closer to cost goals. Several promising ways are recommended for strengthening the present acquisition process and improving the quality of information that managers need to track and control ongoing programs.
Weapons systems --- Management. --- United States. --- Procurement. --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Weapons systems.
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Critics of weapon system acquisition frequently claim that management process changes during the 1960s and 1970s caused the acquisition cycle to lengthen. A review of three classes of aerospace systems--aircraft, missiles, and helicopters--shows that over the past 30 years the time from the beginning of full scale development to delivery of the first operational item has changed only slightly, but average production rates have fallen by half. The planning phase corresponding to today's Phase I (from Milestone I to Milestone II) has nearly doubled, and the introduction of Phase Zero may have added still more time, but evidence on Phase Zero effects is still tenuous. Opportunities for shortening the acquisition cycle time appear to lie mainly in flexible application of the regulations governing approval of the Mission Element Need Statement (MENS), and in some cases the Services should be allowed to proceed simultaneously with Phase Zero, and even Phase I, studies while the MENS is being reviewed.
United States --- Armed Forces --- Procurement. --- Weapons systems.
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The time required to divine and develop a new weapon system is an important element of the overall acquisition process. This study identifies the major factors controlling the pace of typical weapon acquisition programs and suggests reforms that may yield overall benefits through reduction of typical development time. Results of the analysis show that, although there are large variations in the duration of programs in each decade, the time to design and develop programs has apparently lengthened. There is no single, narrowly focused policy option that would reduce the length of the acquisition cycle. Rather, coordination of several different initiatives involving the cooperation of Department of Defense agencies and Congress is necessary. The authors found no strong association among the length of the plan, the factors affecting the plan, and the actual schedule outcome, suggesting that programs with fairly short plans can, in some circumstances, have successful schedule outcomes.
United States --- Armed Forces --- Procurement. --- Weapons systems.
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This study, by examining management practices and program outcomes associated with the acquisition of communication satellites by the Air Force and by the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), tests the contention that the commercial sector consistently manages acquisition programs better than the military. The study finds that the military and commercial programs are organized and managed in much the same way and that both produce well-functioning, useful spacecraft. Several significant differences in management practices and outcomes, however, suggest that the Air Force may be able to improve its acquisition activities. It concludes that, in carefully selected situations, there should be a place for the performance-oriented INTELSAT management practices.
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""Other Transactions"" authority provides the Department of Defense with the latest commercial market technologies while reducing the burden of an extensive procurement process to the contractor.
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This report has two objectives: (1) to record in some detail how the Cruise Missiles Project was organized and managed; and (2) to provide a preliminary evaluation of the management methods. Section II summarizes the project origins, including a review of cruise missile development before the formation of the joint office and how the Joint Cruise Missiles Project Office originated. Section III identifies the major management issues involved in the project and describes the management techniques used. Section IV presents the limited assessment of project outcomes that is possible at this time. Additional details are included in the appendixes, published separately as N-1989.
Cruise missiles. --- United States. --- History. --- United States --- Armed Forces --- Procurement --- History --- Case studies.
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It is frequently argued that Special Access Programs (SAPs) are more effectively and efficiently managed than their counterparts conducted in a more open environment. Unfortunately, such programs usually remain under tight security control, making it impossible to rigorously test the accuracy of the claims or to systematically identify and apply strategies and attributes to a wider variety of acquisition programs.
F-117 (Jet attack plane) --- Purchasing. --- United States. --- Procurement.
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